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Abstract

This thesis develops an account of human understanding on the basis of an analysis of
German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, and in relation to the thought of the
Kyoto School philosopher Watsuji Tetsurô. The aim is to describe shared human intelligibility as
founded upon a historical tradition and maintained by concrete practices, and yet as expressed
only by interpretive projections, and therefore always open to revision. An analysis of the
significance of anxiety and authenticity in Being and Time, as aspects of the existential
interpretive process of our lives, is accompanied by a philosophical description of everyday acts,
which finds that the world is interpreted in relation to the others with whom the world is coinhabited. This social relatedness between, on one hand, authentic, ‘individualized’
interpretation, and on the other hand, the everyday basis of intelligibility, is shown to support a
potentially radical philosophy of social transformation. The first half of the text discusses the
central significance of interpretation for Heidegger’s phenomenology, and argues for a reading
of authenticity as a contextual, practical and individualized project. The second half develops an
account of social existence in reference to Watsuji’s phenomenological ethics, and concludes
with an examination of social opposition movements and the revision of the ground of
intelligibility provided by a tradition and expressed in social practices.
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Introduction: Genealogy, Reflexivity, and Phenomenology

Nietzsche writes in The Dawn: “How did reason come into the world? As is fitting, in an
irrational manner, by accident. One will have to guess at it as a riddle.”1 In looking toward its
own origins, reason guesses at itself, finding in its fundamental self-reference a riddle that it
cannot overcome. If we turn toward our past, and identify that from which we emerged to be
‘irrational’ or purposeless, a constellation of accidents and contingent details, we can yet do so,
and consider legitimate such an understanding of these accidents and details, only insofar as we
‘posses’ reason. Reason, that on the basis of which such a discovery is first possible, seems in
that case to undermine its own legitimacy through its self-reference. On what basis can reason,
finding itself to have arisen from an ‘irrational’ history, being an accident itself, proclaim its
legitimacy? And yet, in the absence of such legitimacy, can reason even coherently make a claim
against its legitimacy? Reason, finding the ‘irrational’ as its foundation, encounters this riddle,
and can only ‘guess at it.’
In a section of The Order of Things titled “The Analytic of Finitude,” Foucault describes
the first appearance of ‘man’ through the episteme of modernity: “Man appears in his ambiguous
position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows; enslaved sovereign, observed
spectator.”2 ‘Man,’ that is, ‘appears’ as a subject-made-object, or an object-made-subject.
Knowledge, in the modern episteme, depends on a knower, who is also the object of ‘his’ own

1
2

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 81.
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 312.
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knowledge.3 Foucault identifies the subject here constituted as the necessary center of
knowledge; as the precondition for knowledge; but also as presenting limits to knowledge.4
In The Order of Things, one might identify the subject as a necessary presence, appearing
in the modern episteme as it emerged out of the classical episteme, for reasons that seem not
entirely arbitrary, but determined by contradictions implicit in the latter. But the modern
episteme creates only a new set of contradictions, in particular, in the dilemma of the subject as
both the initial condition and the limit of knowledge. The foundational self-understanding of this
subject confronts this dilemma: In its reflexivity, the subject objectifies itself, and so undermines
its own subjectivity; but it is only as subject that self-objectification is possible.
In Foucault’s genealogical analyses, he turns toward examinations of the history of
practices as constitutive of particular modes of subjectivity. In a statement of his methodology,
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault writes:
A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism, and knowledge will never confuse itself
with a quest for their ‘origins,’ will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of
history. On the contrary, it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany
every beginning; it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every
beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive to their petty malice.5
3

“By episteme, we mean . . . the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give
rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems.” Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of
Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 191.
4
Dreyfus and Rabinow explain this as follows: “Foucault thinks that the study of human beings took a decisive turn
as the end of the eighteenth century when human beings came to be interpreted as knowing subjects, and, at the
same time, objects of their own knowledge. This Kantian interpretation defines ‘man.’ Kant introduced the idea that
man is that unique being who is totally involved in nature (his body), society (historical, economic, and political
relations), and language (his mother tongue), and who at the same time finds a firm foundation for all of these
involvements in his meaning-giving, organizing activity.” Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), xix.
5
Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” In Michel Foucault: Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed.
D. F. Bouchard (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 80. Regarding the motivation of his genealogical
accounts, Foucault writes: “The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free
thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.” The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of the
History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 5. The question of how thinking one’s history can transform
thinking, by making that which is implicit in thought explicit to thought, expresses the issue presented in this
introduction.
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Such a genealogy is itself an expression precisely of Nietzsche’s riddle, of reason finding its own
origins in the irrational, and guessing at that. It represents the perturbation of reason—the selfdisruption of reason—in which reason manifests its own capacity toward the end of undermining
its legitimacy. But the reflexive self-interrogation of reason by which reason challenges its
legitimacy even itself presupposes that reason has the legitimacy to challenge its own legitimacy.
What capacity allows the individual interpreter to identify herself as the product of
historical contingencies, of discipline, of power, and to what end does this capacity serve? Is the
“riddle” identified by Nietzsche—reason’s discovery of its own ground in the irrational—only an
‘absence’ that perturbs reason, and sets it against itself? We might ask: is reason which has thus
identified itself, which is perturbed, the same as reason which has not identified its descent? And
is there something ‘worthwhile’ in this ‘discovery,’ or perturbation? Foucault offers, perhaps
conspicuously, no direct reply to these questions in his genealogical analysis Discipline and
Punish.
That absence might haunt us, as we are perhaps haunted by the absence in the ‘center’ of
“Las Meninas.”6 But, into this absence, it seems that no subject of knowledge can again step
forward. It is not framed, as in “Las Meninas,” by ‘representation’ which calls forth a subject
who represents. It is, rather, framed by practices, by the contingencies of history: and they frame
that which they constituted, but also that which examines the frame. The subject was constituted
by a history of practices ‘directed’ in their development by no transcendental or even consistent
6

Foucault examines in the first chapter of The Order of Things “Las Meninas,” a painting by Velázquez. For
Foucault, it represents representation. Foucault discusses the content of the painting as indicating all of the modes of
Classical representation: “representation undertakes to represent itself here in all its elements, with its images, the
eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being.” Michel Foucault, The
Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1994), 16. That to which all attention is directed—the attention of a
painter, pausing to examine his subjects; the gaze of a child; the reflection of a mirror—is an ‘absence:’ the ‘subject’
of the painting is absent except as it is reflected and signified by the gazes contained within the frame of the image.
That which is not represented is the subject itself: the subject represented, and for whom representation is possible.
The absence is that of the modern subject, about to be called forth in the modern episteme, as the being for whom
representation is possible.

4
immanent telos, but in relation to historical contingencies and accidents. It is, of course, that
same constituted subject which discovers its own genealogy.
There are a few directions that we might here take toward understanding this subject that
has the capacity to uncover such a genealogy of its own constitution. First, we might suppose
that the ontology of the subject is not exhausted by the effect of historical conditions through
which it has ‘passed:’ The subject can be identified as attaining substantiality through some
aspect of its constitution that is not defined by its historical situation. This might be a
transcendental essence or capacity, or a more provincial notion of ‘the human’ as a biologically
defined, but relatively stable category. Although there are many possible identifications of the
subject that would fit this definition, we might as well identify it as an assertion of the modern
subject. In taking such a view one confronts Foucault directly, and simply rejects his premises.7
There

is a second general approach to this question of the constituted subject’s ‘capacity’

for identifying and responding to its genealogy. We simply forget about grounding the subject, or
discovering in it any subsisting essence and rather extend our genealogy and follow it directly
into our immediate present. We ask, therefore, what does this sort of discourse with which
Foucault is engaged do, what sort of practice is this, and what are its consequences? To restate in
different terms the question above asked about reason: Is the subject who questions her
genealogy—who confronts this riddle—indeed the same as the subject who does not? Perhaps,
by asking this, we are no longer quite engaged in genealogy. We are, rather, considering the
immediate consequences of the genealogical method itself. What sort of ‘subjects’ are

7

Regarding this Foucault states, unambiguously: “Nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to
serve as the basis for self-recognition of for understanding other men. The traditional devices for constructing a
comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be
systematically dismantled.” “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 87-88.
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constituted by the methodology of genealogy? Might we be reconstituted through the
genealogical method?
We face the riddle posed by Nietzsche: we are confronted by the dilemma of ‘reason’
identifying its ‘non-rational’ foundation. What does it mean to guess at this riddle? Perhaps not
simply nothing, to find nothing, but—in guessing, and not solving—to make a discovery that is,
yet, not an answer. Supposing that the riddle is legitimately foundational—an irresolvable
riddle—to guess at it might still have some productive consequence. In guessing at the riddle, we
discover that we cannot catch hold of ourselves. We find ourselves split: There is that which is
questioning itself, and the questioned. The former can never ‘catch up’ with itself, but finds itself
in a relation of ekstasis to its own foundation, which it observes, even as it identifies it as its
foundation. This is the dilemma of reason identifying its non-rational ground, and guessing at
that riddle; and it is the dilemma that Foucault presents as the foundational dilemma that it is. We
confront here the conspicuous absence in Foucault’s genealogy, into which we might have, first,
naively, hoped for some subject ‘beyond the genealogically constituted subject’ to step.
We ought to wonder, considering the oppressive power of the institutionalized practices
that Foucault identifies, what might allow for the transformation of these institutions. If it is the
case that our self-understanding is always already established by a history of discourses and
practices, on what basis can we identify and respond to those practices: how can they be
transformed? We must identify some ‘capacity’ for reflexivity, through which the subject that
arose from a history of practices can reflexively relate to those practices in such a way that opens
a space for their transformation. But where might we find the locus of reflexivity? If it is not to
be found in any subject standing both within and beyond its historical situation—a subsisting

6
entity that can be defined as having the capacity for reflexivity—how can such reflexivity be
situated?
I suggest that a phenomenological approach to this question can reveal something
significant. The ‘riddle’ of reflexivity, which is revealed by genealogy, has a positive
phenomenological appearance. It is discovered precisely in Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein. But
does not even the concept of Dasein describe an entity that has some determinate form persisting
beyond its particular historical, social situation? Is not even this bare notion that ‘Being-in-aworld’ has certain existential characteristics, only a residue of the modern subject; only, even,
the most subtle essence of the subject?
Further, perhaps as a consequence of this, does Being and Time present Dasein in any
deep phenomenological relation to others, and indicate how it can transform the practices that
constitute these relations? Is not Dasein, as a being which ‘is,’ defined somehow ‘as it is’ in a
way which is ‘beyond’ the particular relations in which it exists, the discourse from which it
attains some self-understanding, and the practices in which it is engaged?
To address this, I will present a reading of Heidegger which first takes up his ‘question of
the meaning of Being,’ and reexamines what it means for something to ‘be.’ I will develop an
account of Heidegger’s phenomenology which shows that the phenomenological and
hermeneutical dimensions of his thought are mutually interdependent to such an extent that what
it means for something to ‘be’ is always for it to be as something, which is, for it to be
interpreted. This is the case no less for Dasein—the being for whom there ‘is’ Being—than for
any other beings within the world. Dasein ‘is’ only ‘as’ it is interpreted, and nothing else besides;
but, it is itself the interpreter of its own Being.

7
Heidegger presents interpretation as not a strictly conceptual activity: “The primordial
‘as’ of an interpretation which understands circumspectively we call the ‘existentialhermeneutical ‘as’’ in distinction from the ‘apophantical ‘as’’ of the assertion.”8 Something can
be ‘understood’ ‘as’ something in its use, which is an ‘interpretation’ that is not conceptual, or
theoretical: A pen is ‘interpreted’ in writing. In examining theoretically this activity of writing,
in which the pen is ‘circumspectively’ interpreted, we are engaged in another mode of
interpretation, in which we seek a ‘thematic’ account. There are many ‘levels’ of interpretation
and understanding, between the most circumspect or everyday (such as using something as
something), and the most conceptually abstract (such as ontological interpretation).9 The
significance of asserting that these different activities are modes of interpretation is that each can
be understood as expressing the reflexivity which is foundational to Dasein’s way of Being, and
which is not merely, or initially, conceptual reflexivity.
Being and Time represents through and through an asking of the question of the meaning
of Being. And Dasein is nothing other than, or beyond, the finite position from which any
understanding and interpretation is possible. Therefore, the concept of Dasein can be
distinguished from that of the subject, as the subject is only as it understood in a distinct way,
and Dasein—Being in the world, as a finite interpretive position—is the condition even for the
possibility of any concept of a subject. Where we would seek some concept of the subject that

8

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row,
1962), 201.
9
“Between the kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in concernful understanding and the extreme
opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand, there are many intermediate gradations:
assertions about the happenings in the environment, accounts of the ready-to-hand, ‘reports on the Situation,’ the
recording and fixing of the ‘facts of the case,’ the description of a state of affairs, the narration of something that has
befallen. We cannot trace back these ‘sentences’ to theoretical statements without essentially perverting their
meaning. Like the theoretical statements themselves, they have their ‘source’ in circumspective interpretation.”
Being and Time, 201.
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can provide a ground for the capacity for reflexivity, we have already overlooked that which is
most phenomenologically ‘immediate.’
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology should be understood as uncovering that which is
phenomenologically primordial, and this is precisely interpretation. We are, that is, always
already engaged in interpretation, on the basis of some understanding, as soon as we identify,
through, for instance, use or conceptual reference, ‘something as something.’ The ‘capacity’ for
reflexivity is therefore, from a phenomenological perspective, that which least needs to be
demonstrated as the capability of some being (a subject) which persists through and beyond the
practices that define it.
The ‘riddle’ of reflexivity, that which is revealed by the most fundamental reflexive selfreference, as it is exemplified by the position of the genealogist seeking conceptually or
‘thematically’ to uncover her own foundations, appears phenomenologically, in its most
primordial form, as anxiety. It is an interpreting being’s existential interpretation of itself, as
finitely situated, and yet as the only basis for an understanding of Being. Heidegger identifies
this as ‘individuating;’ but, what precisely is individuated? Is it the ‘self’? If so, can we find here
evidence that Heidegger’s account, insofar as we take his presentation of authenticity as essential
to his overall project, fails to provide a basis for an adequate social phenomenology?
I maintain, rather, that authentic Dasein is nothing other than authentic interpretive
activity: that is, interpretation from a position which has turned back toward and interpreted
itself, and identified its own finitude. Authenticity, understood thusly, is by no means the
‘individuating’ of a subjective self. As the analytic of Dasein constitutes fundamental ontology,
interpretive activity is the phenomenological precondition for any such ‘ontic’ notion of a ‘self,’
and this as much as of ‘community.’ The significance of that which authenticity uncovers is that

9
any such understanding is as an interpretation from a particular, finite position. Further, the
notion of authenticity in no way merely represents a distinct ‘existentialist’ aspect of Being and
Time, separable from the analysis of the everyday in Division I, but is an essential dimension of
the work, which illustrates, fundamentally, what Dasein ‘is.’
Dasein is the basis for social phenomenology. The relationship between the individual
and society can be approached phenomenologically only from an interpretive perspective, the
examination of which constitutes fundamental ontology. Heidegger does gesture toward social
phenomenology, but it remains undeveloped in Being and Time. Not, however, because of any
essential incompatibilities between his approach and a more robust social phenomenology.
My analysis of Being and Time will be followed by the development of an account of
social phenomenology in reference to the Kyoto School philosopher Watsuji, whose Ethics in
Japan responded to Being and Time and provided an account of sociality as phenomenologically
primordial. I will present Dasein as the interpretive position which is the foundation for social
phenomenology, but argue that this does not place the ‘ontic’ individual in a position of
phenomenological priority.
The account of social phenomenology to be developed here will aim to present
individuality and community as interdependent, as mutually determining, such that neither can
be identified as having ontological priority over the other. However, because both ‘community’
and ‘individuality’ are only as they are interpreted from a finite interpretive position—Dasein—
the reformation of social practices is possible always through the revised interpretation, the
revaluation, of community and individuality. As tradition and ‘community,’ the living
expression of tradition, are the basis of intelligibility—the basis upon which any understanding
of anything is first possible—it is ‘from’ the understanding that Dasein first has, as received from
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the tradition, that a projected reinterpretation is possible. This reinterpretation is therefore a
revaluation which does not project itself ‘out of’ the tradition and community, but into it as a
revised interpretation of the tradition and a reformation of community. The basis of the
possibility for social existence is also the basis of the possibility for its transformation.
I have two very general aims that correspond with the two halves of the following:
Chapters one through three present a reading of Being and Time as providing a suitable
foundation for social phenomenology, which yet takes individual reflexivity as a starting point.
The first chapter examines the question of the meaning of Being, as the starting point of
ontology, and as that which leads to the analytic of Dasein, as the perspective from which the
question of Being is asked; the second examines interpretation generally; and the third argues
that authenticity is a certain mode of interpretation. In the second half, parts four through six, I
present an account of social phenomenology along with a discussion of the significance of the
concept of authenticity and the possibility of social transformation. Chapter four argues that what
is most phenomenologically immediate in everyday ways of Being is not the individual self, but
relatedness, as expressed in practices; chapter five argues that the phenomenology of social
relatedness does not constitute fundamental ontology, nor can it take its place, as even everyday
social acts are interpretative and must be placed in relation to particular interpretive perspectives,
which are foundational; chapter six further discusses reflexivity and social transformation.
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I. Preliminary Notes on the Question of the Meaning of Being

1.

The question posed and the problem of under-standing

Has a more obscure question ever been asked, than what ‘Being’ ‘is’? Perhaps, at least, a
more opaque question cannot be posed. If that were so, might we consider the question, and at
least learn something about opacity? If ‘Being’ resists ‘thematic’ conceptualization more than
anything else to which we may direct our attention, this is perhaps because it is that which is
always and most ‘immediately’ understood already; if, in fact, it can be said that it is
‘understood’ at all. Indeed, as Heidegger has formulated the question, there is ‘nothing’ which
could ‘stand’ under it. Heidegger presents the most foundational question, which seems to have
been always already answered, and perhaps without ever having first been asked.
On one hand, it might be said that Being is never in need of being ‘understood:’ Rather, it
addresses ‘that which is,’ and ‘is,’ somehow distinct from the understanding that it ‘is.’ In other
words, following this notion, there is no particular understanding involved in recognizing that
‘something is,’ aside from the way that it is understood as it is—and this latter understanding of
something as a particular something, distinct from the fact that something is understood at all, is
the only issue with which we can be concerned. It can be asked what it means for this or that
particular thing to be, for a person to be, or whether there is a primordial ‘substance’ of which
everything is ‘composed,’ or a God from which all was brought ‘into’ Being, but the ‘question of
Being’ as such is incoherent.
But the question of the meaning of Being is not an inquiry regarding (only) the existence
of particular beings, but seeks to find what it means for (any) beings ‘to be’ at all. And so, on the
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other hand, it might be supposed that there is something significant about, or some particular
understanding involved in recognizing, the fact that something ‘is’ at all, aside from or ‘over and
above’ the particular recognition of something as a specific something-or-other.
In the first case, in which the notion of Being serves only to identify this or that, ‘as’ this
or that, and yet has no essential significance of its own, it can be said that there is no question of
the meaning of Being beyond asking what this or that in particular is. In the second case, in
which ‘Being’ is considered to have some significance itself—that is, as the ‘bare fact’ of
something Being at all aside from the particular way that something is (what it is, where it is,
why it is, etc.)—the meaning of Being ‘in general’ can be taken as a subject of inquiry. Either
approach overlooks the significance of the question as it has been posed, and each by
overlooking the relation between ‘meaning’ and ‘Being.’
“Being is always the Being of an entity [of a particular being].”10 That is, there is no
Being ‘beyond’ the particular beings which ‘are.’ Any determinate conceptual significance given
to Being—any notion of Being as beyond but determining of beings—will deliver the question
into the hands of a metaphysics which ‘looks away’ from beings.11 The question of the meaning
10

Being and Time, 29.
In his “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger identifies metaphysics as the result of a misunderstanding of what he
defines as the ‘ontological difference’ between beings (the particular beings which are found in the world) and
Being. “Metaphysics does indeed represent beings in their Being, and so it thinks the Being of beings. But it does
not think the difference of both. Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of Being itself.” Basic Writings, ed. David
Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 226. Therefore, because it does not ‘think the
difference’ between Being and beings, a metaphysical position can claim for itself absolute truth, truth that is always
derived from beings and then applied to Being as a totality. For instance, because in a certain way of looking, beings
appear as constituted by ‘substance,’ Being itself might be identified as ‘substantiality.’ Yet, at the same time that
‘Being’ is always ‘the Being of an entity,’ “Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of
Dasein’s Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation.”
Being and Time, 62. The significance of this ‘individuation’ will be addressed below. The transcendens which
‘Being is,’ and its connection to the ‘radical individuation’ of Dasein, are both to be understood in reference to an
account of Being as intelligibility in general, and to Dasein as the interpreting being for which something can be
identified (is intelligible as) something. “Entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are
disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But
Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being
belongs. Hence Being can be something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood.” Being
and Time, 228. This understanding of Being which is unconceptualized is that which constitutes ‘pre-ontological’
11
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of Being asks what it means for beings to be, yet without supposing that there is some
metaphysically determinate way which all beings necessarily are.
It might be suggested, in accordance with the first position noted above, that what ‘is’ is
a matter initially distinct from understanding, only acknowledged by linguistic reference: it
cannot be asked what it ‘means,’ in general, for anything ‘to be,’ but only how we arrive at the
knowledge that this or that does actually exist. In this case, the question “What is Being” turns
the most empty signifier back upon itself as though it contains some conceptual significance: a
tautological question with no content, a boneless ouroboros.
If the bare notion that ‘this or that’ ‘is’ has no abstract significance, it means that ‘this or
that’ exists always ‘as’ ‘this or that,’ and that the, perhaps implicit, ‘as’ holds all of the
significance.12 If one says “there is a stone,” what it means for something to be a stone could be
evaluated: The speaker has some ‘criteria’ for identifying ‘a stone’ as a stone. ‘Stone’ can signify
some particular set of entities in the world, and so is a formalizable. The only additional
significance that the bare ‘fact’ that it ‘is’ has is situational: A stone is ‘on’ a path; it is ‘not’ a
clump of dirt. But, to continue this line of reasoning, the fact that it ‘is,’ distinct from what it is,
and where it is, cannot possibly mean anything.
The most concise formulation of the question is also the most apparently problematic:
“What is Being?” Its form seems to demonstrate that the question cannot be asked without
presupposing its answer. Here it is apparent that the question of the meaning of Being has a
circular form.
understanding; ontological understanding, on the other hand, involves the conceptualization, or thematization, of
pre-ontological understanding. This distinction is examined in detail below.
12
“The primordial ‘as’ of interpretation which understands circumspectively we call the ‘existential-hermeneutical
‘as’’ in distinction from the ‘apophantical’ ‘as’’ of the assertion.” Being and Time, 201. This “primordial ‘as’”
refers to the fundamental interpreting which is Dasein’s way of Being, as having an understanding of Being. It is
‘primordial’ because it defines the way that any being in the world can appear; therefore the examination of the
existential-hermeneutical ‘as’ (what it means for something to appear as something: that is, for it to ‘be’) constitutes
fundamental ontology, and is oriented toward the ‘analytic of Dasein.’
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2.

Questioning and circularity

But, Heidegger notes: “In the question of the meaning of Being there is no ‘circular
reasoning’ but rather a ‘remarkable relatedness backward or forward’ which what we are asking
about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an entity.”13 This entity, which
stands in a particular relation to the question of the meaning of Being, is Dasein—a being that is
‘there,’ in the world. Heidegger begins his preparatory analysis of the question with an
examination of this being, for which Being is an issue.14 The question of the meaning of Being
not only must begin with an analysis of the being which can ask the question, but, further, the
question is “the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein
itself.”15
In other words, only Dasein can ask the question of the meaning of Being; the asking of
that question is a particular way of Being for Dasein; and the question addresses the Being of that
being who asks it. As Heidegger writes in “What is Metaphysics:” “Every metaphysical question
can be asked only in such a way that the questioner as such is present together with the
13

Being and Time, 28. Italics mine. “It is quite impossible for there to be any ‘circular argument’ in formulating the
question about the meaning of Being; for in answering this question, the issue is not one of grounding something by
such a derivation; it is rather one of laying bare the grounds for it and exhibiting them.” Ibid. Also, see especially
sections 31 and 32 of Being and Time, in which Heidegger examines the circular structure of understanding.
Commenting on Being and Time, Derrida writes: “If one looks closely, it is the phenomenological opposition
‘implicit/explicit’ that permits Heidegger to reject the objection of the vicious circle, the circle that consists of first
determining a [particular] being in its Being, and then of posing the question of Being on the basis of this
ontological predetermination.” “The Ends of Man” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1982), 126. Gadamer writes: “What Heidegger is working out here is not primarily a prescription
for the practice of understanding, but a description of the way interpretive understanding is achieved. The point of
Heidegger’s hermeneutical reflection is not so much to prove that there is a circle as to show that this circle
possesses an ontologically positive significance . . . The process that Heidegger describes is that every revision of
the fore-projection is capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning.” Truth and Method trans. Joel
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004), 269.
14
“Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact
that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, and
this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a relationship which itself is one of
Being.” Being and Time, 32.
15
Being and Time, 35.
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question.”16 The question of the meaning of Being can only be asked by a being that is ‘in the
world:’ a particular being which ‘is’ always already in some determinate way—a way which
involves having an understanding of its Being. Asking explicitly the question of Being is a mode
(a radicalization) of the way of Being of the being which asks the question.
The understanding which Dasein always already has, is designated by the phrase ‘preontological;’ the understanding sought by the explicitly posed question of the meaning of Being
is ‘ontological.’17 Ontology, which seeks to obtain a ‘concept’ of Being, is an extension of preontology. Each is an ‘understanding of Being:’ the former a thematization of the latter. The
‘relatedness backward or forward’ involved in the question of the meaning of Being is that
between Dasein’s Being (which involves having an understanding of Being) and the explicit
asking of the question of Being. To ask the question of what it means ‘to be’ is to be in a certain
way.
The way that the question is (pre-ontologically) ‘answered’ is the way that Dasein
understands its own Being; ‘asking the question’ is a mode of interpretation that ‘takes up’ preontological understanding and opens it for revision. To ask the question of the meaning of Being
is to ask the question as a being who ‘is’ and for which therefore the question has already been
answered in some way. It is only on the basis of being in some particular way that the question
can be asked, and asking the question is a way of Being for the being who asks the question. This
describes the relatedness backward or forward between Dasein and the question of the meaning
of Being.
16

Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1993), 93.
17
“Dasein is ontically ‘closest’ to itself and ontologically farthest; but pre-ontologically it is surely not a stranger.”
Being and Time, 37. Dasein is ontically ‘closest’ to itself because it ontically is itself. It is ontologically farthest
from itself, because its most difficult interpretive task is to interpret itself, or, as the ‘clearing’ in which beings
appear, there is no clearing beyond Dasein in which Dasein can appear to itself. And Dasein is ‘not a stranger’ preontologically because it is as what it is in all of its worldly acts (of pre-ontological interpretation).
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3.

Finitude and the opacity of the question

The ouroboros revealed by the question of Being does indeed have ‘bones’ (conceptual
content): they are constituted precisely by the particularity of the being who asks the question, its
finitude.18 Beings can only ‘be’ ‘as they are’ for a being that is finite and particular. The question
of the meaning of Being has always been answered in a particular way by the being who can ask
the question. The question ‘What is Being?’ appears ‘transparent,’ empty in its circularity only
because Being has already been understood in a certain way. Being, placed into a relation with
itself in the question, is distinct, particular and finitely situated. ‘Being’ is least of all an empty
signifier—Being ‘is’ always as particular beings are understood in a certain way by a finite,
interpreting being.
However, Being is the foundation of all intelligibility. To ask the question of the meaning
of Being is to look for ‘the meaning’ of that which is the possibility of all meaning. Or, it is to
attempt to make intelligible that which allows all else to be intelligible. What is the meaning of
Being? But all meaning depends first on Being, as the foundation of intelligibility.
Therefore, the question is ‘opaque.’ It is the most opaque question, because it relates that
which is the basis of all clarity to itself, such that there is no more expansive clearing upon
which the question of the meaning of Being can be positioned. Being, as ‘clearing,’ or the
foundation of intelligibility upon which all phenomena appear, is founded upon nothing more
fundamental than the Being of Dasein, which is a finite, particular being. This opacity has
existential significance in Dasein’s encounter with its own Being, in anxiety, which is Dasein’s

18

The relationship between the particularity and finitude of Dasein is defined by this interdependence: Dasein is a
particular being (as thrown, existing in a certain social and historical context, itself defined in a specific way, and
having a perspective which is only its own), because it is finite (as ‘being towards death’). These attributes of
Dasein are discussed further below.
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discovery of its primordial interpretive relation to Being, and this, as founded upon Dasein’s own
finite particularity.

4.

Methodological comments on phenomenology and hermeneutics

Heidegger’s methodology for approaching the question of the meaning of Being is
phenomenology, a method which aims directly at the ‘things themselves.’19 This methodology,
which Heidegger employs to uncover beings in their ‘essence’—what they are ‘as’ they are—
will be discussed explicitly below, but only following a discussion of hermeneutics, for which it
will have ‘implicit’ relevance. Heidegger’s phenomenological method can be distinguished from
Husserl’s in part because the phenomena which it uncovers are hermeneutically situated.20 The
phenomenological essence of a being, what it is as it is, is always what it is for the being from
which phenomenology begins—Dasein. As the phenomenological essence of Dasein is its
understanding, everything which ‘is,’ is as it is understood. But as will be shown, this
understanding is not fundamentally or initially ‘conceptual,’ or theoretical. It is carried through
all of the ways that Dasein is (in its ‘ways of Being’), which includes but is not limited to
conceptual understanding.

19

“The term ‘phenomenology’ expresses a maxim which can be formulated as ‘To the things themselves!’ It is
opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which
only seem to have been demonstrated.” Being and Time, 50.
20
“Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in
interpretation. . . . The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word,
where it designates this business of interpreting. But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the
basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities
which do not have the character of Dasein, this hermeneutic also becomes a ‘hermeneutic’ in the sense of working
out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends. . . . ‘hermeneutic,’ as an
interpretation of Dasein’s Being, has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and
this is the sense which is philosophically primary.” Being and Time, 62.
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The following chapter will examine what it means for Dasein to have understanding as its
phenomenological essence, and will thereby explicate fundamental hermeneutics as the
foundation for the chapters that follow. The phenomenological method will be implicit in the
next chapters, which seek to define Dasein’s hermeneutic essence, and show how it is carried
through every way that Dasein is; phenomenology will be taken up more explicitly, as social
phenomenology, after a discussion of hermeneutics, in an analysis which will extend and offer
corrections to Heidegger’s phenomenology, with the aim of further developing an ontological
interpretation of Dasein.
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II. Being as Intelligibility and Significance: Ontological and Pre-Ontological Interpretation

1.

Interpretation, understanding, and projection

What the question of Being reveals as the starting point of ontology is the essence of
Dasein’s Being, as ontological.21 The thematic development of the concept of Being is only a
development (a ‘radicalization’) of Dasein’s way of Being, which is to have an understanding of
its Being. What Dasein is, is its understanding of Being.22 The essence of Dasein is not divided
between ‘something that is’ on one hand, and the self-understanding of that ‘something’ on the
other.23 The concept of Dasein primordially refers not to a being which has the ‘capacity’ of
understanding itself, but to a being which ‘is,’ as its essence, its understanding. And its way of
Being is interpretive.
Ontological interpretation is, therefore, an interpretation of interpretation. This means to
examine: the genealogy of how Being has been understood ontologically (‘the task of destroying
the history of ontology’); how it is understood pre-ontologically (as the everyday way of Being
of Dasein); and how either understanding is both the basis for and product of interpretation.
21

“Dasein is itself ‘ontological,’ because existence is thus determinative for it.” Being and Time, 34.
“In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which,
in its very Being, it somehow understands.” Being and Time, 69. As will be discussed below, Dasein’s ‘possibilities’
are always the possibilities which it understands itself to have. Dasein ‘is’ as it understands itself. It can ‘cover’ its
own possibilities, which means, fundamentally, that it can cover its own interpretive way of Being.
23
“Ontologically, every idea of a ‘subject’—unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic
character—still posits the subjectum along with it, no matter how vigorous one’s ontical protestations against the
‘soul substance’ or the ‘reification of consciousness.’” Being and Time, 72. “But if the Self is conceived ‘only’ as a
way of Being of this entity, this seems tantamount to volatizing the real ‘core’ of Dasein. Any apprehensiveness
however which one may have about this gets its nourishment from the perverse assumption that the entity in
question has at bottom the kind of Being which belongs to something present-at-hand, even if one is far from
attributing to it the solidity of an occurrent corporeal Thing. Yet man’s ‘substance’ is not spirit as a synthesis of soul
and body; it is rather existence.” Ibid., 153. Dasein is a ‘self’ as a way of its Being, which means that Dasein’s self is
constituted by the self-understanding which Dasein maintains. As a phenomenological starting point for an
investigation of ‘self,’ Dasein is the interpretive position from which ‘oneself’ can be in a certain way, as one
understands oneself. Any ‘substance’ which defines the subject has always already been interpretively posited, and
so presupposes Dasein.
22
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The understanding that Dasein has of Being is not something which is merely ‘received’
from a tradition. Dasein ‘is’ its understanding, which is both the beginning and end of Dasein’s
way of Being, as interpreting. The ‘pre-ontological’ understanding of Being, which is the starting
point of ontological interpretation, is an interpretation of Being on the basis of the tradition.
What Dasein ‘is,’ is not determined by its tradition; rather, Dasein exists as its own
understanding, which is always an interpretation of tradition. Dasein relates itself to
(understands itself in terms of) a tradition as it relates itself to (understands itself in terms of) its
world. In each case, Dasein relates to itself and its world interpretively.
What it means, existentially, to be in a world, is to have an interpretive understanding of
the world. Being-there means having an understanding, and interpreting. The question of the
meaning of Being is both the most immediate, and the most circuitous question: immediate,
because in everyday practices, that meaning is always already in play—the question is answered
by every particular interpretation, which express (projects) an understood meaning of Being; it is
circuitous, because the path by which question is approached thematically, for the purpose of
explicating an ontology, moves through recursive interpretive circles. The ‘initial,’ or everyday
circle of pre-ontological interpretation (Being in the world), is interpreted thematically, in
relation to existing ontological concepts, with the aim of attaining ontological understanding.24

24

The methodological hermeneutic task which aims at a thematization of pre-ontological interpretation, must take
the form presented by Gadamer: “The hermeneutical task becomes itself a questioning of things and is always in part
so defined. This places hermeneutic work on a firm basis. A person trying to understand something will not resign
himself from the start to relying on his own accidental fore-meanings, ignoring as consistently and stubbornly as
possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently audible that it breaks through what the
interpreter imagines it to be.” Truth and Method, 271. As will be discussed below, the questioning of things is
particularly difficult in the case of ontological interpretation, as that which is questioned is exactly the background
understanding which is generally ‘implicit,’ and taken for granted, as the practices and discourses of a particular
tradition. This is why Heidegger states that: “Dasein’s kind of Being thus demands that any ontological
Interpretation which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality, should capture the Being
of this entity, in spite of this entity’s own tendency to cover things up. Existential analysis, therefore, constantly has
the character of doing violence, whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its
tranquilized obviousness.” Being and Time, 359.
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To ‘be there’ is to have an understanding of the world, which is both the ‘starting point’
and the ‘end’ of interpretation. This relationship between interpretation and understanding is
designated by ‘projection.’25 Interpretation is ‘projected understanding.’ To ‘be there’ is to
understand, and to interpret on the basis of that understanding. There is always already an
understanding; However, this understanding is not ‘static,’ or fixed, but is the basis for
interpretation, through which understanding is revised. In other words, there is a background of
intelligibility, which is a condition for the possibility of the appearance of beings in a world (for
something to be something); but this background is not merely ‘there:’ it exists as the
‘beginning’ and ‘end’ of interpretation. The background is continuously reshaped and
transformed through interpretation.

2.

Interpretation as projected understanding

Before a book has even been opened, the reader has some expectation of what the text
will mean. Perhaps this expectation is determined by the title of the book, or by the place where
it was found, or the person from whom it was received. Even if the book had no visible title, this
itself would create some distinct expectation, though that expectation might be colored by
perplexity (that here is a book with no title). And there is a bare expectation produced by the fact,
alone, there here is a ‘book.’ So, a book is opened with at least some vague but perhaps very
distinct expectation of its meaning. It might be suggested that, as this expectation will ‘influence’
the interpretation of the text, it should be ‘put aside,’ ‘bracketed,’ or somehow prevented from

25

“Why does the understanding—whatever may be the essential dimensions of that which can be disclosed in it—
always press forward into possibilities? It is because the understanding itself has the existential structure which we
call ‘projection.’ With equal primordiality the understanding projects Dasein’s Being both upon its ‘for-the-sake-ofwhich’ and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world.” Being and Time, 185.
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influencing the reading. This is, of course, naïve: What is the appropriate extent of this
‘bracketing’? Need we only put aside expectation based on our knowledge of the author (based
on, say, a previous familiarity with her work); should we also ignore what we know about the
genre to which the book belongs? Or must we even forget our expectations about what any book
might say, or what can be said in this or that language?
It is the case, rather, that any understanding to be arrived at will depend not on a
bracketing of ‘presumptions,’ but a ‘back and forth’ movement between those ‘presumptions’
and the text as it is read: an ongoing revision of understanding.26 There is, therefore, an
‘understanding’ of the text, which is always initially available, even before the first words have
been read.27 But, this understanding (what the text ‘is;’ what it ‘means’), though it is present
immediately, is not fixed. It is brought forth in interpretation, the first act of which is opening the
text (any consideration of the text), and through this it is revised. Regarding this, Gadamer
writes:
The process that Heidegger describes is that every revision of the fore-projection is
capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning; rival projects can
emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of the meaning is;
interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones.
This constant process of new projection constitutes the movement of understanding
and interpretation.28

26

Gadamer writes: “A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the
text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because
he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection,
which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is
there.” Truth and Method, 269.
27
“Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having,
fore-sight, and fore-conception. An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented
to us. . . . In an interpretive approach there lies such an assumption, as that which has been ‘taken for granted’ with
the interpretation as such—that is to say, as that which has been presented in our fore-having, our fore-sight, and our
fore-conception.” Being and Time, 191.
28
Truth and Method, 269.
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To read the text is to interpret it on the basis of an understanding of what it says, which is
continuously revised. This interpretive process is defined by projection: an understanding is
‘projected’ upon the text, and is revised through the process of reading. A text can only be
approached with some (‘fore-’)understanding of what it means, but to read a text—to interpret
it—is to project an understanding provisionally, and to revise it continuously.29

3.

The hermeneutic circle

Any interpretation is a projection on the basis of some understanding, through which that
understanding is brought into play (in relation to something which is understood) such that it
may be revised. This describes the hermeneutic circle. Interpretation involves a ‘back and forth’
movement between ‘background’ understanding (the basis of intelligibility) and the particular
something which is interpreted. The interpretive projection is necessarily provisional, because it
is a projection of understanding which is revised in the act of interpretation.
In the broadest sense, the hermeneutic circle moves between generality (the background
understanding through which something is understood as something; the foundation of
intelligibility) and particularity (the specific something which is understood as such and such,
and is a particular subject of interpretation).
In the case of a text, this means that the initial interpretive projection issues forth from
some background of understanding (e.g., and most generally, what a, or any, text ‘is,’ what might
be written in this or that language) and provides an interpretive ‘frame’ for reading the text. The
29

An understanding is revised, for instance, as we discover that language is not used in the text in a way which we
expect. Gadamer writes: “How do we discover that there is a difference between our own customary usage and that
of the text? . . . I think we must say that generally we do so in the experience of being pulled up short by the text.
Either it does not yield any meaning at all or its meaning is not compatible with what we had expected. This is what
brings us up short and alerts us to a possible difference in usage.” Truth and Method, 270.
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movement back involves the reformation of the background understanding (again, most
generally, one’s notion of what any text ‘is,’ what can be written in this or that language, is
revised).
But the broader, or more fundamental, significance of this interpretive structure is only
dimly exhibited in the example of interpreting a text. As an illustration of pre-ontological and
ontological interpretation, it is limited in two ways, which will be considered in the following
sections. First, as a particular example of, and general analogy for, pre-ontological
interpretation, it is explicitly ‘conceptual,’ and so phenomenologically inadequate. Second, as an
analogy for ontological interpretation, the example of a text is even more inadequate, because it
allows for a separation between ‘generality’ (intelligibility in general, or background
understanding) and ‘particularity’ (something understood as something) which cannot be
maintained where the subject of interpretation is ontology.

4.

Pre-ontological interpretation

The interpretive process involved in reading a text is a particular example of Dasein’s
way of Being. The hermeneutic circle is a structure that is recursively exhibited in every way that
Dasein is. A thematic, explicitly ‘conceptual’ interpretation is only an illustration of Dasein’s
way of Being within a particular domain (of, for instance, textual interpretation). To be in the
world is not to thematically interpret that world, although that is a way of Being in the world
(ontologically interpreting). The pre-ontological understanding which always first defines
Dasein’s way of Being in a world is not (yet) explicitly conceptual for Dasein. Yet, it is
interpretive.
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If ontological interpretation involves making conceptually intelligible something which
is, as it is (in its way of Being), pre-ontologically interpreting something may involve, for
instance, using something for (in order to do) something.30 The example of usefulness will serve
here to illustrate pre-ontological interpretation generally, though it should be noted that this is
taken as a starting point not because it is the most significant or fundamental mode of preontological interpretation (the question of what mode, if any, is most significant, will be
considered below). This is taken as a starting point because, first, usefulness is an easily
explained example which will clarify the meaning of pre-ontological interpretation in preparation
for a closer examination of the form of such interpretation; and, second, because it is the mode of
pre-ontological interpretation which was examined in the most depth by Heidegger.
Something which is useful for something is pre-ontologically interpreted in being used
for this or that purpose. Heidegger examines ‘equipment’ as an example of a class of entities
which is used for something. As this ‘use for’ is the way that such an entity ‘is,’ as it is, such
usefulness is not ‘reducible’ to some other way of Being. This is why Heidegger distinguishes
between that which is ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden) and ‘present-at-hand’ (vorhanden) in such a
way that the Being of the former (qua usefulness, equipmentality) is not reducible to the latter
(objective presence, as for instance and especially ‘substance’). Indeed, the ‘objective presence’
of something is founded upon ‘usefulness,’ as the way of Being which is first encountered.
A hammer is, as it is, in the interpretive use of the hammer for hammering a nail. In
‘hammering,’ the Being of the hammer, as a tool, is understood. The use of the hammer is its
pre-ontological interpretation, which ‘takes up’ and projects an understanding of the hammer.
What a hammer ‘is’ as a hammer, is to be found in ‘hammering.’ The mode of interpretation is
30

Use of equipment involves ‘concern,’ one type of ‘care’ (the other being ‘solicitude,’ regarding Being-with
others). Being and Time, 237. Care itself should be identified as an interpretive mode. It is directed always by
understanding, and is expressed in interpretive acts.
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in this case use for something: hammering a nail, fixing a shingle, stopping a leak. This means
that, phenomenologically, a hammer is as it is in hammering a nail into a shingle, in order to fix
a roof, etc.; and that therefore ‘what’ it is (qua hammer) is not, for instance, something composed
of some material, discovered when the hammer is just ‘looked at.’ It is not understood as a
hammer when the materials from which it is constructed are examined, when it is considered to
be some-thing which is ‘made of’ substances.
Equipment is defined by its position in a relationship to other equipment: “Taken strictly,
there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a
totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is.”31 The totality of equipment is
the condition for the possibility of interpreting a particular tool, using it, in a certain way. The
totality is the foundation of intelligibility, through which a particular equipmental entity can be
as it is. A hammer is understood, and is therefore interpretable, only as it is in reference to nails,
shingles, a roof, a house, etc.
Pre-ontological understanding exhibits the form of the hermeneutic circle generally: here,
in the relation between the particular equipment and the totality in which it ‘is,’ which is the
basis for its intelligibility. The hermeneutic structure of interpretation is exhibited in the relation
between the particular equipmental entity, and the totality of equipment in which it is found. The
latter is a background of intelligibility which allows the former, a foregrounded, particular entity,
to be interpreted.
The interpretive projection, in this case, is found in the actual ‘project’ for which the
equipment is put to use. An understanding of equipment is put to use in a certain way, equipment
is interpreted in relation to the background of significance which is the relation of the equipment
31

Being and Time, 97. “The ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ signifies an ‘in-order-to’; this in turn, a ‘towards-this’; the latter
an ‘in-which’ of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the ‘with-which’ of an involvement. These
relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality.” Ibid., 120.
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to other equipment. An interpretation of the equipment is a projection of understanding. There is
a back-and-forth movement between the actual use of equipment (its interpretation) and the
understanding of the equipment and its relation to other equipment (its significance); and this
back-and-forth relation describes the movement of projection, which is exhibited in the ‘project’
for which the equipment is put to use.
This means that the pre-ontological understanding of a hammer is no less ‘provisional’
than is an understanding of a text. Perhaps one is already more familiar with the hammer. But, it
no less can provide occasions for the revision of understanding. One must first learn how to use a
hammer: This involves developing a sense of its weight, of how to swing it, and of how to hold
nails. One develops a ‘feel’ for using a hammer. In any particular use, the interpretation is
provisional: In the swing of a hammer, the nail is sometimes missed. Or, the nail is not driven as
deeply as was expected. It is then swung more to the right, or with more force. In this preontological interpretation, an understanding of the hammer is put to use (it is tried out, the
understanding is projected) and then the understanding is revised.
Through practice, one becomes more and more of an expert at using a hammer.
‘Surprises’ or ‘inconsistencies’ which occasion significant revisions of understanding happen
less frequently. One misses or bends nails less often; the work goes more smoothly and quickly.
Yet, this understanding is always again brought into play as an interpretive projection every time
that the hammer is put to use. There is never a point at which one can be certain that a hammer is
fully ‘understood,’ because every act of interpretation takes place within a particular referential
context: of this particular hammer, using these nails, on this roof. Every act of hammering is a
particular act, performed on the basis of some general but not perfectly generalizable
understanding. Even the expert will make mistakes. It is the case, then, that there is no ‘final’
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pre-ontological understanding of equipment to be attained: every use of equipment is a new
interpretive projection. But, the more consistent the context is (the more that one has used this
particular hammer, and these nails, on this roof), the more nuanced and insubstantial the
revisions are likely to be (that is, the ‘better’ that one will use the hammer).
This illustrates the significance of the relation between the pre-ontological interpretation
of equipment, and the process of interpreting a text, described above. Between the extremes
cases of, on one hand, encountering a text written in an entirely unfamiliar language,
accompanied by no guide for translating it, and on the other, a return to a familiar text which has
been already read many times, there is a continuum of degrees of likely interpretive revision.
But, at either extreme, the interpretive process is no less a provisional projection of
understanding which is thereby opened for revision. Whatever initial, tentative understanding of
the unintelligible text one has will be revised radically if one begins to learn the language in
which it was written. And whatever deeply familiar, reliable understanding that one has of the
well-known text is nonetheless opened for revision in another reading, in which one discovers
some passage that had been overlooked, or notices a connection between parts of the text that
had not previously been apparent.
As illustrative of the basic form of interpretation (as a back-and-forth movement between
a basis of intelligibility or significance and the particular something which is, on that basis first
understood—however dimly—in an interpretation) both the example of textual interpretation and
pre-ontological interpretation have in common the structure of the hermeneutic circle. However,
there is the difference that one is explicitly conceptual and the other is not. It will be an
important point for what follows, that interpretation is recognized as not always essentially or
initially conceptual.
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There is this distinct difference between the pre-ontological interpretation of equipment,
and an interpretation of a text: The latter is almost entirely conceptually mediated, and the former
is not (essentially). In the case of interpreting a text, the understanding which is brought into play
(projected) is conceptually explicable in the very form which that understanding has: The
understanding of a text is itself conceptual, and so is explainable ‘on its own terms.’ If asked
what a text ‘says,’ we can ‘explain’ our understanding of the text, and that explanation has the
same form as the understanding itself. The understanding of the text and the understanding of
that understanding (expressed in an explication of the understanding) are both essentially
conceptual. It is of course the case that we understand a text also in a way which is not strictly
conceptual. We understand it, for instance, ‘as a book’ to be opened and read, and in this way,
the book is equipment. Also, a text could, for instance, be interpreted as, (found to be) ‘beautiful’
in a way which is perhaps not entirely contained within a strictly conceptual understanding
(which is not explicable). But, essentially, the understanding of a text, as a text, can be identified
as conceptual understanding, and textual interpretation as a conceptual matter.
In the case of pre-ontologically interpreting equipment, understanding is not essentially
conceptual. Rather, a hammer is interpreted in its use, and one’s understanding of the hammer is
revised as it is put to use. Developing a ‘feel’ for using a hammer does not mean developing
some set of applicable conceptual rules to be referenced in its use. One need not say, explicitly:
“The hammer missed the nail because it was swung too far to the side. I should aim to the right.”
One, rather, just swings the hammer more to the right. However, one might say: “I aimed too far
to the right,” explicitly, and this is indeed a particular way of revising one’s use of the hammer.32
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It should be noted, though here only in passing, that there is a foundational relationship between the ‘hammer’ qua
equipment and the concept (the word) ‘hammer.’ As there is a back-and-forth movement between an ‘interpretative
projection’ and an ‘understanding’ of an equipmental entity in its use, there is also a back-and-forth movement
between the conceptual signifier for the equipmental entity, and the entity itself (as it is in its use). Although the

30
In the pre-ontological interpretation of the hammer, the hammer as such ‘recedes’
phenomenologically.33 That is, in its interpretation, the hammer is not explicitly apparent. It is
‘just used.’ As one hammers, there is no hammer apparent as such: there is an act of hammering,
but perhaps what is most phenomenologically immediate is, rather than the hammer, ‘fixing a
roof.’ In other words, as the hammer is used for, or in order to do something, its way of Being is
to be phenomenologically ‘transparent.’34
This means that the way in which a hammer is intelligible as a hammer is not as
something conceptually understood as something. It is intelligible, rather, in being used. This is
precisely unlike a text, which is intelligible as it is conceptually understood as meaning
something. Unlike a text, understanding of equipment is not, therefore, explicable in a way that
is identical to the form that the initial understanding itself has.35 The understanding (itself) of a

examination of pre-ontological understanding involves attempting to uncover that which is a ‘background’ of
conceptual understanding, and is not explicitly conceptual, the two domains are not clearly separable, or without
influence upon each other; nor should one expect to find any one-directional causal relationship (e.g. that the
conceptual ‘arises’ from the pre-ontological background of practices). The relationship between, for instance,
equipment and the words that designate equipment involves movements with a structure analogous to that which
exists between particular equipment and the equipmental totality. This could be described as a reversible figureground relationship: The word ‘hammer’ becomes implicit in the use of the hammer; and use is implicit in the word,
and implicitly referenced when the word is spoken.
33
“The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes
proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readinessto-hand, it must, as it were, withdrawal in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our
everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern
ourselves primarily is the work.” Being and Time, 99.
34
This becomes ‘opacity’ (i.e. conspicuousness) as soon as something goes wrong, which indicates that the hammer
is being reinterpreted. In its opacity, that is, its phenomenological appearance as a (malfunctioning) ‘hammer,’
rather than for hammering, it has ‘appeared’ in a distinct way, such that it can be reinterpreted conceptually. “In
conspicuousness, obstrusiveness, and obstinacy, that which is ready-to-hand loses its readiness-to-hand in a certain
way. But in our dealings with what is ready-to-hand, this readiness-to-hand is itself understood, though not
thematically. It does not vanish simply, but takes its farewell, as it were, in the conspicuousness of the unusable.”
Being and Time, 104.
35
“This is the way in which everyday Dasein always is: when I open the door, for instance, I use the latch. The
achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our
[theoretical] interpretive tendencies, which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along with us, and which
conceal . . . those entities themselves as encountered of their own accord in our concern with them.” Being and
Time, 96. This describes the difficulty of ontological Interpretation. To gain phenomenological access to preontological interpretation, one has to ‘thrust aside’ theoretical Interpretive tendencies which would not allow the
pre-ontological interpretation of something to appear as it is (as in ‘using the latch to open a door’), such that it can
inform a revision of ontological understanding.
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text has the same essential form as the explicit, conceptual understanding of understanding the
text. To make explicable the understanding one has of a text, or of the process of understanding
texts generally, one uses concepts in a way that is similar to the way that concepts are first used
to understand the text. However, in explicating the understanding one has of equipment, one
moves between two distinct modes of understanding.36
Therefore, in the case of interpreting pre-ontological interpretation, we find a form of
interpretation that has a structure which is unlike that of pre-ontological interpretation itself. The
interpretation of pre-ontological interpretation—thematic interpretation, with the aim of attaining
a conceptual understanding of something which does not itself have the form of ‘thematic’
interpretation (pre-ontological interpretation)—is ontological interpretation. Ontological
interpretation will be designated in the following as ‘Interpretation’ as distinguished from preontological ‘interpretation.’37 Ontological Interpretation is the thematic, conceptual Interpretation
of interpretation. Ontological Interpretation aims to explicate fundamental interpretive structures
(e.g. those which are constitutive of the world).

36

To Interpret something which is ready-to-hand is to examine phenomenologically what it is to interpret, for
instance, ‘equipment.’ But this involves Interpreting the interpretation of equipment in a way which keeps its
distance from the pre-ontological interpretation which is to be examined. To phenomenologically examine, for
instance, a ‘door latch,’ is to examine the phenomenon of the latch in its essence, which is ‘to open a door:’ that is,
as it is ‘interpreted’ in opening a door. But to Interpret this phenomenon is to Interpret the (pre-ontological)
interpretation (e.g. opening the door) without merely (i.e. unreflectively, non-conceptually) ‘interpreting’ (using the
latch to open the door).
37
Macquarrie and Robinson write: “Heidegger uses two words which might well be translated as ‘interpretation’:
‘Auslegung’ and ‘Interpretation.’ Though in many cases these may be regarded as synonyms, their connotations are
not quite the same. ‘Auslegung’ seems to be used in a broad sense to cover any activity in which we interpret
something ‘as’ something, whereas ‘Interpretation’ seems to apply to interpretations which are more theoretical or
systematic, as in the exegesis of a text.” Being and Time, 1. ‘Auslegung’ is translated as ‘interpretation,’ and
‘Interpretation’ as ‘Interpretation.’ I follow that usage here, and use ‘Interpretation’ to refer to ontological
Interpretation and ‘interpretation’ to signify other modes of interpretation.
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5.

Ontological Interpretation

As stated above, ontological Interpretation is a ‘radicalization’ of (pre-ontological)
interpretation generally. Both exhibit the structure of the hermeneutic circle, in which an
understanding is projected as an interpretation, and thereby opened for revision. In ontological
Interpretation, there is a back-and-forth movement between thematic conceptualization (founded
on conceptual intelligibility generally) and pre-ontological interpretation.
Ontological Interpretation traces a hermeneutic circle which contains ‘epicycles.’ It
moves between pre-ontological interpretation as its subject, and conceptual, thematic explication
as the form of its understanding, which is its beginning and end; each pole of the circle itself
constitutes a circle. Pre-ontological interpretation involves, for instance, the interpretation of that
which is ready-to-hand, as exhibited in the above example of equipment, which involves a backand-forth relation between a particular entity and its equipmental totality. The thematic
explication of pre-ontological interpretation, its ontological Interpretation, involves examining
the interpretive circle of pre-ontological interpretation in relation to the ontological concepts
which are the product of Interpretation and the background of ontological understanding (the
tradition of ontological thought which is to be revised in the process of ontological
Interpretation).
The circle of ontological Interpretation is circumscribed in asking the question of the
meaning of Being. There is, on one hand, the pre-ontological understanding of how and what
things are, which is always already in play in our way of Being; and on the other hand, there is
the tradition of ontological thought, which has sought to arrive at a thematic understanding of
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Being. To ask the question of Being is to bring into play both interpretive circles and relate them
to each other in the circle of ontological Interpretation.
In other words, ontological Interpretation seeks to make the basic (implicit) structure of
intelligibility conceptually and explicitly intelligible. There is an initial everyday pre-ontological
intelligibility which is to be made conceptually intelligible through explicit ontological concepts.
The former does not initially or essentially have the form of ‘conceptual’ understanding (as
evinced by the example of equipment), and so, in its Interpretation, is ‘translated’ into
ontological concepts. The ontological concepts are the beginning and end of the understanding of
a philosophical tradition (that from which it interprets and which is revised in its interpreting),
which is to be subjected to Interpretation by the ontological interpreter—this is the second circle
of interpretation within the Interpretive circle, to which Heidegger refers with the notion of
‘destroying the history of ontology.’38 Ontological Interpretation therefore involves explicitly
placing into a relation pre-ontological interpretation and an interpretation (‘destruction’) of the
history of ontology.
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“If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be
loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in
which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until
we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—
the ways which have guided us ever since.” Being and Time, 44. The means interpreting the history of the
ontological tradition, examining its genealogy, such that what it has provided—the ontological concepts which we
are inclined to ‘take for granted,’ which are for us implicit—are to be made explicit, so that they can be opened to
revision.
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III. Interpretation and Authenticity

1.

Interpretation and understanding as authentic and inauthentic

Heidegger writes: “[Our Interpretation] will make manifest . . . not only that Dasein is
inclined to fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms of
that world by its reflected light, but also that Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the tradition of
which it has more or less explicitly taken hold. The tradition keeps it from providing its own
guidance.”39 Dasein’s ‘reflected light’ is the interpretive activity which is first apparent to Dasein
only as it is ‘reflected’ by the beings within the world which it interprets. In (and only in)
relation to these things within the world, disclosed as made intelligible by a tradition, does
Dasein initially understand itself. As will be shown below, the ‘guidance’ to which Heidegger
refers is nothing other than individualized (authentic) interpretation. Dasein cannot have some
intelligible guidance which comes from ‘within’ itself (intelligibility which is beyond the
intelligibility of the tradition), but rather it makes itself (and Being in general) intelligible to
itself by interpreting its world and its tradition, and this it can do either ‘as itself’ (in authentic,
individualized interpretation) or not, and ‘fall prey’ to its tradition and to its world.
The section of Being and Time titled “Being-there as Understanding,” contains the
following distinction: “Understanding is either authentic, arising out of one’s own Self as such,
or inauthentic.”40 The recognition that understanding can be either authentic or inauthentic,
depending on whether it “arises out of one’s own Self,” will be of essential significance for the
notion of authenticity generally. The explicitly ‘existentialist’ sections of Division II of Being
39
40

Being and Time, 42.
Being and Time, 186.
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and Time, in which Heidegger further develops a concept of authenticity, should be understood
in relation to this initial statement, in which understanding is described in terms of authenticity.
Only if authenticity is placed into the right relationship to ‘understanding,’ can the ontological
significance of authenticity be apparent.
In the following, I will present an account of Heidegger’s notion of authenticity which
aims at avoiding identifying Dasein’s ‘possibilities’ with something like its freedom, which it
‘has’ in a way which can be distinguished from its ‘situation.’ Such a reading of Heidegger
conflates the ontic and the ontological (the ontic, ‘individual person,’ and ontological Dasein)
and recapitulates precisely the sort of dualism which Heidegger intended to avoid. Further, and
consequently, such a reading of Heidegger will tend toward either, one, a communitarian
reading, in which the fore-structure of understanding is given priority (and Dasein is defined by
the values of its tradition and community), or, two, an existentialist reading, in which Dasein’s
capacity for the movement of authentic interpretation is given priority (and Dasein is identified
as self-defining in a way that can enable it to define itself apart from its tradition and
community).
To overcome these dichotomous readings, we should look more closely at what Dasein
‘is,’ how it might uncover itself, and how it ‘responds’ to, or what follows from, whatever
confrontation with itself is possible. What I aim to show is that Heidegger’s notion of
authenticity should not be understood to mean the individualizing of an ‘individual’ person, but
that what is individualized in authenticity is only ‘interpretation’ itself.41 That which is
41

Heidegger does not state this explicitly. I extend here the notion of ‘interpretation’ so that the relationship between
authentic and inauthentic Dasein can be made clearer, and so that the ontological significance of authenticity is
apparent. That which individuates Dasein—anxiety—arises in Dasein’s confrontation with the ‘possibility of the
absolute impossibility of Dasein’—death. Being and Time, 294. And anxiety reveals that “as long as Dasein is, there
is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to that which is thus outstanding,
the ‘end’ itself belongs.” Ibid., 276. There is always something still outstanding, because Dasein is as it ‘projects’
itself toward the future. The projection is identified by Heidegger as that of ‘care,’ which is ‘ahead-of-itself.’
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individualized is phenomenologically prior to the distinction between ‘self’ and ‘community,’
either of which are understood only as they are interpreted, always from some particular, finite
interpretive perspective. This perspective—Dasein—can perhaps authentically arrive at an
understanding of itself as a discrete individual, or as existing in defining relationships with
others. But authenticity itself does not determine one way or another which understanding
Dasein will attain.
Further, the authentic interpretive projection is nothing other than a projected
interpretation of the fore-understanding of tradition, embodied in the They.42 In other words, the
projection of authentic Dasein—which I will here refer to as ‘existential interpretation’—is an
interpretive movement which takes place within a particular tradition, but is projected ‘from’ a
finite perspective, which has reflexively identified itself as such. If we do not understand
appropriately the relation between these two aspects of the movement of authentic projection—
on one hand, the tradition, the understanding of Being which is first given; and on the other
hand, the finitely situated interpretation of that tradition—we may give priority either to the
fore-understanding, the tradition, as defining what Dasein is, or to the interpretation, as allowing
Dasein to define itself ‘beyond’ or ‘aside from’ its tradition.

Anxiety uncovers that Being-towards is always towards an end, and so that which Dasein is, its projectedness, is
always toward death, and could not be otherwise. Thus, death is the ‘possibility’ of an ‘impossibility:’ the possibility
of no further possibilities. Following Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as “an entity which, in its very Being,
comports itself understandingly toward that Being,” I maintain that understanding and interpretation, in the broad
sense in which I present them here, are the most significantly foundational existential characteristics of Dasein.
Ibid., 78. ‘Care,’ therefore, is directed always by the understanding which Dasein has of itself, and of Being. The
‘possibilities’ which Dasein has are disclosed always by Dasein’s understanding. And taking up a possibility is an
interpretive act. Therefore, although Heidegger does not describe authenticity using entirely hermeneutic terms, I
maintain that understanding authenticity hermeneutically allows us to recognize the relationship between the
different aspects of Heidegger’s account, and to identifying the full ontological significance of authenticity.
42
Tradition presents the problem of covering its origins, such that, as a source of intelligibility, it becomes
‘implicit,’ and is ‘taken for granted.’ Regarding “the task of destroying the history of ontology,” Heidegger writes:
“When tradition . . . becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible,
proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and
delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and
concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn.” Being and Time, 43.
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2.

Existential interpretation

There is a mode of interpretation that aims to make Being intelligible qua Being, yet does
not remain within the domain of thematic conceptualization (Interpretation). The difficulty of the
issue, to be noted here at the outset, is that in the present discussion the aim is a thematic
Interpretation which presents an interpretive mode that concerns neither everyday ways of Being
(pre-ontological interpretation) nor thematic conceptualization (ontological Interpretation).
Heidegger does not present a concept of ‘existential interpretation’ as such. It is presented here
for two reasons: One, to emphasize the continuity of the concept of authenticity with the rest of
Heidegger’s account, by identifying it as an interpretive mode; and two, to distinguish this mode
of interpretation, which begins with, or projects from, the phenomenological appearance of
anxiety, from the pre-ontological interpreting of everyday comportment on one hand, and, on the
other hand, ontological Interpretation, which seeks to attain a thematic conceptualization of preontological interpretation. The project of thematically presenting (ontologically Interpreting)
what is referred to here as existential interpretation is presented especially in Division II of Being
and Time.
That

which ‘is’ is that which is intelligible as this or that. Intelligibility is based on

understanding, which is projected as an interpretation. Something is intelligible only as it is
interpreted. A world is a domain of intelligibility (significance): To be in a world is to be
making-intelligible that world; to be interpreting. Dasein, being-there, therefore ‘is’ interpreting
as its way of Being. Ontological Interpretation involves thematically conceptualizing Dasein’s
interpretive way of Being. The issue to be addressed here is: If Dasein ‘is’ interpretation, what
does it mean for it to interpret itself, ‘primordially,’ or in its essence (which is ‘interpretation’)?
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What does it mean for the being whose Being is interpretive to interpret itself, and thereby that
which provides the possibility for Being (intelligibility) in general?
Pre-ontological interpretation has a ground of worldly significance (of, for instance, a
referential totality of use-objects) upon which particular entities in the world are interpreted
(such as in their use). Ontological Interpretation relates pre-ontological interpretation to the
history of ontological Interpretation (to existing ontological concepts). Ontological Interpretation
has this tradition—the tradition of ontology—as the initial ground of its own (conceptual)
intelligibility. In ontological Interpretation, the tradition of ontology provides the initial basis for
understanding, from which is projected an Interpretation of pre-ontological interpretation. But
the ‘primordial,’ authentic, self-interpretation of Dasein can have no such ground of
intelligibility to which it can relate itself. In its interpretive Being, it is that upon which all
intelligibility depends, and so it cannot uncover any more fundamental ground of intelligibility to
which it can relate itself interpretively. In other words, here is the self-interpretive activity of that
which ‘is’ its interpretive activity. There is no background understanding which is projected in
existential interpretation, yet the existential projection is interpretive.
Existential

interpretation involves a projection from anxiety, as the ‘null-disclosure’ of a

finite being’s self-interpretation. What is interpreted in the projection is Being. This means
taking up some way of Being as one’s own. But, as that is possible only within the particular
situation in which Dasein is, existential interpretation means revising one’s way of Being in the
world, in relation to others. Existential interpretation relates, on one hand, the anxiety of
primordial self-interpretation: null-disclosure, or nullity; and, on the other hand, intelligibility in
general (the world, given intelligibility by the They), or Being.
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3.

Anxiety and existential interpretation

Dasein

always already, or initially, understands itself, but this understanding is identified

by Heidegger as inauthentic. Dasein is always first ‘one,’ or ‘the They.’ It understands itself only
in terms of ‘others.’43 What this means is that Dasein does not ‘own’ or take responsibility for its
Being, but rather ‘covers’ its interpretive way of Being with some understanding, which is taken
to be ‘foundational.’44 Dasein understands itself first in terms of its world without realizing that
its own interpretive way of Being makes possible that understanding of the world as it is
continuously interpreted.
Authenticity demands, on the other hand, that Dasein identify (interpret) its interpretive
way of Being. But there is no (background) understanding to which this foundational way of
Being (interpretation) can be related. The uncovering involved (which, as will be discussed,
means a phenomenologically positive way of ‘not’ uncovering) does not reveal anything which
is understood, rather, it involves an encounter with unintelligibility, and the collapse of ordinary
significance, in anxiety. Authenticity projects from this encounter with anxiety, which has a
phenomenologically definable appearance, yet contains no specific content.
It is precisely in the recognition of finitude that such anxiety arises. It is when ‘one’
realizes that one will die that one understands oneself to be a particular being, which is in the
world as it understands and interprets the world.45 In other forms of interpretation a particular

43

The expressions ‘The They’ and ‘The One,’ both of which are translations of das Man, will be used here
interchangeable.
44
“Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, having understood everything, develop the supposition that
Dasein’s disclosedness, which is so available and so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its
Being will be secure, genuine, and full. Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the ‘they,’ it gets spread
abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the state-of-mind that goes with it.” Being
and Time, 222.
45
“As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to
that which is thus outstanding, the ‘end’ itself belongs. The ‘end’ of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which
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something is interpreted in the projection of understanding from a background of intelligibility.
But, in this case, there is no background upon which the particular can appear. The interpreted
particular is the interpreter: the finite being whose way of Being is to be interpreting. Any
understanding is revealed to be supported by the finite interpretive perspective of a particular
being.
In anxiety, the circle of interpretation ‘collapses.’ It is not ‘broken’ as such (Dasein does
not lose its interpretive way of Being), but it is reduced to a singular point (a ‘not’).46 There is no
‘movement’ possible, because there is no general foundation of intelligibility upon which the
particular something which is interpreted can appear—both the ‘general’ (the basis of
intelligibility) and the ‘particular’ (the being who interprets) are bound together. What is
interpreted is interpretation itself, and this has precisely the phenomenological form of anxiety—
the absence of significance, in which the world is drained of intelligibility. There is no
interpretive movement, but only the uncovering of interpretation as foundational, as founded
upon nothing other than itself. Because Dasein discovers itself to be a finite, particular being that

belongs to the potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, to existence—limits and determines in every case whatever
totality is possible for Dasein.” Being and Time, 277. Because Dasein is Being-towards-death it is a finite being in a
particular situation. This finitude is both the basis for the possibility of Dasein’s possibilities, and also the limit of
those possibilities. “The ‘ending’ which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Beingat-an-end, but a Being-towards-the-end of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is.”
Ibid., 289. Therefore, death, as that which indicates Dasein’s finitude, is fundamental to the way that Dasein is, as
long as Dasein is, and regardless of how far away from death a particular Dasein might be.
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“’Nullity’ does not signify anything like not-Being-present-at-hand or not-subsisting; what one has in view here is
rather a ‘not’ which is constitutive for this Being of Dasein—its thrownness. The character of this ‘not’ as a ‘not’
may be defined existentially: in being its Self, Dasein is, as a Self, the entity which has been thrown.” Being in Time,
330. “In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies essentially a nullity. This nullity is the basis
for the possibility of inauthentic Dasein in its falling; and as falling, every inauthentic Dasein factically is. Care
itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through. Thus ‘care’—Dasein’s Being—means, as
thrown projection, Being-the-basis of a nullity.” Ibid., 331. ‘Care,’ which I have identified as a type of
interpretation, is ‘permeated with nullity’ because it cannot disclose itself to itself as a whole. In the hermeneutic
terms that I am using here, this nullity is the null-disclosure of interpretation turned back onto itself, which is
disclosed in anxiety. Anxiety discloses ‘nothing’ because it is the primordially self-interpretive activity of an
interpretive being, and so has no content.
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interprets, it finds itself to be responsible for its interpreting.47 The foundation of all
intelligibility is Dasein’s interpretive activity, which cannot appear as something interpreted (as
intelligible) as it is the condition for the possibility of intelligibility.
Dasein’s interpretative way of Being is authentic when it is projected from the disclosure
of its ‘groundlessness,’ (as having no intelligible ground beyond itself to which it can
primordially relate itself) in anxiety. To be ‘authentic’ is to authentically interpret: To be this
interpretive way of Being, without covering it with a general understanding taken to be more
foundational than the interpretive way of Being (an understanding arrived at through an
interpretive act, which covers its interpretive origin by appearing foundational). In anxiety,
Dasein discovers that Being itself is finite, because Being and all beings can ‘be’ only for finite
beings who interpret.
There are two aspects of the interpretive projection of authentic Dasein. First, there is
‘anticipation:’ the authentic way of Being towards death (anticipation of death).48 It is founded
upon anxiety, as the existential disclosure of finitude. Second, there is ‘resoluteness:’ an
interpretation of Being projected from finitude (with the understanding that Dasein ‘is’ its
interpretation, and is responsible for it).
Anticipation refers to Dasein’s own interpreting Being, which is itself ‘groundless,’ as it
is ‘what Dasein is’ and cannot ‘get behind’ (uncover some ground for). Resoluteness refers to the
47

This ‘responsibility’ is what Heidegger identifies where he writes: “‘Care’—Dasein’s Being—means, as thrown
projection, Being-the-basis of a nullity (and this Being-the-basis is itself null). This means that Dasein as such is
guilty, if our formally existential definition of ‘guilt’ as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’ is indeed correct.” Being and
Time, 331. As Dasein is the interpreting activity by which it sustains itself, which it can never ‘get behind’ and be
before it ‘is’ (meaning that Dasein can never get behind and guide its own interpreting, before it interprets), it is
always already responsible, and this because of the ‘nullity’ which designates its incapacity to get itself before itself.
48
“Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport ourselves towards death that in this
Being, and for it, death reveals itself as a possibility. Our terminology for such Being towards this possibility is
‘anticipation’ of this possibility.” Being and Time, 306. “The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the
more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all.”
Being and Time, 307. Finitude is encountered, in anticipation, as the ‘possibility of the impossibility of any
existence,’ because it indicates the possibility of no further possibilities. In that sense, Dasein encounters itself as its
possibilities, and yet as finite, and therefore containing the possibility of the end of possibilities.
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reinterpretive movement of authentic projection, in relation to the understanding that Dasein
always first has, as received from a tradition and maintained by the They. What distinguishes
authentic Dasein is that it has, in identifying its finitude, collapsed the circle of interpretation in
the ‘null’ interpretation of its own interpreting; and, from this—‘anticipation’—Dasein projects
‘as its own’—‘resolutely’—a reinterpretation.
The interpretive movement of existential interpretation can be defined as a contraction
and expansion of the interpretive circle. Anxiety is the collapse of the circle of interpretation, in
which interpretation closes upon itself in not-disclosing (the null-disclosure of its incapacity to
interpret its interpreting), and resoluteness is the expansion again of the interpretive circle, in
which some revised interpretation of intelligibility, of Being generally, is projected. The collapse
of the hermeneutic circle is Dasein’s interpretation of itself as an interpreting being, a nulldisclosure, which has the phenomenological form of anxiety. From this follows Dasein’s
recognition of its responsibility for its own interpretive activity (its way of Being in the world)
and the possibility of authentically individualized interpretation.
Heidegger writes: “The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get
that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis.”49 The basis of the
self is its existence, into which Dasein was thrown and has always already understood in some
way. Dasein is its own interpretive foundation—it is the basis for all intelligibility—and
therefore, though it must take responsibility for that basis, as its own, it cannot interpret its basis
in relation to a more foundational intelligibility. Authentic Dasein, in anticipatory resoluteness
projects an interpretation of Being. The projected interpretation is authentic Dasein’s way of
Being.
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Being and Time, 330.
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This can be described in reference to textual interpretation: An authentic approach to
interpreting a text involves acknowledging one’s own particular position in relation to the text.
The reader does not assume that she can ‘directly’ understand the meaning by ‘just reading.’
Rather, the reader acknowledges that every understanding of the text is an interpretive
projection, founded upon her own background understanding, and that such understanding is
always therefore provisional. The understanding is, perhaps, likely to ‘improve’ to the extent that
the reader acknowledges throughout the interpretive process that she has particular ‘biases’
which will inform her reading, and that the set of these biases—the background understanding
from which she projects an interpretation of the text, and which is revised in reading—is the only
basis for her own approach to the text. The back-and-forth movement between the background
understanding which the reader brings into play, and the text read, describes the process of
hermeneutic interpretation. The interpretative process is authentic to the extent that it involves
the explicit acknowledgment that there is a background understanding (biases, a tradition) which
is the basis for the interpretive projection. If the reader approaches the text without such an
understanding of the interpretive process—that is, if she does not acknowledge her own initial
background understanding, her biases, her tradition—then, in arriving at some understanding of
the text ‘as it is,’ she is likely to unreflectively read her own biases into the text.
For Dasein, there is no deeper understanding from which an interpretation of itself ‘as
interpretation’ can be projected. However, as the reader of a text interprets authentically to the
extent that her projected interpretation takes up, explicitly, rather than only implicitly, the
background understanding which is the precondition for approaching the text, Dasein projects an
authentic interpretation of its own Being to the extent that it does so with an explicit recognition
of its own finitude.
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In all other cases of interpretation, what is to be interpreted is something which is
understandable first on the basis of some general intelligibility. But interpretation in general is
possible only because Dasein’s way of Being is to understand itself and its world, and to project
interpretively.50 In existential interpretation, Dasein interprets interpretation itself. The
primordial interpreting of interpretation is anxiety. It arises in the face of finitude, which reveals
the absence of any foundation of intelligibility beneath Dasein’s interpretive way of Being. What
anxiety reveals is that Dasein is always projecting itself interpretively, and so, in response to
(from) anxiety, Dasein first projects authentically (recognizing its interpretive way of Being). It
projects an interpretation of Being which is authentic because, as the authentic reader recognizes
the particularity of the background understanding which she brings to a text, Dasein understands
its own particularity, which is the groundlessness of being a finite interpreting being. Dasein’s
uncovering of itself as a groundless interpretive activity is the ‘collapse’ of the hermeneutic
circle in the primordial interpretation of interpretation, which is anxiety.
The projection of authentic Dasein is a projected interpretation of Being founded upon
the ‘nullity’ of finitude. In authentically interpreting, Dasein ‘takes up’ some way of Being, as its
own. While ontological Interpretation is the most ‘complex’ form of interpretation, because it
relates several interpretive circles in its own ‘Interpretive’ circle, the interpretive projection of
authentic Dasein is the most ‘simple.’ While the question of the meaning of Being is taken up
conceptually in ontological Interpretation, it is taken up primordially, that is, ‘existentially,’ in
the interpretive projection of authentic Dasein. The question of Being is existentially answered in
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“The character of understanding as projection is constitutive for Being-in-the-world with regard to the
disclosedness of its existentially constitutive state-of-Being . . . As thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being
which we call ‘projecting.’ . . . Any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it it, it is
projecting.” Being and Time, 185.
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authenticity, but in the form of a projection from the null-disclosure of anxiety, which has no
content which determines the answer. 51

4.

Anxiety, thrownness, finitude

Dasein’s interpretive way of Being is not a consequence of something which Dasein ‘is’
aside from Being in the world. Dasein is not a being who interprets on one hand, and who has a
world, on the other. Rather, the fact that Dasein interprets its Being is a consequence of its Being
in the world as a particular factical being. It is because it is thrown into Being, with nothing
‘behind’ this, that it interprets. What authentic Being towards death uncovers, and ‘takes up’ in
resoluteness, is Dasein’s finite particularity, as a being in a particular situation.
From the basis of, and as such a situation, Being is understood in a certain way. If that
understanding is taken for granted, and the particularity of its source covered, then Dasein is
‘one,’ or is as ‘they are,’ (as its interpretive mode, in falling) and is inauthentic. This way of
Being is inauthentic not because the understanding of Being that it involves is parochially
situated and bounded by finitude; rather, it is inauthentic because a situated and bounded
understanding of Being is not identified as such. When ‘one’ acts as others do, and takes this for
granted as what ‘is done,’ then the particularity of that way of Being is covered over.
Authenticity does not take Dasein out of this situation, nor provide any access to an
understanding of Being which is not provincially situated, beyond involving the recognition that
51

“Resoluteness, by its ontological essence, is always the resoluteness of some factical Dasein at a particular time.
The essence of Dasein as an entity is its existence. Resoluteness ‘exists’ only as a resolution which understandingly
projects itself. But on what basis does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness? On what is it to resolve? Only the
resolution itself can give the answer.” Being and Time, 345. Why can only resolution give the answer? Because
‘anticipation’ has nothing to say: it is an encounter with unintelligibility, in Dasein’s existential interpretation of
itself. Anxiety itself has no content which informs ‘resolution,’ and so only the resolution itself ‘can give the
answer’ (as a projection).
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interpretation is itself foundational to Being. What authenticity uncovers and expresses is the
finitude on the basis of which all Being ‘is.’ In other words, the reason that Dasein ‘is’ its
interpreting is only that Dasein is as it ‘understands’ always from some particular perspective.
This means that Being ‘is’ for Dasein. On one hand, there is Being (qua intelligibility); and on
the other, the finitude (thrownness) which is the foundation for Being—the only basis upon
which understanding is possible. Authenticity only modifies this existential situation, such that
Dasein first recognizes the situation as it is (it identifies its way of Being as interpretive), and so
can project an individualized interpretation of Being.
A reader approaches a text with some particular background understanding, with biases
which are determined by her own situation. Biases of some sort are what make possible reading a
text. One does not even know a language without a certain ‘way’ of knowing the language (a
particular way of understanding and relating words; a dialect; etc.). To understand a language is
always to understand it in a certain way. Or, one has some reason for first approaching the text,
which influences how the text is read. But, the extent to which such biases are not explicit
correlates to the extent to which they will be read naively into the text and taken for granted (as
what the text ‘really says’). The authentic interpreter does not attempt to eliminate all biases, but
rather allows them to the greatest extent to be ‘read through,’ though explicitly.
Similarly, Dasein will take for granted a certain understanding of Being, and of its own
Being (and will be and understand as ‘one’ does), to the extent that it does not acknowledge its
own particularity, its thrownness, as the basis for its understanding of Being. Authenticity is
based only on a confrontation with this existential situation, such that it is taken up explicitly.
Unlike the textual interpreter, authentic Dasein’s interpretation of Being and its own
Being has no ‘basis,’ aside from the ‘nullity’ which Dasein encounters as the fact that it cannot
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‘get behind’ its thrownness and find some more fundamental intelligibility. But from
interpretation’s null-disclosure of itself, which reveals that Dasein cannot get behind its
thrownness, Dasein can project re-interpretively.

5.

Unintelligibility and authentic projection

If Being is the basis of intelligibility, and authentic Dasein discovers that Being ‘is’ only
ever for itself, as a finite interpretive being, then anxiety—Dasein’s encounter with itself as an
interpreting being responsible for its understanding, which it receives first from its tradition,
embodied in the They—must involve a confrontation with unintelligibility.
Heidegger states that the ‘call of conscience’ which calls Dasein out of ‘the They,’ and to
itself, says ‘nothing.’52 The call is ‘reticent.’ It “discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping
silent.”53 Yet, it calls Dasein to itself and to itself as ‘uncanny:’ “The caller is Dasein in its
uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the ‘not-at-home’—the bare ‘that-it-is’ in
the ‘nothing’ of the world.”54 Dasein appears ‘uncanny’ to itself in anxiety, because it encounters
itself as an interpreting being, and cannot interpret its interpreting.55 Anxiety is the
phenomenological appearance of the hermeneutical problem of interpreting that which provides
the fundamental basis for interpretation.
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“What does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives
no information about worldly-events, has nothing to tell.” Being and Time, 318.
53
Being and Time, 322.
54
Being and Time, 321.
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Foucault’s description of the problem: “It is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within
these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say . . . its modes of appearance, its forms of
existence and coexistence, its system of accumulation, historicity, and disappearance.” Archaeology of Knowledge,
130.
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“Anxiety robs us of speech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so that just the nothing
crowds around, in the face of anxiety all utterance of the ‘is’ falls silent.” 56 ‘Uncanniness,’ or
‘reticence,’ is the phenomenological appearance of unintelligibility in Dasein’s anxiety. As what
it means for something ‘to be’ is a product of an interpretive act, in anxiety “all utterance of the
‘is’ falls silent;” there is nothing which can be interpreted, that is, appear as something.
Anxiety discloses that what it means for something to be is founded always upon the
intelligibility provided by a particular tradition and social context (the They), and that therefore
there is no intelligibility ‘beyond’ that of a tradition and context. Yet anxiety further reveals that
this foundation of intelligibility exists only as it is understood by Dasein in particular interpretive
acts. In anxiety, the intelligible world ‘collapses,’ as it is maintained only by Dasein’s
interpretive way of Being.
Dasein discovers that it is nothing other than its particularity, its ‘position’ in a world,
into which it was ‘thrown.’ In other words, there is nothing to under-stand beyond or behind the
understanding provided by a tradition and context, which is the basis for Dasein’s interpretive
projections. Interpretation turned back toward itself encounters ‘nothing,’ i.e. unintelligibility.
Anxiety has a phenomenologically positive appearance, though it is described in negative terms
(uncanniness, reticence, nullity, etc.), because it has no content for hermeneutic interpretation.
What is phenomenologically revealed is therefore the ontological significance of hermeneutics:
that is, that Being is as it is interpreted. This is revealed by anxiety because it displays the fact
that Dasein is as it interprets and cannot finally interpret itself, or ‘get behind’ its thrownness—
the basis of intelligibility upon which understanding and interpretation is possible.
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“What is Metaphysics,” 101.
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6.

Individual interpretation / the individual as such

The projection of authentic Dasein is only a ‘modification’ of what Dasein already, and
always, is. Authenticity means ‘taking responsibility’ for being a fundamentally interpreting
being, and thereby projecting an interpretation as one’s own. This hermeneutic account of
authenticity shows why authenticity cannot bring one out of or somehow distance one from ‘the
world.’ It is only in an encounter with one’s own interpretive relationship to Being that
authenticity arises. Authenticity is the authentic way that a certain being ‘is’ in a world.
Authentic Dasein projects an interpretation of Being, of its own Being, and of its world.
Authenticity need not involve individualism in an ontic sense, of, for instance, holding
oneself aloof from others, or defining oneself as having an existence which is ‘independent’ of
others. Heidegger writes:
Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world,
nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating ‘I.’ And how should it, when
resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-inthe-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its current concernful Beingalongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.57
What anticipation reveals is that Dasein is a particular, finite perspective, for which and only on
the basis of which can Being be understood. This means that Dasein is ‘responsible’ for its
interpretation, because it ‘is’ that interpretation, whether it identifies it or not. But what is
identified and taken up by Dasein is only its interpretive way of Being; it is not a substantive self
or subject, both of which are ways that Dasein can understand itself. Being towards death
discloses to Dasein its own particularity and finitude, within a specific situation, such that it
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Being and Time, 344.
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realizes that Being ‘is’ only as it is interpreted. How much more, then, must authentic Dasein
find that ‘self’ and ‘subject,’ and the relation between selves, are possible interpretations, and not
ontologically certain beforehand?
The authentic interpretive projection indeed ‘individualizes’ Dasein, but only as having a
particular interpretive perspective. Whatever ontical definition of individual self-subsistence
follows is not determined by the particularity of, and the finite basis for, the projection. Indeed,
the projection is ‘finite’ specifically in its situatedness, which is determined by the world in
which Dasein is. It is only as a being in a world that Dasein can project an interpretation of that
world, and of Being. To have an individual interpretive perspective is possible only for a finite
being in the world—having such a perspective means to be in the world—and what authenticity
discloses is this, that Being ‘is’ only from such a perspective.

7.

Possibility, nullity and projection

The existential ground of Dasein’s interpretive openness is defined by Heidegger as
‘possibility.’58 “Projection, in throwing, throws before itself . . . possibility as possibility, and lets
it be as such. As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its
possibilities as possibilities.”59 There is a risk that this notion of ‘possibility’ can be dissociated
from its appropriate interpretive context, in which it is the foundation of the possibility for
projection. Possibility might then be reified, and identified as something like unbounded or
arbitrary freedom. From this can follow the error of defining Dasein as a ‘free’ subject, founded
upon pure possibility which is in some ‘secondary’ way constrained by the world in which it is.
58
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“As potentiality-for-Being, understanding is altogether permeated with possibility.” Being and Time, 186.
Being and Time, 185
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Possibility must rather be understood to signify that Dasein is interpretively open in its relation
to the world. Possibility is always this or that particular possibility, and is understood only as the
world is understood, as an interpretation is projected ‘upon’ it.60
The mistake of identifying Dasein’s Being as ‘unbounded possibility’ is, further, the
consequence of a misunderstanding of the phenomenon of anxiety, and therefore also a
misunderstanding of the ‘nothing’ (nullity) which Dasein ‘is.’
The nullity we have in mind belongs to Dasein’s Being-free for its existential
possibilities. Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one possibility—that is, in
tolerating one’s not having chosen the others and one’s not being able to choose
them. In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies essentially a
nullity.61
The nullity which Dasein uncovers ‘as’ its own foundation—or, more accurately, the ‘null’
disclosure which follows from Dasein’s attempt to interpret the (interpretive) basis of its own
Being—could be understood as indicating that Dasein ‘is’ nothing, perhaps other than its free
potentiality (for Being). This involves an incomplete understanding of Dasein’s interpretive way
of Being.
It is rather the case that Dasein is so fundamentally an interpreting Being, that it can
never not project an understanding of its own Being, and this to such an extent that it cannot
uncover itself as a ‘free’ potentiality for Being.
In being a basis—that is, in existing as thrown—Dasein constantly lags behind its
possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis.
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“Because of the kind of Being which is constituted by the existentiale of projection, Dasein is constantly ‘more’
than it factually is, supposing that one might want to make an inventory of it . . . But Dasein is never more than it
factically is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially.” Being and Time, 185.
61
Being and Time, 331.
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This ‘Being-a-basis’ means never to have power over one’s ownmost Being from the
ground up. This ‘not’ belongs to the existential meaning of ‘thrownness.’62
In other words, Dasein can never ‘get behind’ that which it factically ‘is,’ as it understands itself,
such that it could ‘be’ its possibilities in a way which is ‘before’ it actually ‘is.’ Dasein ‘is’ its
basis, but as its basis, it is always ‘projecting.’ Dasein always is a particular Being who has been
‘thrown’ into the world; and as thrown, it is always projecting an interpretation of its own Being
and its world.
Nullity appears as Dasein’s null-disclosure of its own basis: It is because it cannot ‘get
behind’ its basis that it confronts nullity. Dasein does not uncover its own basis as nullity.
Rather, it cannot uncover its basis as ‘something,’ because the basis is Dasein’s interpretive way
of Being a particular, finite being. This ‘nullity’ is anxiety, which is not anxiety in the face of
boundless potentiality, but of Being a particular being that is thrown into a world and projects an
interpretation of that world. There is no way of Being to Dasein more foundational than
projection, so nullity is the ‘null’ disclosure of an ‘interpretation of interpretation.’ Dasein cannot
‘get behind’ its own interpreting, such that it could find a basis for its interpreting: it is that basis,
and ‘nothing’ besides.
From anxiety there is nowhere to go but toward resoluteness—taking up a way of
Being—but this can be only a reinterpretation of the ground of intelligibility, and so, it is a
reinterpretation of tradition, and of one’s way of Being in the They.63 Anxiety reveals that
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Being and Time, 330.
The alternative notion that authentic Dasein projects ‘once and for all’ some understanding of Being, that is, that it
takes up a way of Being which must be maintained until its factical ‘end,’ could be wrong for two related reasons:
One, it may involve a conflation of the ontic and ontological significances of Being towards an end (death). Only in
Being towards an end does Dasein, in anticipatory resoluteness, encounter its finitude, and project a individualized
interpretation of Being. But that does not mean that Dasein must ontically maintain its ‘factual’ project until its end.
Two, such an interpretation of authenticity ignores the extent to which Dasein’s projection remains situated within a
tradition, and within a factical world. That is, in authenticity, ‘one’ does not ‘lose the world,’ or somehow redefine it
63
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interpretation is always provisional, because it is projected always from some finite perspective.
And so, even Dasein’s authentic interpretive projection is a provisional projection, which is
continuously revised. To be authentic means to have uncovered the finitude of one’s own
interpretive position, and to recognize it to be provisional and revisable. By uncovering its
finitude, Dasein first discovers that all projections are provisional. They are provisional because
they are always situated as particular, finite perspectives. This is covered insofar as Dasein is in
The They. Authentic Dasein discovers that it cannot but interpret Being, but in discovering the
provisional quality of interpretations, it ‘takes up’ some interpretation from its particular
perspective, as its own. Understanding that its Being is interpretative, Dasein projects an
interpretation with an understanding that it is provisional, and that there are no criteria which can
provide any certain guidance for the interpretation.

8.

Essence, existence, ek-stasis

The account presented here of authenticity as authentic interpreting shows that the
‘existentialist’ dimension of Being and Time does not present some division between the
individual and her situation, nor does it presuppose some deeper ground of intelligibility to
which authenticity gives access. Authenticity, as authentic interpreting—interpretation which is
individualized in a confrontation with its finitude—does not involve the separation of the ontic
individual from her situation. It is not through an encounter with something like its freedom that
Dasein attains authenticity. ‘Freedom’ as such is always the freedom of particular selves, or
subjects, which have already been understood in a certain way. Dasein is condemned to interpret,
solipsistically. This could hardly be less true, because the authentic project is possible specifically because Dasein
discovers its finite particularity in relation to the tradition, and the world, and on that basis can project a unique
interpretation.
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because it is always already in a situation (a historically situated tradition, a social context),
through which it understands Being, and itself, in a certain way. Dasein is that understanding,
and interprets insofar as Dasein ‘is’ at all. As will be discussed below, this approach to
authenticity allows it to be understood appropriately in relation to sociality, as both defining the
understanding from which interpretation is projected, and as always re-formed in the interpretive
projection. This is possible to the extent that the hermeneutic holism of Heidegger’s ontology is
maintained, and carried into an understanding of authenticity. The difference between this
approach and Sartre’s existentialism will be discussed here, in relation to Heidegger’s critique of
Sartre, with the intent of further clarifying the significance of authenticity and individualized
interpretation.
In his “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger writes: “Sartre’s key proposition about the
priority of existentia over essentia does . . . justify using the name ‘existentialism’ as an
appropriate title for a philosophy of this sort. But the basic tenet of ‘existentialism’ has nothing
at all in common with the statement from Being and Time.”64 In “Existentialism is a
Humanism,” Sartre identifies ‘existence’ with ‘thrownness,’ with a particular situation into
which one was always thrown in advance, and ‘essence’ with the self-definition of a free
subject.65 The capacity for self-definition, for freedom, is presented as a statement of the
‘dignity’ of ‘man:’
This theory alone is compatible with the dignity of man, it is the only one which does
not make man into an object. All kinds of materialism lead one to treat every man
including oneself as an object—that is, as a set of pre-determined reactions, in no way
different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a
64

“Letter on Humanism,” 232.
“What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters
himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards.” “Existentialism is a Humanism,” in Existentialism
from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: Penguin Group, 1975), 349.
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chair or a stone. Our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of
values in distinction from the material world.66
What distinguishes humanity from other existing things is that humans define their own essence.
For a thing to have an essence is for it to have some purpose, a meaning for its existence; and
this can be given only by a meaning-giving subject, of which there are no others than humans.
Human subjectivity therefore has priority over all non-human beings, as that which can extend
beyond ‘mere’ existence to essence. As it places humanity in a position of such priority,
existentialism is a ‘humanism.’
Heidegger writes:
The highest determinations of the essence of man in humanism still do not realize the
proper dignity of man. . . . Humanism is opposed because it does not set the
humanitas of man high enough. Of course the essential worth of man does not consist
in his being the substance of beings, as the ‘Subject’ among them, so that as the tyrant
of Being he may deign to release the beingness of beings into an all too loudly bruited
‘objectivity.’ . . . Man is rather ‘thrown’ from Being itself into the truth of Being, so
that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of being, in order that beings
might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are.67
What defines ‘man’ is not that he is ‘over and above’ his existence, some essence which he
defines for himself, but, that Dasein is the ‘clearing’ of Being in which beings appear.68 Being
‘is’ only for Dasein. Dasein ek-sists. “As ek-sisting, man sustains Dasein in that he takes the Da,
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the clearing of Being, into ‘care.’”69 This clearing is Dasein’s primordial interpreting: Being ‘is’
for Dasein because only for Dasein can something be interpreted (appear) as something.
Sartre overlooks the significance of ekstasis in his examination of existence. That which
exists, in-itself, is that which has ‘mere’ being. Following an identification of the human as first
‘existing,’ he identifies human Being as involving mere existence, the in-itself of immanence on
one side, and freedom, from which a human establishes its essence, on the other side. Sartre does
not begin from an appropriately primordial foundation: the ekstasis, the projectedness, of
Dasein—its interpretive way of Being which establishes the clearing in which beings can appear;
he does not consider deeply enough into the question of the meaning of Being, to discover that
‘existence’ no less than ‘essence’ have Being only for Dasein.
In other words, Sartre does not identify the depth of the ontological significance of what
has been referred to here as ‘interpretation.’ The consequence of this is that through his thought
runs a fissure between existence and essence, a division which recapitulates Descartes’ dualism.
Despite his analysis of the particular ‘situation’ in which humans find themselves, as the space in
which freedom is exercised as concrete choices, there is still preserved ‘freedom’ on one hand,
and ‘situations’ on the other. Sartre looks beyond (presupposes some notion of) Being, and so
misses the phenomenological significance of Dasein, as the interpretive foundation for the
appearance of anything as anything.
The concept of interpretive authenticity, as it has here been developed, signifies an
orientation of Dasein’s toward Being, such that, in anxiety, Dasein does not discover only that it
is free to define itself through its choices. Rather, in anxiety, Dasein discovers that Being, its
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own Being, and its world, ‘are’ for it only as it is an interpreter.70 And the human is not only in
an ‘ontic’ situation; Dasein is thrown into Being. It finds itself always already understanding
Being, its world, itself; and in a way that precedes even any concept of the human. As Heidegger
writes: “Sartre expresses . . . We are precisely in a situation in which there are only human
beings. Thought from Being and Time, this should say instead: . . . We are precisely in a situation
where principally there is Being.”71
Sartre places the Being of the in-itself outside of ‘subjectivity’ (which he yet takes as a
starting point), and so neglects Heidegger’s notion of Being, as the Being of any beings which
can appear for Dasein.72 Therefore, his notion of anxiety is of that of a being ‘condemned’ to
make choices within some situation in which it finds itself. He does not account entirely for the
significance that anxiety has for Heidegger:
We ‘hover’ in anxiety. More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging because it induces
the slipping away of beings as a whole. This implies that we ourselves—we humans
who are in being—in the midst of beings slip away from ourselves. At bottom
therefore it is not as though ‘you’ or ‘I’ feel ill at ease; rather, it is this way for some
‘one.’ In the altogether unsettling experience of this hovering where there is nothing
to hold onto, pure Da-sein is all that is still there.73
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This ‘pure Da-sein’ is bare thereness. This means being an interpreting being confronting its
pure Being-there (understanding) as it is sustained by its own interpreting. It is, again, the
existential interpretation of interpretation. The primordiality of anxiety is such that the human
confronts its ‘pure Da-sein,’ the bare fact of its Being-there, in a way which uncovers something
which has phenomenological primordiality over the understanding of the human as human. In
other words, this is not the anxiety of a human being facing its own freedom: it is anxiety in the
face of the finitude of Being; of the particularity of any interpretive position from which beings
can ‘be.’ This anxiety calls Dasein not only to ontic action, to making some decision, but toward
taking responsibility for its own interpretive way of Being. Anxiety, as that which discloses
Dasein to itself as the interpretive foundation of Being, points not essentially toward Dasein’s
freedom to make choices within a situation, but to its own responsibility for whatever
understanding it always already has, as sustained only through interpretive projection, yet which
was never first ‘chosen’ in advance, because it was always initially sustained by the intelligible
world (qua the understanding of Being maintained by a tradition) into which Dasein was thrown.
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IV. Preparation for the Development of a Hermeneutical Ethics: Social Phenomenology,
Heidegger, and Watsuji

1.

W

Ethics and ontology

atsuji Tetsuro’s Ethics in Japan offers a critique and extension of Heidegger’s

phenomenology on the basis that Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein overlooked the foundational
sociality of the human way of Being. In his previous work, Climate and Culture, itself a direct
response to Being and Time, Watsuji writes: “From the standpoint of the dual structure—both
individual and social—of human existence, [Heidegger] did not advance beyond an abstraction
of a single aspect.”74 Watsuji understood Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein as an illustration of only
the ‘individual’ aspect of human Being, which is, more comprehensively understood, a
‘movement’ in-between individuality and community. Watsuji’s phenomenological method aims,
therefore, at ethics—the ‘way’ that human beings are, as they are socially—in place of ontology.
Rather than an analysis of Dasein (Being-there), Watsuji examines ningen (Being-between), as
the appropriate foundation for understanding the human way of Being. The individual human is
understood by Watsuji to be one side of a dialectical movement ‘between’ individuality and
community.75 The examination of this dual movement constitutes the foundation of his study of
ethics.
Watsuji identified traditional Western philosophical approaches to ethics as taking for a
starting point ‘isolated subjectivity.’ “Such problems as the independence of the self over against
74

Watsuji Tetsuro, Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study, trans. Geoffrey Bownas (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1961), vi.
75
“Individualism attempts to consider the notion of the individual that constitutes only one moment of human
existence and then substitutes it for the notion of the totality of ningen.” Watsuji Tetsuro, Ethics in Japan, trans.
Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 9.
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nature, or the sway of the self over the self itself, or the satisfaction of the desires of the self, and
so on are of central importance to ethics.”76 Watsuji suggests that these problems cannot be
resolved from a perspective that begins with individual subjectivity. The appropriate starting
point for ethics is, rather, betweenness—sociality. There are two central concepts in this account:
‘ningen,’ which corresponds with ‘human being,’ but in a dual sense of signifying both
individual human beings as well as communities; and ‘sonzai,’ which indicates roughly (as will
be explained, not very well) the way of Being which is ningen’s. The study of sonzai, as the way
of Being-between (ningen), is the foundation for the study of ethics. Ningen’s sonzai is the
“constantly moving interconnection of acts” which constitutes human Being. Watsuji notes that
his “study of sonzai is . . . not equivalent to Ontology.”77 The examination of the interconnection
of acts is to be given priority over the question of Being, which Watsuji identifies as addressing
only one side of the dialectic of human Being, a dialectic which moves from “being to
nothingness, and from nothingness to being.”78 Watsuji notes that sonzai had been the
conventional translation of Sein (Being), and challenges this, suggesting that the significance of
sonzai is not at all equivalent to that of Sein.79
In the following, an account of social phenomenology will be developed first with
reference to the passages in Being and Time which explicate, perhaps roughly and incompletely,
the publicness of the world, and the primordiality of Being with. This will be developed further
through Watsuji’s account of social phenomenology, first in its continuity with Being and Time,
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and then with a focus on its discontinuity, in which the question of the legitimacy of the
prioritization of ‘ethics’ over ‘Being’ will be addressed.

2.

Being with, Being alongside, and the publicness of the world

In his examination of the way in which equipmental entities in the world are for Dasein,
Heidegger states:
The work produced refers not only to the ‘towards-which’ of its useability and the
“whereof” of which it consists: under simple craft conditions it also has an
assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his figure; he
‘is’ there along with it as the work emerges. Even when goods are produced by the
dozen, this constitutive assignment is by no means lacking; it is merely indefinite, and
points to the random, the average. Thus along with the work, we encounter not only
entities ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein’s kind of being. . . . Any work
with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of
the workshop but also in the public world.80
Something is used or made always in reference to others. Equipment references others. The
hammer was bought at this or that store, or borrowed from a friend; perhaps the roof to be
repaired shelters one’s family, or is unsightly to one’s neighbors. One uses a hammer as one was
first taught by a friend. The hammer was made to be grasped by a hand: probably in such a way
that it could be held by any hand, and so is public in a generalized sense. Even a solitary worker
in an isolated workshop is surrounded by tools which could be used by another, which were
perhaps made to be used by ‘anyone.’ Equipment is interpreted, that is, put to use, in its
publicness. The interpretation (its use) involves reference to others. One always first uses a
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hammer as ‘one’ uses a hammer—on the basis of the intelligibility provided by ‘the They,’
which is the background of understanding ‘how’ things are to be used, and what for.
As ‘the They’ is the foundation upon which equipment can be understood, it can be asked
if Heidegger has indeed placed Dasein’s relation to equipment and to others in the appropriate
order when he says: “In existing entities sight [understand existentially] ‘themselves’ only
insofar as they have become transparent to themselves with equal primordiality in those items
which are constitutive for their existence: their Being-alongside the world [e.g. using equipment]
and their Being-with Others.”81 Is it the case that the use of equipment and ‘Being-with Others’
are equally primordial in one’s existential self-understanding?
It would appear, rather, that being with others is the foundation for using equipment, and
that self-understanding is more primordially based on ‘Being-with’ others, than it is on ‘Beingalongside’ equipment. If equipment is understood only on the basis of the intelligibility provided
to it by the They—that is, if equipment is interpreted always in relation to others, and in relation
to some public understanding of what equipment is, what it is for—then is it not the case that
equipment is founded upon Being with others? Is equipment not first public, and in such a way
that ‘the public’ must be understood as its foundation (as that which is more primordial)? Being
alongside appears to be founded upon Being with, as publicness is the basis for the intelligibility
of equipment.
We should consider what precisely is meant by ‘transparency,’ as ‘knowledge of the
Self.’ Heidegger writes:
In its projective character, understanding goes to make up existentially what we call
Dasein’s “sight.” With the disclosedness of the “there,” this sight is existentially; and
Dasein is this sight in each of those basic ways of its Being which we have already
81
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noted [circumspection, e.g. using equipment; considerateness, i.e. relating to others]
and as that sight which is directed upon Being as such, for the sake of which any
Dasein is as it is. . . . The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to
existence we call “transparency.”82
The particular mode of ‘sight’ which Heidegger designates with the term ‘transparency,’ is sight
which penetrates into Dasein’s existence. It is Dasein’s understanding of ‘what it is, as it is,’
which is its way of Being as interpreting. Such an understanding of ‘transparency’ provides the
insight we need to understand correctly the passage above, in which Heidegger claims that
Dasein can be equally transparent to itself in both its Being alongside and Being with. In its
Being with others no less than its Being alongside entities (equipment), Dasein ‘is’ as it
interprets. This interpreting way of Being is that which is most foundational, and can itself be
therefore made transparent with equal primordiality in all of the ways which Dasein is. In other
words, the issue here is not one of the comparative primordiality of Being with and Being
alongside—rather, what Heidegger identifies is the interpretive foundation of both Being with
and Being alongside, and this foundation, as what Dasein is.
This interpretive way of Being is more primordial to Dasein than is its ‘self,’ insofar as
Dasein is the basis for any understanding of self. It is the basis, even, for any initial, general
understanding of self and other, and for individuality and community. Yet, at the same time, such
interpretation always begins from an understanding which Dasein already has of itself, as being
in a certain situation, in relation to others and to entities in the world. Dasein’s way of Being
must be identified strictly with the interpretative projection which is carried through in all that
Dasein factically ‘does.’
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Heidegger states that “Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with.”83 Even being alone is
only a modification of ‘Being-with,’ which Dasein ‘is’ essentially, as one of its existential
attributes. In other words, Dasein is always in some relation to others, as what it is.
Even the use of equipment in the ‘absence’ of any immediately present others essentially
references others. And equipment is intelligible only on the basis of the foundation of
understanding which is provided by ‘the They:’ ‘One’ uses a hammer in such-and-such a way;
for this and not that purpose; etc. This being so, we might question why Heidegger first and more
closely examines Dasein’s use of equipment rather than Dasein’s relation to others. Heidegger’s
analysis of Being with others is primarily through equipment, and hardly stands on its own.
Heidegger does not, for instance, consider in any detail phenomena which involve immediate
relatedness between particular Daseins (i.e. actual human relationships). The phenomenology of
Being alongside is thoroughly developed, while that of Being with is barely considered, except
insofar as it relates to Being alongside. The following sections, therefore, further develop the
phenomenology of Being with.

3.

Thinking as private and public

Watsuji’s

phenomenological investigation of everyday events finds that what are always

most immediate are the relations which are referenced in any act, and this ‘before’ and in a way
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that is foundational to any notion of individual subjectivity. He notes that one who engages in
philosophical contemplation might be accustomed to
being alone in his study, or to taking a solitary ramble along a quiet road. One deals
with things most familiar, such as a desk, a piece of paper, a pencil, an ink box, a
book, a window, an outside street, a field, a mountain, or woods. These things exist
outside of us, and each of them reveals its own features. We perceive these features
and use them in some way. They are considered to have something to do with facts at
the ‘natural level’ and to which no theoretical constructs are added. There, what is
called our consciousness or what it means ‘to be in the world’ becomes a starting
point of our consideration. But the question is this: Are these ordinary things really
the facts most familiar to us?84
Perhaps, that is to say, there is an odd bias which is likely to follow from this situation, for the
philosopher who contemplates and writes, maybe with an eye to the everyday, but from the
perspective of a somewhat unusual mode of the everyday. The writer perhaps sits alone, with her
equipment for writing, and to the extent that she looks toward the phenomenology of the world at
all, notes first and foremost the way that she uses her writing equipment.85
One who is in such a situation might be compelled to make claims which are even more
bound to the particularities of her unusual situation, of being alone and contemplating. From
such a circumstance, the solitary thinker could find that what is most immediately present to her
contemplation is her ‘subjective consciousness,’ and from there suppose that such is the starting
point for all doing and thinking. Perhaps she will find even that the evidence for anything other
than this consciousness is inadequate, and proclaim: “only my own existence is certain.” Indeed,
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this statement might be found even worthy of being recorded, and so find its way into some
written work, with the hope that it be fit for publishing.
[Such authors], even though writing about the evidence for the I, did not
simultaneously realize the evidence for the other I. Is one justified in holding that the
operation of writing has developed without anticipating its readers? To write that
‘only I am evident’ is itself contradictory. For writing is an expression of words, and
words are what have come to shape themselves in anticipation of partners who live
and talk together.86
The very act of writing references others. In writing this sentence, I myself am supposing that it
will be read, and address my readers. Moreover, the fact that I have language with which to
express myself references the sociality from which language emerges, and which it mediates.
The notion that ‘only I am evident,’ even before it has been written, is possible only because of
the words from which it is composed. Language is learned first only through relations with
others, in which it is spoken, or written, in communicating.
The point is not, of course, that the preceding constitutes some proof against solipsism.
Rather, it is that the notion of solipsism would seem to occur to one who is in an unusual
situation, of being alone and contemplating. The point is that the tendency exhibited by certain
philosophical traditions, to take as a starting point individual subjectivity, may be a consequence
of the particular, practical form which contemplation has taken within those traditions. For one
who is ‘alone in his study’ it might be reasonable to begin with one’s own consciousness as that
which is most immediately given, and least in need of proving. But this may reveal more about
this philosophical contemplation than it does about existence in general. With this in mind,
Watsuji, as does Heidegger, turns toward ‘the everyday’ as a starting point. The following will
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examine how particular everyday phenomena are revealed from this orientation, which finds
sociality, and reference to others, to be that which is most phenomenologically foundational.

4.

The everyday body

One foundation upon which the independence of individual subjectivity might be
established, is the independence of the individual body. It is apparently the case that subjective
consciousness is ‘bound’ to a body, from which it cannot ‘escape.’ The body can be examined as
an individual organism, and so too might therefore the subjective consciousness which arises
from the body be identified as initially individual, and only in some secondary way capable of
interacting with other conscious subjects. But why ought we begin with the body understood as
‘an organism’? From what perspective does the body appear thusly, as an independent ‘physical’
organism?
As Watsuji suggests: “The question to ask is whether in our daily life we actually deal
with our body as an object of physiology. Is it true to say, when we meet a friend and exchange
greetings, that we take for granted that the meeting of our partner is a movement of our
physiological body?” 87 A friend is not first encountered, in our everyday interactions with her, as
‘a body.’ When a friend approaches, we do not observe the approach of her ‘body,’ nor do we
‘use’ our own body to greet her. Rather, it is the case that, simply, we meet a friend.
No more do we first encounter a friend as a body, than, as Heidegger writes in “The
Origin of the Work of Art,” do we
first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of
things . . . rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three87
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motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen.
Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves.88
A whistling chimney is immediately understood as ‘a whistling chimney,’ or if it is not, perhaps
one listens in alarm, and supposes first that the noise is this or that, and is uncertain. But, what is
in any event phenomenologically closest, or what is ‘most immediately’ understood, is ordinarily
not some ‘sound,’ but ‘a whistling chimney,’ or ‘a plane.’ This is the same as to say that the
essence of a hammer is not an ‘object’ made of some substances, but is its use in hammering. Or,
it is to say that a door latch is, as it is, in ‘opening the door.’ However, it is possible to hear ‘just’
a sound; or to examine the wood and metal from which a hammer is composed; or to
contemplate the mechanism of a door latch. In every case, the consideration of the ‘thing’ takes
place through a particular way of ‘just listening,’ or ‘just looking,’ which is not the way that
entities in the world are generally first encountered.
Similarly, of course ‘a body’ can be observed ‘as a body,’ and not as ‘a friend,’ or as this
or that person.
The strict physiological viewpoint is more readily apparent in a procedure that treats
the human body purely as a physiological object. A surgeon treats a patient on the
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operating table in such a way. Otherwise the operation could not be performed
dispassionately. However, for an operation to be undertaken dispassionately, the
framework of ‘the operation’ needs to be carefully set up in advance.89
It is perhaps necessary for the surgeon who performs an operation to look at a person’s body as
‘just a body,’ and so treat it as a physiological ‘thing.’ But this approach to the body is one which
takes place only in particular, circumscribed domains. It is otherwise and ordinarily the case that
we encounter persons; only by abstracting from this is the ‘body’ of another person encountered
as a physiological thing.90
Phenomenologically, the body is always first public. For the most part, the body is, as it
is, in meeting a friend, and by shaking her hand; or in walking down a street, visiting a store,
returning home. When we greet a friend, we do not grasp a ‘hand-thing,’ but shake our friend’s
hand. Even this, perhaps, is done in such a way that it is not noticed explicitly: the shaking of
hands is, as it is as, simply in ‘greeting a friend.’ Further, to encounter the body as a
physiological thing depends itself on some particular understanding of the body, through which it
can be interpreted as ‘composed’ of certain types of ‘tissues.’ It is as such for the surgeon who
works within a hospital, within a context such that bodies can be (de)contextualized in a specific
way, distinct from their ordinary way of Being. In other words, the body, in its Being, is
interpreted immediately, and is as it is only on the basis of an understanding which is first public.
The friend’s hand is interpreted spontaneously in the greeting, as it is ‘shaken.’
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To take the body as a first isolated, distinct thing, from which subjectivity emerges and so
is bound, and bounded by the body’s limits, is to ‘examine’ the body from a perspective which is
already an abstraction from the way that the body is in its everyday acts. To the same extent that
we find, in private contemplation, that the locus of our own consciousness is centered always in a
body, in public engagement the body is ‘for’ others, as it is seen and felt by others. And it is
thereby the interface which is always first, publically, ‘between’ selves—in a greeting, or an
exchange, or in walking along a road, visible to others.

5.

‘Sensations’

There is yet another, more compelling, reason to take the individualized body as the
starting point for phenomenological investigation. Is it not the case that bodily sensations are
always one’s own, and only secondarily interpretable by others through the medium of empathy?
Do we not always first ‘feel’ our own body, and only secondarily understand what others might
feel? For instance, one’s physical pain is felt to be ‘one’s own,’ and another’s pain is not felt as
one’s own. But, under what conditions do we simply have ‘pain’ in some abstract sense? Is it not
the case that, rather, one hurts one’s leg, is nauseated from eating poorly prepared food, or is sick
with a cold? Is not the pain, while it is ‘one’s own,’ always within a public space in which there
are things which cause pain and other persons to whom we might describe the pain? In other
words, is not pain always immediately interpreted as taking place within a shared world, and this
in such a way which is more immediate than just ‘having a sensation’?
Regarding empathy, Heidegger writes:
Disclosure of the Other [in solicitude] easily becomes the phenomenon which
proximally comes into view when one considers the theoretical problematic of
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understanding the ‘psychical life of Others.’ In this phenomenally ‘proximal’ manner
it thus presents a way of Being with one another understandingly; but at the same
time it gets taken as that which, proximally and ‘in the beginning,’ constitutes Being
towards others and makes it possible at all. This phenomenon, which is none too
happily designated as ‘empathy,’ is then supposed, as it were, to provide the first
ontological bridge from one’s own subject, which is given proximally as alone, to the
other subject, which is proximally quite closed off.91
This notion of empathy to which Heidegger is referring describes a ‘capacity’ which allows a
person to share, in some way, the inner state of another person. Empathy, so understood, is a
psychological event, by which the subjective consciousness of one person responds to that of
another. An ontic psychology which follows from an ontology which defines persons as
individual subjects must account for empathy as occurring ‘on top of’ a foundation of individual
subjectivity, and as mediated by some kind of communication between subjects. Heidegger’s
ontology, which identifies Being with as an existential aspect of Dasein, identifies as
foundational the sort of relatedness towards which ‘empathy’ circuitously points.
Watsuji examines the phenomenology of such ‘empathic’ relatedness in detail. Regarding
the ‘sharing’ of physical sensations, he writes:
We are far from having even roundabout methods with which to infer another
person’s bodily sensations from facial expressions alone, to take a single instance
(i.e., to analogically infer that it is the same with the other, in comparison with one’s
own facial expressions, and the bodily sensations they represent). Rather, we assume
that we feel the same bodily sensation. Therefore, those who together feel the heat
can simultaneously say that it is hot. Or, when one says that it is hot, the other can
readily consent without delay.92
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When we stand with others together in the heat, we do not first feel the heat on our own skin, and
then infer that others must feel that heat too. We ‘feel the heat’ together. Indeed, we no less have
to infer that others feel the heat as we do, then must we infer from the feeling of warmth on our
skin, and the dripping of sweat, that it is hot ‘outside.’ One feels the heat; and with others, all are
hot together. In other words, again, in the everyday world of practical actions, we share public
space; and when that space is a certain way, we do not first ‘determine’ how it is for ourselves,
and then infer that it must be likewise for others. When one uses the word ‘hot’ in such a way,
one does so understanding that this is immediately understood by others.

6.

State of mind; emotion

In light of and to further develop the preceding critique of ‘empathy,’ as a capacity which
allows one subject to share the feeling of another, emotion in general should be considered here
more closely. Can emotion be identified as something like a ‘state of mind’ which a person has,
as a response to and as a way of acting toward some-thing in the world, which may have
‘inspired’ the emotion, and which one acts toward in a certain affective way? Or has such a
definition already looked away from the everyday phenomenon of emotion?
Regarding

mood, Heidegger writes: “The mood has already disclosed, in every case,

Being-in the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards
something.”93 A mood is world-disclosing, it is a ‘way’ of interpreting the world: “State-of-mind
[that upon which ‘having a mood’ is founded] is one of the existential structures in which the
Being of the ‘there’ maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this Being is
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understanding.”94 In other words, the world is understood along with some mood. Dasein has
always a ‘state of mind’ (this is perhaps a problematic translation, as what is addressed here is
neither ‘mind,’ nor some ‘state’ which it might have) along with which it understands the
world.95 Moods are not secondary to the understanding that Dasein has of its world. An
understanding of something in the world is always accompanied equiprimordially by a mood: In
our everyday way of acting, things always have significance which deeply involves (is
inseparable from) our ‘affective orientation’ toward them.96
Something is disclosed as something, as it is understood, accompanied by a mood.
Although Heidegger’s statement regarding the ‘equiprimordiality’ of these two existential
structures could be interpreted as identifying two distinct ways of Dasein’s Being-there, which
exist always together, it would be more accurate to interpret this equiprimordiality to mean,
rather, that Dasein understands always in some distinct way (state of mind); that understanding is
not a pure ‘beholding’ which is affected secondarily (by a mood).97 We ‘have’ a mood, for the
most part, not as something which we ‘have.’ It is as understanding is attuned in a certain way
94
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An emotion can be described as something not only ‘felt’ in response to experienced events, but as something
‘through which’ one is oriented toward something in a particular way, and through which the world appears in a
distinct way. An affective orientation is phenomenologically ‘deep.’ Through a certain mood one’s own experience
of self-identity—what one feels about oneself, or the memories that one is most likely to recall—is oriented a
particular way; perceptions—that which is noticed and ignored—are given a certain order; personal relationships
have a distinct meaning. To understand these effects as consequences of an experienced ‘feeling’ is analogous to the
notion that we experience a door as a wooden object of a certain color, rather than as something ‘to walk through:’ It
is of course true that we can experience the feeling, and the perception of the object as such, but we do not
generally. Indeed, it is only through a very particular type of examination, perhaps inspired by some interruption, or
when something goes wrong, that we consider a door as a wooden object, or an emotion as a feeling that we have.
Rather, a door is usually something that is walked through; An emotion is something through which a situation is
disclosed in a particular way.
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Of course, one may sometimes say that one is not feeling any particular emotion. There are two points to be made
about this: first of all, ‘not feeling any emotion’ can sometimes mean boredom, or lethargy, it can mean
contentment, or subtle malaise. Or, indeed, it can mean that one is thoroughly engaged with some task, that one is
engrossed. That is, secondly, it is difficult to define some entirely ‘neutral’ state. This is not to deny that extreme
states of emotion are significantly distinct from more mild, or ambiguous moods. But they are not divergences from
some ‘normal’ state: there is no clearly identifiable ‘baseline’ of experience.
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present-at-hand, it does not show itself purely as it looks unless this [theory] lets it come towards us in a tranquil
tarrying alongside.” Being and Time, 177.
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that things appear as they do. Something is noticed with interest, or irritation. It is in anger,
sadness, frustration, anticipation, etc. (some state of mind) that understanding discloses the
world. As a ready-to-hand object can become present-at-hand when its use is interrupted, in the
case of something ‘breaking,’ or malfunctioning, a mood can appear as ‘a feeling,’ which
inspires a certain way of understanding, and interpreting—a way of acting.
Consider, for instance, a conversation that becomes an argument: Perhaps neither person
thinks “I am angry,” or is explicitly aware of the feeling involved in being angry; but one person
says something to which the other responds with surprised silence. And then both persons find
themselves first aware of their anger as ‘a feeling’ that appears to have motivated a certain way
of speaking. Maybe one then identifies that anger as something that ‘influenced’ a ‘perception’
of the situation, that inspired a ‘way of thinking,’ and resulted in an inappropriate or hurtful
response. In the same way that a door is usually that which is ‘walked through,’ and is not
present to awareness as a distinct ‘object,’ emotion is ordinarily that through which a situation
appears in a certain way, and not as a particular ‘feeling.’98
Comparably, a joyful mood can be, and so often is, interrupted as soon as it becomes
explicit apparent as such. One identifies one’s happiness, as a ‘feeling,’ and it then ceases to be
world-disclosing. Rather than understanding happily, one understands happiness, as a feeling,
and it has thus ceased to be a ‘way’ of understanding, and becomes something present-at-hand.
98

The opposition which constitutes the angry affect is experienced as something like, perhaps, a ‘push’ or pressure
against the other. And the other person is perceived in a way that is determined significantly by the anger—
memories of past encounters are ordered on the basis of this anger. What is ‘noticed’ about the person is defined by
‘being angry’ with that person. It is, again, when the mood is broken—when one realizes that one has been
‘unreasonable,’ for instance—that anger may then appear as a feeling which motivated action, influenced
perception, and perhaps ‘distorted’ thinking. At that point, anger appears to be a ‘response’ of oneself toward the
other person. But in the mood of anger, there is not an awareness of anger as some response: It is ‘behind’ the
perceptions and actions; and, further, it is between oneself and the other person. Anger discloses a particular
relationship between oneself and the other person. In an angry mood, one does not have an awareness of the
relationship on one hand, and an awareness of an angry feeling on the other. Indeed, it is only when the mood has
been ‘broken,’ that such a distinction appears. Otherwise, there is opposition to the other, who appears in a certain
way, through this mood of anger. Perception of the other is ‘foregrounded’ upon the background of anger. The
relationship is disclosed through the mood.
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The ‘feeling’ is then nothing other than the residual effect (affect) of the state of mind which has
been interrupted, and quickly fades.
There is a further significance of emotion, which is identified by Watsuji:
The interpenetration of the consciousness of self and other is conspicuously
recognizable in emotion. . . . We share the same emotions as others in situations in
which the relationship between oneself and the other is quite intimate and in which a
sense of community is to a considerable extent realized. For parents who have lost a
child, concern for their child is shared by both. In such cases the independence of the
consciousness of the ego is almost completely lost sight of.99
Watsuji does not mean here that both parents feel independent but similar emotions toward their
lost child. He directs our attention to the space between ‘individual’ persons, which is always
already shared and inhabited. Shared grief makes that space particularly apparent. In the grief of
the parents, there is not an awareness of the ‘feeling’ of sadness, arising from one’s individual
sense of loss, toward a person who is no longer in one’s life. The phenomenology of this shared
grief is such that the parents simply ‘grieve together.’
Compare the preceding description of the shared grief of parents to Judith Butler’s
account of grieving:
Something takes hold, but is this something coming from the self, from the outside, or
from some region where the difference between the two is indeterminable? What is it
that claims us at such moments, such that we are not the masters of ourselves? To
what are we tied? And by what are we seized? . . . It could be that in this experience
something about who we are is revealed, something that delineates the ties we have to
others, that shows us that those ties constitute a sense of self, compose who we are,
and that when we lose them, we lose our composure in some fundamental sense.100
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Grief is not experienced as a ‘feeling’ that arises from one’s self, as a ‘stable’ self that can feel
this or that. In grief, we “lose our composure;” one no longer feels oneself to be ‘the same,’
because one is confronted by a loss so great that it has ruptured one’s identity. Following the
above account, Butler adds: “We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing
something.”101 In an experience of grief we ‘come undone.’ For Butler, in grieving, one realizes
the extent to which one is constituted by relationships. A broken relation is a loose thread that
can allow self-identity to become unraveled entirely.
Phenomenologically examined, emotions have their locus not in the subjectivity of
individual consciousnesses. They are, first, and again, world-disclosing, in that they allow a
world to appear in a distinct way (they are, as possible states of mind, the way that understanding
always ‘is,’ in disclosing); and, second, they may have their locus in-between persons. Emotions
can be identified not as ‘shareable’ (as contagious) through a capacity for ‘empathy,’ but as
shared in the basic essence of what they are.
When Watsuji discusses the shared experience of grief, he does not mean to point only to
a mode of empathy through which emotions are communicated between persons, or to the
concurrence of emotional responses to an event. What Watsuji identifies in his account of grief,
is that emotions are always already within a shared space. The parents do not have to share their
distinct and separate experiences of grief through some medium, because the grief already
occupies a shared space, which is uncovered through their loss. In a state of grief such as that
described by Butler, one’s world can nearly ‘collapse.’ In the description of the phenomenology
their mourning and commemoration, those who have remained behind are with him, in a mode of respectful
solicitude. Thus the relationship-of-Being which one has towards the dead is not to be taken as a concernful Beingalongside something ready-to-hand. . . . The deceased has abandoned our ‘world’ and left it behind. But in terms of
that world those who remain can still be with him.” Being and Time, 282. In other words, and in support of Butler’s
point, with the deceased we continue to have the sort of relationship to which we would have with ‘living’ Others.
Yet this relationship is defined by absence. Therefore, grieving involves an absence not of but in our way of Being
with others.
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of anger it was identified that in an angry state one’s awareness becomes fixated on a ‘feeling of
opposition,’ around which the rest of one’s experience becomes oriented. In the example of grief,
that which ‘fixates’ awareness is an absence where some constitutive relationship once was. That
absence gives no center to, or provides no substantive ‘background’ for, one’s world to be
ordered. And so the world is disclosed with an absence at its center. Perceptions seem ‘distant’ or
‘insignificant;’ one has trouble thinking about anything, or being interested in anything; and one
feels disinclined to act at all.
In certain moments of profound ‘empathy,’ individuality is backgrounded in relation to a
foreground of community.
Scheler refers to the consciousness of identification between oneself and the other
prevalent among primitives and recognized in totemism, or Extasis as found in the
mystic cults of ancient religions, or in sexual intercourse in intimate love affairs, or in
that love which terminates in the unity of self and other as found between mother and
child, and so forth. These are instances in which the consciousness of ego perishes, so
to speak.102
Such moments need not involve a loss altogether of any awareness of individuality, but it has
become the background of awareness. It is phenomenologically ‘distant,’ and what is closest
rather is ‘togetherness,’ a ‘pure’ mode of relationality, which overwhelms even an awareness of
the individuality of those who are in that relation. If grief uncovers the depth of relations through
absence, and discloses (or rather, nearly or actually ‘collapses’) a world with that absence at its
center, profound modes of ‘empathy’ disclose relationality through its overwhelming presence.
Relationality thus similarly appears as that through which the world is disclosed, and similarly
threatens at its extremes to collapse that world through ekstasis. One is ‘beyond’ one-self so
thoroughly that there is no awareness of a particular self for whom the world is disclosed. Such
102

Ethics in Japan, 71-72.

78
ecstatic empathy points to the purest phenomenological essence of relationality, which, for
Watsuji, is the ground of ‘empathy’ generally.

7.

The primordiality of sociality

The notion of ‘in-betweenness’ (ningen), as illustrated by the preceding examples, is
identified by Watsuji as that which is phenomenologically most foundational to human Being. If
we take as a starting point the practical acts of persons in their engagements with each other, we
find that what is most phenomenologically immediate is never first a subjective self, which can
then secondarily relate to others. On the basis of this understanding of human existence, Watsuji
takes, as a starting point (as ‘first philosophy’), ‘ethics’ (rather than ontology), meaning that the
phenomenological foundation of Being is the way of Being of those who are in relation to eachother. Individuality and community are both to be understood as arising from a primordial
sociality.
This primordial sociality is identified by Watsuji as a double movement of negation:
On the one hand, the standpoint of an acting ‘individual’ comes to be established only
in some way as a negation of the totality of ningen. An individual who does not imply
that meaning of negation, that is, an essentially self-sufficient individual, is nothing
but an imaginative construction. On the other hand, the totality of ningen comes to be
established as the negation of individuality. A totality that does not include the
individual negatively is also nothing but a product of the imagination. These two
negations constitute the dual character of a human being. And what is more, they
constitute a single movement.103
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Human Being is therefore an ongoing dialectical movement between individuality and
community. The individual exists as it is asserted over against a community, as the negation of
the community. Community exists, similarly, only as it is affirmed through a negation of the
individuals who compose it. The back-and-forth movement between these two negative
movements constitutes human Being, and is the basic foundation of ethics.
Phenomenological ‘primordiality’ should here be examined more closely. A
phenomenon, defined as primordial in relation to other phenomena, is exhibited throughout the
phenomena that are secondary in relation to the more primordial phenomenon.
Phenomenological primordiality is determined by considering what aspect of a phenomenon is
most ‘essential,’ or foundational, and so most necessarily exhibited in particular examples of the
phenomenon in question.
In the case of, for instance, ‘equipment,’ Heidegger finds that ready to handedness is
foundational, meaning that all equipment is as something which is ready to hand—something
which is ‘picked up and used.’ Presence at hand, or the ‘objective presence’ of some-thing which
is as an ‘object,’ is phenomenologically secondary to ‘handiness,’ as things are for the most part
encountered first in their use. It is only secondarily—if, for instance, a use-object malfunctions—
that it can appear as something which merely ‘is,’ and is just ‘looked at.’ What is most
phenomenologically primordial to Dasein is the structure of interpretation and understanding.
This means that, in all of the ways that Dasein is, it projects interpretively.
Watsuji is making a claim of the same sort, in his account of the dialectic of sociality
which constitutes human Being. The sort of primordiality which ‘betweenness’ has in relation to
the particular individual as well as the community, is not, for instance, some kind of temporal or
historical priority. ‘Betweenness,’ as a phenomenological concept, is primordial in that it runs
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through all of the phenomenal appearances of individuality and community. This means that
although the dialectic of sociality has an ontic form, in, for instance, the affirmation of factical
communities, and factical individual assertion over against communities, the dialectic, as
ontological, is exhibited throughout all of the ways that humans are.
This can be compared to Heidegger’s distinction between Being with and Dasein with:
the latter is the ontological, existential basis for the former. Dasein is always ‘with’ others in that
its existence depends on a relation to others—only in relating itself to ‘others’ in some way, does
Dasein understand itself, and thereby have a self. This can be distinguished from being in the
presence of other persons or having a factical relationship with another person, which Heidegger
designates as Dasein with. So, similarly, ningen ‘is’ always as the dialectical movements
between individuality and community; the factical ‘events’ of the development of actual
communities, or the self-assertion of individual persons, are founded upon betweenness as the
way that ningen is.
The dialectic presented by Watsuji identifies the individual as nothing other than the
negation of a community, and community as nothing other than the negation of individuality.
Individuality is as it stands against a background of community, which is ‘negated’ in the
standing-forth of the individual. It is only on the basis of the community that an individual can
appear at all. Yet, at the same time, only as the negation of the individuals which always could
stand-out, is a community. But, Watsuji further states that these two movements constitute a
single movement. The absolute poles of ‘individuality’ and ‘community’ are abstractions, and
nothing in themselves, but have existence only as ‘directions’ of movement, and the movement
in any direction is only ever possible because of the potential for a movement in the other
direction.

81
These movements could be represented as directions upon a circle, such that a continued
movement leads always back around. Individuality and community are abstractions which are off
of the circle, because they never actually appear in any pure form. The relationship between
individuality and community can be represented as a circle describing ningen’s sonzai, which is
drawn between ‘individuality’ on one side, and ‘community’ on the other, as poles which are not
actually points upon the circle. A movement, therefore, towards individuality, never attains the
pole, but at the point at which it is closest begins its movement back, towards community. As
movements ‘around’ the circle, both directions of movement could thus be understood ‘as a
single movement.’ The movement in either direction expresses the fundamental interdependence
of each movement.104
The movement is ‘single’ because individuality is possible only on the basis of
community, and community is possible only on the basis of individuality—individuality is a
function of community, and community is a function of individuality—and in such a way that,
by the assertion of the individual, communities are transformed; and by the affirmation of their
communities, individuals are transformed. The movement of individuality is therefore a
movement toward the transformation of community; and the movement of community is a
movement toward the transformation of individuals. As will be discussed below, the phenomenal
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form of this interdependence of ‘individuality’ and ‘community’ should be described in relation
to interpretation and understanding.
Again, these movements are not expressed only ontically, in factical ‘social movements.’
They are the movements between which all of ningen’s actions take place. The examples in the
previous section are intended to illustrate that even in such an example of using equipment,
social relatedness is expressed. Actions are always social, such that even privateness is only a
mode of sociality.105 The phenomenological foundation of everyday actions generally is the dualmovement of individuality and community.
Therefore, even in the case of hammering nails into a roof, that which is
phenomenologically most primordial is the sociality of the action, which is the dual movement
between community and individuality. On one hand, the intelligibility of the hammer is
dependent on a community in which hammers have significance. And on the other hand,
hammering is not possible except as an action performed by some particular person. The
individual interprets the hammer on the basis of a shared understanding, which is provided by the
community. The hammer is taken up by one as ‘oneself,’ but the hammering is always a
reference to others, ‘for whom’ the roof will be fixed, for instance, and in whom, as the They, the
tradition which is the basis for the intelligibility of equipment is maintained. Even if there are no
others who are immediately present—if one is repairing the roof of an isolated cabin—this
being-alone is itself felt, and has positive significance; and the work is possible only because of
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the community in which such acts are intelligible. Even using a tool takes place in a
phenomenological space which is ‘between’ individuality and community. In the act there is a
movement between individuality in the particular act of hammering, and community in the
reference that the act has to the community in which such acts have significance.
Watsuji’s claim is that ningen’s sonzai—the way of Being between—has such
phenomenologically primordiality, that it must be taken as the starting point of any investigation
of human Being, and runs through all that humans do. One way of summarizing this point, is to
say that Watsuji is challenging, on phenomenological grounds, philosophical methodology that
begins with individual, subjective consciousness. He suggests that what has been overlooked,
and is uncovered by a careful phenomenological analysis of everyday acts, is that such acts are
positioned between persons, and between individuals and community. One particularly
significant aspect of this account, is that, at least in its foundational premises (there is a question
of whether Watsuji maintains this view consistently), it can be taken as a critique of positions
which begin with the individual as well as positions which take community as their starting point.
Either position overlooks ‘betweenness’ as such.
In the one case, which begins with individuality, it is necessary to show in a secondary
way how individuals relate to each other. In the other case, which begins with community, it may
be assumed the community determines and has priority over individuals.106 Neither approach
takes as its starting point practical actions, which do not have their locus strictly in the abstracted
individual, nor in the community, but are always between these two poles of sociality. What may
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be overlooked as the insubstantial, fleeting interstices between individuals, across which their
practical acts pass, are here taken to be the background upon which individuals can appear, and
further, upon which the relation generally between individuality and community can appear. That
which Watsuji would consider to have been neglected by Western philosophy as what is most
insubstantial, the diminutive space—really ‘nothing’—produced where individuals act toward
each other, is shown here to be the very background upon which the acting individuals first
appear as such. But, again, this background is not even ‘community’ as such, but primordial
‘sociality’ upon which both community and individuality are founded.
Watsuji’s account of this dialectic will here have its greatest relevance in its applicability
to the factical self-transformation of communities which takes places through the movements of
individuality and community, which together constitute the re-formation of communities. But, in
advance of a discussion of this application, a further examination of the basic structure of the
dialectical movements of sociality is called for, and for this it will be necessary to consider more
closely the background of this dialectical approach.

8.

Emptiness and the absolute

Watsuji is drawing deeply from the tradition of Japanese thought, and without direct
reference here to the content of that tradition, some of the issues may be incoherent. What is
perhaps most important is the Buddhist notion of emptiness, which is explicitly discussed at
points in Ethics in Japan, but is implicit throughout. Watsuji writes:
Now, that ningen’s sonzai is, fundamentally speaking, a movement of negation makes
it clear that the basis of ningen’s sonzai is negation as such, that is, absolute negation.
The true reality of an individual, as well as of totality, is ‘emptiness,’ and this
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emptiness is the absolute totality. Out of this ground, from the fact that this emptiness
is emptied, emerges ningen’s sonzai as a movement of negation. The negation of
negation is the self-returning and self-realizing movement of the absolute totality that
is precisely social ethics. Therefore, the basic principle of social ethics is the
realization of totality (as the negation of negation) through the individual, (that is, the
negation of totality).107
For this to be intelligible, the meaning of emptiness must be here discussed. It is a concept
central to the tradition of Mahayana Buddhism, which means that all entities and concepts are
without self-subsistence, are ‘empty,’ and have existence only through that to which they stand
in some relation. This is expressed by the metaphor of ‘Indra’s Net:’ an infinite ‘net’ or grid of
lines, with ‘jewels’ appearing at every point at which the lines converge. Each jewel is perfectly
reflective. Therefore, in each jewel, every other jewel is reflected. Further, every jewel is
contained in every reflection: One could magnify a particular jewel, and then, further, magnify a
jewel reflected in that jewel, ad inf. The jewels themselves have no existence aside from that
which they reflect. This expresses abstractly the notion of ‘absolute interdependence’ which is
the meaning of ‘emptiness.’ It illustrates the idea that everything is ‘empty’ of self-existence, and
exists as it references everything else.
The notion of emptiness has also for Buddhist thought the significance that
‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ are mutually interdependent, such that neither has meaning
aside from reference to the other. That is, as a Buddhist soteriological concept, emptiness means
that ‘transcendence’ of the world is dependent upon—has significance only in relation to—the
concrete existence of the world. This has the consequence for Buddhist philosophy of inspiring a
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revaluation of ‘transcendence,’ such that it could no longer be understood as any sort of end in
itself, separable from its relation to immanence.108
Buddhist emptiness is therefore not a negation of the reality of everyday phenomena. It is
a response to the early Buddhist position that itself more closely approximates such a negation.
Buddhist emptiness can be understood as the complete realization of the Buddhist refutation of
abiding selfhood—it is the extension of a concept of no-self to a total rejection of the selfsubsistence of any-thing, being, or position; including any ‘position’ outside of the world from
which it could be negated. The earlier abhidharma system deconstructed the self, but did not
deny the ‘self’-subsistence of its particular constituents. A concrete difference remained between
the ordinary condition of self-grasping worldliness and the salvation that is freedom from this
condition.
The Heart Sutra contains the following: “There is no suffering, no origination, no
stopping, no path. There is no cognition, no attainment and no nonattainment.”109 The position of
absolute emptiness makes impossible a judgment of the ultimate reality of any particular
phenomena, or of identifying any-thing whatsoever as self-subsisting. Anything that ‘is,’ any
claim, position, or being, cannot exist in isolation: the ‘deepest’ reality is interdependence.
Perhaps more accurately stated, to look for that which is most fundamental is always to find
interdependence. Emptiness, then, is an absolute negation that negates even relative negations (it
is in this sense equivalent to an absolute affirmation)—it is a statement of the absence of any
static ground on the basis of which the final ‘reality’ of any-thing can be absolutely affirmed or
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negated. It has thus been interpreted as a call to affirm the world as the expression, or perfect
manifestation, of absolute emptiness. Nishitani explains this as follows:
All attachment is negated: both the subject and the way in which “things” appear as
objects of attachment are emptied. Everything is now truly empty, and this means that
all things make themselves present here and now, just as they are, in their original
reality. They present themselves in their suchness, their tathata. This is nonattachment.110
The immediate relevance of this point is that the relative existence, or the appearance, of
beings is not negated by their interdependence. Where we look for the basis of Being, what is
uncovered is a matrix of contingency (thrownness); fully understood, the infinity of these
contingent relationships can be described as emptiness. But the very concept of emptiness allows
no bias toward the reality of bases (or a lack thereof) over that of their expressions. It could be
said that to look for a basis is to discover interdependence (emptiness), and to examine
interdependence is to find the particular phenomena of which it is, from an equally valid point of
view, composed. Emptiness self-negates; otherwise it has become reified, and represents exactly
the sort of privileged position or final static truth of which it is a negation. One way in which this
is expressed is in the assertion that Buddhist salvation—a relative negation of a false sense of
self—is, from the perspective of absolute emptiness, inseparable from everyday worldliness.
Emptiness makes impossible the sort of judgment that would allow relative negation to have
anything other than contextual, provisional meaning.
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9.

Being and interbeing

The notion of emptiness is foundational to Watsuji’s account of the negative movements
which constitute the sonzai of ningen. The basic premise which supports such an account is that
all entities are without self-subsistence but exist as they are related to other entities. The
foundation of Being is, in such an account, relatedness: The ways in which entities are
interrelated have priority over the things themselves. This could be defined as something like a
relational ontology, except that, insofar as ontology address Being, it is not an appropriate term.
“[The] way of being, which is particular to ningen, or to be more precise, this transformation
from being to nothingness, and from nothingness to being (hence, this way of becoming a human
being), we attempt to express by the Japanese concept of sonzai.”111 Sonzai is therefore not
‘Being,’ because it references also ‘non-Being,’ and in such a way that it describes a movement
from Being to nothingness. Sonzai is bound to the notion of emptiness, as an expression of
interdependence, which at its most foundational is the interdependence of Being and nothingness
(or, in Buddhist soteriology, immanence and transcendence).
As does Heidegger, Watsuji begins his analysis with an examination of everyday acts.
But, where Heidegger’s investigation is motivated by the question of Being, Watsuji’s is
oriented, rather, toward the interconnectedness expressed by practical acts. The significance of
taking ningen as a starting point, rather than Dasein, is that ningen is not ‘there,’ thrown into
Being, but is between, as an expression of emptiness. Where Watsuji describes community as the
negation of individuality, and individuality as the negation of community, he is referencing this
interdependence, which indicates that both individuality and community each are ‘empty’ and
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have existence only because of each other.112 Therefore, it is the ‘movement’ or relation between
the two which is taken as a starting point of Watsuji’s phenomenological method.
The relation between Watsuji and Heidegger’s basic orientations, can now be phrased,
roughly, as a question of the priority of Being and ‘interbeing.’ Heidegger begins with the
question of what it means for something to be; and Watsuji begins with the question of how
entities are related, and arise from a matrix of relationality. Both approaches are oriented toward
an analysis of everyday acts; but where Heidegger seeks to identify the way of Being which is
Dasein’s, and the entities which appear in Dasein’s world, Watsuji looks toward practical acts of
relatedness, which express the interdependence of persons, and of individuality and community.
Watsuji attempts to place the very issue of Being, and the analysis of the being who asks
this question (Dasein), within a more primordial dialectic in which Being ‘is’ always in relation
to non-Being, and the being who asks the question is always ‘between,’ in the movements of
sociality. For Watsuji, therefore, the question of Being arises from a more basic foundation of
practical acts, which expresses a primordial interrelatedness. In Watsuji’s view, Heidegger
overlooked the dependence of ontology on a foundation of practical, ethical acts.
This issue of whether the examination of ‘interbeing,’ which is interpreted by Watsuji as
ethics, should be identified as first philosophy must be addressed through a return to Heidegger’s
question of the meaning of Being, and a clarification of the significance of ‘Being’ which the
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question reveals. This will be the subject of the following chapter, which will begin with a
discussion of the social significance of inquiry generally, and the question of the meaning of
Being
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V. Intelligibility, Ethics, and the Phenomenological Priority of the Question of the Meaning
of Being

1.

Introduction

Watsuji’s account of social phenomenology addresses that which is perhaps most
conspicuously absent from Being and Time. What Watsuji shows, as was discussed in the
previous chapter, is that individual interpretation is always oriented in relation to others. That
which is phenomenologically most immediate in everyday ways of Being is not the individual
self, but the space between selves in which practical actions take place. Watsuji’s
phenomenological account of sociality presents the individual self as one aspect of a primordial
social dialectic which moves between individuality and community. Heidegger’s account of
Dasein is considered by Watsuji to be an analysis of only the individuality side of his social
dialectic. As will be discussed in the following, this is problematic: Dasein should be identified
as an interpretive position, not as an ontic individual. By positioning Dasein within his social
dialectic, Watsuji positions that dialectic beyond interpretation. This is methodologically
problematic, and displaces the phenomenologically foundational significance of reflexivity
presented here in the chapters addressing Heidegger’s phenomenology. It has the following
additional consequence: Although Watsuji presents the dialect of sociality (as the movements of
individuality and community) as phenomenologically primordial, at points he seems to be
affirming a more strictly communitarian view of values. If sociality is phenomenologically
primordial, and has some determinate form beyond interpretation, then it is not entirely open to
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reformation.113 It is both more accurate phenomenologically, as well as important ethically, to
understand the dialectic of sociality in relation to the interpretation and understanding of Dasein,
as the position from which an understanding of sociality is possible.
As has been maintained in the preceding, individuality and community are only as they
are understood from particular interpretive perspectives. Such an interpretive perspective—
Dasein—is not the individual self, as self ‘is’ only as an understanding of selfhood generally,
other selves, or ‘oneself,’ which are sustained interpretively. Similarly, community ‘is’ only as it
is understood from a particular perspective. And yet, as has been discussed, everyday
interpretation is oriented always first in relation to others. The ethical significance of identifying
interpretation as that which is phenomenologically foundational to both individuality and
community is that a reinterpretation of community and individuality is always possible. As will
be discussed in the next chapter, this is the phenomenological basis for the possibility of
opposition movements that project reinterpretations through which society is re-formed. What
will be addressed here are basic issues of Being, interpretation, and ethics in Watsuji and
Heidegger.

2.

The question of Being; questioning as an everyday way of Being

Watsuji orients his approach to the ‘method of ethics as the study of ningen’ with a
discussion of the phenomenology of inquiry generally. He notes, first, that “learning in general,
that is, ‘to ask,’ already belongs to the sonzai of ningen.”114 The possibility of inquiry in general
is founded on the sonzai—the ‘way of Being’—of ningen (human Being, as being-between.)
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Inquiry is always first an act that takes place within a context of relatedness, in everyday acts:
another is asked a question about this or that. Questioning expresses already a relation to the
other, from whom a response is expected.
Asking a question about, for instance, a philosophical problem, through the development
of a written text, is understood by Watsuji to be founded phenomenologically upon inquiry as an
everyday mode of relatedness, in which asking expresses a relation: it seeks to learn something
from the other; or, perhaps it only serves to give expression to an existing relationship (such as in
the asking of a question which serves only as a greeting or an acknowledgment of the other).
Questioning, as an everyday act, is to ask another person this or that particular question,
perhaps to learn how to do something. In Japanese, the same word which signifies ‘asking’ can
mean just ‘paying a visit.’115 Questioning is identified by Watsuji as always first a social act,
which may be a request to be taught something by the other.116 “Originally, ‘to learn’ meant ‘to
imitate.’ In other words, it meant to follow another person who already had the ability to do
something and learn how to do it by imitation.”117 Inquiry seeks to learn, and learning is first
imitation. Learning, as an everyday social act, is not initially oriented toward ‘thematic’
understanding (to know-what), but, rather, to know-how to act.
As Heidegger asks the question of the meaning of Being, and considers first the being
who asks the question of Being (Dasein), Watsuji examines questioning as a social act, and, as
such, an expression of betweenness.118 Inquiry is social in at least two ways: First, questioning,
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as an everyday act means asking a certain question so that something might be learned from
another; or, it may even only give expression to a relationship (as when one asks another ‘how
are you?’) Second, even questioning which aims to attain some thematic, or conceptual
understanding, is possible only as it is composed of particular words, and these are always the
words of a shared language.119 For Watsuji, even thematic, philosophical inquiry is founded upon
(perhaps a privative mode of) everyday inquiry.
Where Heidegger recognizes that ontological Interpretation is founded upon Dasein’s
everyday way of interpreting, and is a ‘radicalization’ of this everyday interpretation, Watsuji
maintains that philosophical inquiry is a development or extension of inquiry as it is expressed in
the everyday acts of ningen’s relation to others. Watsuji is thereby suggesting that what
Heidegger takes to be the most primordial question (the question of the meaning of Being) is
possible only on the basis of the everyday relatedness of human beings, in which inquiry serves
first as an expression of betweenness. Watsuji turns to ethics, as the study of the everyday acts of
betweenness, as first philosophy; as, that is, the foundation for ontology, as it provides the basis
for any particular mode of inquiry (including that through which an account of ontology can
arise).
Regarding his methodology, Watsuji writes: “If it is true that ethics must use expressions
[e.g. the things of daily life] as its medium, so that it may grasp subjective ningen subjectively,
then the hermeneutic method will have to be adopted as its only method.”120 In other words,
because that which is to be examined is not simply a set of propositions, or given facts, but the
‘subjective’ way of Being which is ningen’s (in its everyday acts, its ‘expressions’), and this is to
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be made available to (‘subjective’) interpretive understanding, only hermeneutics is an
appropriate method for examining ethics.
Watsuji’s approach to ethics aims therefore to say something about the everyday practical
acts which constitute the sonzai of ningen, through a hermeneutic method, as providing access to
a thematic understanding of those everyday acts, and thereby, to an understanding generally of
ningen’s sonzai. The possibility for that inquiry is founded upon inquiring as a way of ningen’s
sonzai. Therefore, it is as ningen, in its capacity for ‘inquiry,’ as a way of its ‘Being,’ that
ningen’s sonzai is to be evaluated.
Although ningen ‘is’ not strictly identified as something which ‘is’ (because it is
identified as containing both ‘Being’ and ‘non-being,’ and beyond ontology as such) Watsuji
can, insofar as he intends to present a thematic account, only offer a description of what and how
ningen’s sonzai ‘is’ (‘as’ it has been interpreted). Watsuji gives his inquiry priority over the
question of Being, and yet it is only in a hermeneutic interpretation of what ningen is that he can
develop his account of ethics.
But the question of the meaning of Being is concerned with what it means for something
to be, and so is the point of departure for any inquiry into even ‘inquiry as a practical act.’
Heidegger’s analysis of the question of the meaning of Being reveals that beings ‘are’ always as
they are interpreted: something ‘is’ always ‘as’ this or that. This is the necessary starting point
for phenomenology, because it asks the question of what it ‘means’ for something to be, that is,
to appear as something, at all. And it finds that what it means for something to be is always what
it means for the being for whom Being can be a question.
In displacing the priority of phenomenological (and hermeneutical) ontology with
phenomenological ethics, Watsuji makes implicit in his account the Being of that which is
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examined. The consequence of this is that Watsuji’s ethics appears uncritical. Watsuji attempts
to present, through hermeneutical-phenomenological investigation, ningen’s sonzai; but he can
attain no certainty that he has established the appropriate foundation for his investigation.
Watsuji identifies, as his means of access to the subject of his analysis (ethics) inquiry as
founded upon ethical, everyday acts, and these acts are presented to us only through Watsuji’s
inquiry into what human Being ‘is.’
While Watsuji takes hermeneutics as a methodology, he does not take it as a foundation.
He attempts to present ethics as his foundation, but he has access to this only through the
methodology of hermeneutics. What he overlooks is that, as only hermeneutics can provide
access to the subject of his inquiry, hermeneutic interpretation actually provides his
phenomenological starting point.
Watsuji’s phenomenological account of inquiry, as founded upon everyday practical acts
of asking particular questions, is already an interpretation of inquiry. Watsuji situates the
foundation of inquiry, as a practical act, beyond his own methodological inquiry through which
he has attained phenomenological access to inquiry (as a practical act). Watsuji cannot
demonstrate the priority of his dialectic of sociality (ethics) over hermeneutic (interpretive)
ontology. The question of Being is a necessary starting point for phenomenological inquiry,
because it addresses the possibility of something appearing as something at all, and it reveals
Dasein, as the being who understands and interprets. Watsuji subsumes Dasein into his dialectic,
as the movement of (ontic) individuality, without acknowledging that individuality and
community both ‘are’ only as they are interpreted, and that Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein is
only an analysis of the position from which such interpretation is possible.
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The examination of inquiry as a practical act already presupposes some more
fundamental mode of inquiry than the everyday expressions of inquiring. Otherwise, a
problematic circularity results: The questioning of what something ‘is,’ is taken to be possible on
the basis of inquiry as a mode of sociality, which is described as having some determinate form.
What Watsuji overlooks is the finitude or particularity of the interpretive perspective from which
some account of sociality is possible. Watsuji places the dialectic of sociality beyond the
particular interpretive perspective from which that dialectic can be understood in a certain way.
He positions Dasein, the finite interpretive perspective, within that dialectic, without explaining
how an account of ‘what is’ (e.g. his dialectic of sociality) is possible beyond the particular
perspectives from which something is understood as something.

3.

The priority of the question of the meaning of Being

Watsuji critiques phenomenology for beginning with ‘intentionality.’121 “What is called
intentional activity is nothing more than the product of an abstraction that first of all excludes the
relational elements from our acts and then posits the residue as an activity of individual
consciousness.”122 Although Heidegger clearly acknowledges the ‘relational elements’ of acts,
in, for instance, the chains of in-order-to references in which equipment is used, Being and Time
does not present a detailed analysis of the ‘elements’ of relationality to others which are involved
in acts. Heidegger does not examine the foundational references to others involved in everyday
acts, as Watsuji does, in identifying betweenness in which acts take place.
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What Heidegger is addressing in his analysis of Being is the foundation of
intelligibility—that upon which the ‘appearance’ of something as something depends. Heidegger
does not develop an account of social phenomenology, and this is perhaps a problematic absence
in Being and Time. However, social phenomenology can be distinguished from fundamental
ontology, which, as it examines the basis upon which anything can be at all—the foundation
upon which any account of individuals, communities, and social actions depends—is the point of
departure for phenomenology generally. Dasein, as the being who understands and interprets, is
the necessary foundation for phenomenology.
The analysis of Dasein does not itself say anything in particular about what it is to be a
human being, or what relation exists between individuals, or between individuals and
communities. What it identifies is the starting point for any possible analysis of such questions,
in an examination of the structures of interpretation. What it finds is that the starting point is,
necessarily, a finite interpretive perspective. Any understanding of Being can only be the
understanding of a finite being in a particular situation.
The phenomenological approaches of both Heidegger and Watsuji contain at their center
circular self-reference: Heidegger’s question of the meaning of Being reveals a back-and-forth
relation between the being who can ask the question of Being as a way of its Being, and the
understanding of Being which that being has. Watsuji begins with a notion of inquiry as a
practical act, which he describes, along with the other practical acts which constitute ningen’s
sonzai, through phenomenological inquiry. His phenomenological inquiry is a modification,
therefore, of inquiry as a practical act which takes place in a context of relations.
Watsuji identifies interpretation as a mode of ningen’s sonzai, as founded upon everyday
inquiry, and thereby gives ningen’s sonzai priority over interpretation. Because Watsuji attempts
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to identify questioning as a capacity which is founded upon a structure which is yet more
fundamental, he places something phenomenologically ‘beyond’ interpretation; that is, out of the
interpretive circle which is the basis for Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. By giving the study
of the sonzai of ningen phenomenological priority over the question of the meaning of Being,
Watsuji separates interpretation and that which he identifies as the condition for the possibility
for interpretation. The sonzai of ningen ‘is,’ unlike ‘Being,’ not ‘as’ it is interpreted. It is distinct
from how it is interpreted, yet provides the foundation for interpretation. Interpretation is a mode
of ningen’s sonzai, but the sonzai of ningen is not foundationally an interpretive way of Being.

4.

Individualized interpretation, individuality, and community

It may be that Watsuji’s identification of Dasein with the ontic individual is inspired by
the analysis of authenticity in Division II of Being and Time, in which the existential
individuating of Dasein is described. Indeed, as Dasein’s possibility for authenticity follows from
its confrontation with its own finitude, in being towards death, it does encounter precisely its
particularity. As was discussed in the preceding analysis of authenticity and interpretation, the
‘projection’ of authentic Dasein should be understood hermeneutically, as a projected
interpretation of Dasein’s own Being, and Being in general. In its encounter with finitude (its
being towards death), Dasein discovers that it ‘is’—it understands itself—as a projected
interpretation of its own Being. This is ‘individuating’ because, in its encounter with finitude,
Dasein confronts its responsibility for its own interpreting. On that basis, Dasein can first ‘take
up’ its Being, and project an interpretation which is ‘its own.’
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But what ‘Dasein’ signifies is only the interpretive activity which is what it means to be
in the world. That which ‘is’ is that which is intelligible, is understood and interpreted from the
particular ‘perspective’ of Being there. Being only ‘is’ as it ‘is’ from a finite, particular
perspective. But that itself does not mean that this interpreting being is an individual as such.
From the particularity of interpretive perspective, it does not follow that the self-interpretation of
interpretation must identify itself as, first and essentially, an individual who only secondarily
relates to other individuals. There is no reason why authentic Dasein cannot interpret itself as a
being that exists fundamentally in relation to others. In taking responsibility for its projected
interpretation, Dasein does not ‘ontically’ individuate itself, and separate itself from others;
rather, it ontologically individuates itself, and as its ontological foundation is interpretation, it
individuates itself only in projecting an interpretation of Being on the basis of the particularity of
its interpretive position.
Further, in projecting, Dasein projects an interpretation of its relation to others. As it is
always with others, and in a community (even if not ontically), authentic Dasein’s interpretation
of these are no less aspects of its projected interpretation of Being than is its own Being. Where
Heidegger identifies the condition of ‘falling’ in ‘the they’ from which authentic Dasein
‘individuates’ itself, he does not mean, or should not mean, that Dasein defines itself ‘apart from’
community, or somehow isolates itself.123 Dasein, in falling, is inauthentic not because it has
failed to attain ‘ontic’ individuality (separation from a community). Falling Dasein is inauthentic
because it does not identify itself as a particular interpretive perspective; it is no less
fundamentally a finite interpreter. But, it ‘covers’ its interpretative essence, it understands as
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‘they,’ or as ‘one’ understands, and does not realize that it is responsible for its understanding,
which is maintained only be its own ongoing interpretive activity.
The They is not community as such, but the foundation of intelligibility which is always
first available, in which everything is understood in a certain way. Dasein is not an individual
which stands out against the They, but the finite interpretive perspective which even maintains
the intelligibility of the They, always first in a way which does not involve an understanding of
itself as sustaining that understanding, through interpretation. But this perspective has always the
capacity to turn its own interpretive way of Being back toward itself (interpret its interpreting),
and in ‘anxiety’ discover that it ‘is’ its interpreting, and project authentically.

5.

Two conceptions of the call of conscience, intelligibility, goodness, badness, and evil

Regarding the call of conscience, Heidegger writes:
Because Dasein is lost in the ‘they,’ it must first find itself. In order to find itself at
all, it must be ‘shown’ to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility,
Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this
potentiality attested. In the following Interpretation we shall claim that this
potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein’s everyday interpretation of itself, is
familiar to us as the ‘voice of conscience.’124
Should we take this to mean that, for Heidegger, the call of conscience is only the individualizing
call of Dasein to assert its individuality? There is a sense in which this is precisely the case, but
we err if we identify Dasein with the individual person. Toward what does conscience call
Dasein? What does the call say?
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“Only in keeping silent does the conscience call; that is to say, the call comes from the
soundlessness of uncanniness, and the Dasein which it summons is called back into the stillness
of itself.”125 The ‘reticence’ of the call, we can identify as its unintelligibility. Its peculiar
significance is that it is a ‘call’ which has nothing to ‘say.’ This is because it is a call toward
what Dasein ‘is,’ and that is as it understands itself, as it ‘cares.’ We can understand the
primordial call as this ‘caring’ itself, as understanding, calling itself to itself, such that it has no
determinate form. The call uncovers anxiety, which is Dasein’s encounter with itself as an
interpreting Being, thrown into some understanding, ‘beneath’ which there is nothing but which
is yet maintained only as it is continuously interpreted by Dasein. That which calls otherwise
always already speaks, in the form of a particular understanding and interpretation; in calling, it
speaks only to itself. Yet, in so doing, it reveals itself to itself: Dasein, in anxiety, encounters
itself as a being that ‘is’ always as it understands itself, and beings, interpretatively.
In the first chapter of his Ethics, Watsuji presents the following contrary and particularly
enigmatic formulation: “Conscience is the call of the original totality; freedom is none other than
the negativity itself of the movement of negation; and good and evil consist respectively in going
back into and going against the direction of this movement.”126 Consider here that Watsuji does
not identify conscience with a call toward the movement which affirms community. If the call is
‘the original totality’ which includes the movements of both affirming community and asserting
individuality, then toward what does conscience call? And what do ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ as “going
back into” and “going against” the direction of the movement of negation, signify?
The ‘movement of negation’ is a movement of primordial sociality, which Watsuji
identifies as the foundation of ethics and human Being generally: it is an expression of
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‘emptiness,’ of the absence of self-subsistence which is the ‘essence’ of both individuality and
community, each of which exists only in relation to the other. If “going back into” this
movement means just as much the affirmation of community as it does the assertion of
individuality, over against and as the negation of community, then what Watsuji is here
identifying as ‘evil’ is not simply that which opposes the values of the community, and the call
of conscience speaks not merely from communal values.
We should consider what this voice of the community does say, when it speaks most
loudly:
In revolting against one community or another, one revolts against one’s own
foundation. As an act, the movement of this rebellion is toward the destruction of
community as well as being a revolt against one’s own foundation. This is why this
movement is not approved of by the other participants in the community, any more
than it is approved by one’s own innermost essence.127
Watsuji acknowledges that the foundation of values is always the community, and yet that one
can revolt against one’s foundation: that the values of the community can be challenged,
opposed, and perhaps opened for revision. The movement of opposition is here identified as
‘badness:’ that against which the voice of the community speaks. This is the movement of
individuality, which is embodied in practical acts which challenge the established values of the
community, and ‘stands forth’ as a negation of the community.128 One’s own foundation is that
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of sociality, understood always first in terms of the intelligibility provided by a particular
community; therefore the revolt is ‘toward the destruction of community’ which is also a ‘revolt
against one’s own foundation.’
Alternatively,

Watsuji states: “obedience to gods or to the authority of the whole, that is,

the abandonment of individual independence, and the manifestation of love, devotion, or service
have always been proclaimed as ‘goodness.’”129 But Watsuji is not making a normative
statement regarding the unity of the communal side of sociality. “Insofar as the movement of
negation makes a dynamic advancement and does not come to a standstill, there is no badness
that does not change into goodness.”130 Goodness and badness are here identified as respective
movements toward community and individuality, and interdependent.
The law that presides over a human being, however, consists in the movement of
absolute negativity returning back to itself. A person who has turned his back on his
own foundation in revolting against one community or another may then try to return
to his own foundation by negating this revolt once more. This return may also be
achieved by recognizing another community.131
Generally, then, the assertion of individuality is embedded in a dialectical movement which
further negates itself in an affirmation of community. ‘Badness,’ in other words, is a movement
which tends toward ‘goodness:’ the reaffirmation of community.
This can be rephrased: The devaluation of communal values is always a revaluation,
which is a movement that expresses, as does any valuation, some reference to others. In the act

wants to conquer, to overthrown the old boundary stones and the old pieties; and only the old is the good.” The
Portable Nietzsche, 93. What Nietzsche identifies as the ‘strongest and most evil spirits’ are those who are most
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“The acts constituting this movement signify the sublimation of individuality, the realization of socio-ethical
unity, or the return to one’s own foundation. Therefore it is approved not only by those who participate in the
community but also by one’s own innermost essence. This is ‘goodness.’” Ethics in Japan, 134.
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of negating the values of a particular community, we are engaged in a revaluation that references
others—we redefine that which is ‘valuable,’ and in so doing move already toward a reformation
of communal values.132 The act of negating community in the assertion of individuality is a
revaluative movement, through which community can be re-formed.
For Watsuji, ‘conscience’ therefore is the call of primordial sociality which contains both
‘goodness’ and ‘badness,’ in calling toward the primordial ground of sociality, which contains
the movements of both individuality and community.133 Both ‘badness’ and ‘goodness’ exist,
then, only in reference to communal values, and are ‘relative’ to each other. ‘Goodness’ is valued
in relation to ‘badness,’ and badness can take place only as an opposition to the goodness of the
community. Conscience calls either toward the affirmation of the already established values of
the community, where, for instance one feels ‘guilty’ in having violated them; or, conscience
speaks against the community, in the assertion of individuality against established values, and
thereby into revaluation.134
Watsuji makes a normative statement opposed to that which halts the movements of
sociality. There is, on one hand, the possibility of halting the movement at the communal side of
the community: “A human being loses his self-conscious essence when he stops the movement
of independence and spends hours in idle slumber in a community, falling victim to ‘the
132
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crowd.’”135 On the other hand, there is possibility of halting the dialectic at the individual side of
individuality: “there enters onto the scene the sublimation of independence . . . and hence
individuals that look like atoms existing side by side.”136 In either case, the dialectical
interdependence of the two movements is covered, and one is reified and taken to be
foundational. Evil, or radical evil, in contrast to ‘badness,’ is the ‘revolt’ of the movement of
individuality isolated from the dialectical progression in which individuality would negate itself,
in the (re)affirmation of community.
The normative significance of this is supported by Watsuji’s notion of what human Being
is, as the dialectical betweenness of sociality. This is informed by his understanding of the
(Buddhist) absolute—the absolute is ultimately ‘self-negating’ in its essence, such that the
fulfillment of individuality is in its self-negation, and reaffirmation of community; and the
fulfillment of community consists in its self-negation in the form of individuality.

6.

Revaluation and the being to whom conscience calls

Aside from the movements of goodness and badness, which express the dialectic totality
of sociality, there is that which prevents the movements—which fixes, and holds back the
individual such that it cannot negate the community; or holds out the individual, such that it
cannot return to or reform community. Watsuji writes:
A human being who comes to a standstill without being able to revolt is unable to
return. That is to say, he who cannot stand badness cannot achieve goodness. A
human being loses his self-conscious essence when he stops the movement of
135
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independence and spends hours in idle slumber in a community, falling victim to ‘the
crowd.’137
But what is this ‘holding back:’ how does the “human being . . . come to a standstill”?
How does she stop “the movement of independence”? If the dialectic of sociality is the
primordial ground of human being, then from what perspective can its movements be halted? If
there is ‘no one’ who stands beyond, or outside of the dialectic—and if ‘individuality’ consists
only in the negation of community, as one side of a movement which is ‘single’ (which, that is,
leads always from the furthest extensions of individuality back toward community)—how can
the individual herself halt that movement? On the other hand, how might even the community,
which exists only insofar as it is ‘composed,’ and the negation of, individuals, halt this
movement?
In Being and Time, falling refers to a primordial mode of interpretation. As was
suggested above, falling, as inauthentic interpreting, means that Dasein does not project ‘as its
own’ an interpretation (of Being, of itself, of others, of its world). The primordial call of
conscience calls Dasein out of its falling, and into a confrontation with its own finitude, as a
particular interpretive perspective, from which it thereby projects as its own an interpretation. It
is only in projecting from an encounter with this finitude, that Dasein can take responsibility for
its interpretation. Therefore, such interpretive authenticity is a condition for the possibility of
authentic Being towards others, and valuation in the most general sense. In the total absence of
such interpretive authenticity, Dasein, ontically: “stops the movement of independence and
spends hours in idle slumber in a community, falling victim to ‘the crowd.’” One does as ‘one’
does. From such an orientation, one cannot even yet act ethically, as one has not taken
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responsibility for, as one’s own, the finite perspective from which both individuality and
community are understood.
The movements of sociality are halted when the process of interpretation is halted. That
which fixes the dialectic is that which prevents the ongoing interpretive process through which
communities continuously reform. The subjects of the next chapter are reflexivity and this
reformative process. If Watsuji’s dialectic of sociality is understood in the appropriate relation to
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, it becomes apparent that what he describes as the movements
of individuality and community can be understood as a socially embodied interpretive process.
The movement of ‘individuality’ is that in which communal values are reflexively opened for
revaluation; and as soon as values take intelligible form, they have already become ‘communal,’
whether they are embraced by a particular community or not.
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VI. Reflexivity, Social Self-Transformation, Opposition

1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I presented an interpretation of Being of Time which argues, on
one hand, for an irreducible reflexivity as that from which phenomenology must explicitly begin,
and, on the other hand, for a more robust social phenomenology than is developed by Heidegger,
but which is compatible with the phenomenology of Being and Time. I have suggested that
Heidegger’s account of everyday ways of Being, in which a social phenomenology is indicated
though significantly underdeveloped, and his account of authenticity—the ‘existentialist’
dimension of Being and Time—are more deeply related than might first be apparent.
Specifically, I have attempted to show the following: That which ‘is’ always is as it is
understood in a particular way; a way which, in Heidegger’s account, need not be first
‘conceptual,’ but could involve using something for something. The basis for this understanding,
or the source of intelligibility, is the set of practices and the history of discourses which
constitute a tradition. Additionally, everyday understanding (of the self, the body, of particular
relationships with others, or of equipment which is used) always references a totality of social
relations, such that social relatedness is the phenomenological foundation for everyday ways of
Being. The foundation of understanding is therefore social in two ways: First, all intelligibility is
founded upon a background of practices and discourses which constitute a historical tradition;
second, everyday understanding always begins with social relatedness. Further, perhaps
apparently contradictorily, understanding is possible only as it is maintained by particular, finite,
interpretive perspectives. For this reason, the essential starting point of phenomenology is
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necessarily this interpretive way of Being, which is Dasein. Authenticity means authentic
interpreting—interpretation which follows from an understanding of the finitude of its own
perspective, which is uncovered in anxiety. On one hand, all understanding is social, and
intelligibility is founded upon tradition, and on the other hand, understanding is possible only for
particular beings whose way of Being is interpretive.
Additionally, I have maintained that phenomenologically primordial ways of a being’s
Being should be understood as pervading everything that being does, in a recursive way.
Foundational ontological structures are not, therefore, to be associated strictly with something
like primordial experiences, but pervade ways of Being generally. Interpretation runs through all
that Dasein does. Anxiety reveals to Dasein that which it always is (a finite interpreting being),
and in such a way that it cannot ever get ‘behind’ it. I have suggested that the dialectic of
sociality presented by Watsuji similarly pervades our way of Being, though it does not provide
the appropriate foundational starting point for phenomenology, because it presupposes a
particular interpretive position for which some understanding of sociality, of community and
individuality, is possible. But I have maintained that this does not lead necessarily to
‘individualistic’ phenomenology, and that Heidegger’s approach, though it begins with Dasein,
should not be understood as such.
The significance of this is the following: on one hand, sociality is interpretive, and
interpretation is always finally the interpretive projection of particular finite beings; and on the
other hand, authenticity, which I have described as authentic interpretive projection
(interpretation projected from an encounter with the finitude and particularity of its perspective),
must be understood in relation to sociality. There is no understanding except that which is
supported by the intelligibility given by a particular tradition, and so Dasein’s authentic
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interpretive projection can only be a revised interpretation of that which is first and only ever
understood through the foundation of intelligibility, which is the tradition, alive in a social world.
It is Dasein’s encounter with unintelligibility, or ‘nullity’—its own finitude (in anxiety)—which
uncovers the possibility for foundational reinterpretation.
Because the form of understanding with which I am concerned is not limited to, or first,
‘conceptual’ understanding, but addresses also the phenomenological appearance of something
as something in its usefulness, and includes social practices, ‘reinterpretation’ does not mean
strictly conceptual revision (though it will involve this), but a revised way of Being. It means
acting differently, and always in some relation to others.
Finally, though such interpretive projection is exemplified in particular moments of
opposition, and in social revolution, it is even aside from this always ongoing. Watsuji identifies
this, perhaps obliquely, with his dialectical account of sociality. The movement toward
individuality, which he identifies as the only side of this primordial dialectic which was
considered by Heidegger, can be redefined here as the movement of finite interpretive projection;
and the movement toward community can be redefined as the existing understanding, founded
upon tradition, which is revised. The preceding critique of Watsuji’s methodology, as not taking
interpretation as a starting point, has the following consequences: First, because Watsuji attempts
to position dialectical sociality (ethics) in place of ontology, as foundational, he cannot give a
proper account of the phenomenology of that dialectic, which therefore appears to be uncritically
asserted; Second, because Watsuji does not give interpretation its appropriately foundational
status, he does not offer an adequate account of the possibility of social revolution.
In the following, I will attempt to develop an account of the social significance of
authentic interpretive projection as the basis for transformation. Watsuji’s social dialectic will be
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given an appropriate phenomenological account, by identifying the movements of individuality
and community with interpretive movements. The aim here is to show that a sort of primordial
reflexivity is foundational to society, to the development and revision of practices and
discourses. I bounded my analysis in my introduction with the ‘riddle’ of reflexivity presented by
Nietzsche, and Foucault’s structurally similar analytic of finitude. Here I hope to show that the
dilemma represented by each, of self-reference, conceived as not only a problem for discursive
rationality but of all understanding (i.e. including that which is involved in ‘background’
practices; in using something for something; in everyday ways of relating to others), has
potentially revolutionary significance.

2. Reflexivity and objectification, absorption and interruption: Mead, Foucault, Benjamin

The account of Dasein which has been presented is intended to show that what is
phenomenological foundational is the finite interpretive perspective from which
phenomenological analysis is itself possible. Anxiety is the rock-bottom self-relation of Dasein,
its ‘existential interpretation’ of itself, in which what is interpreted is nothing other than its
interpretive way of Being. Authenticity has been described as interpretation projected from the
null-disclosure of anxiety, as the phenomenological appearance of interpretation’s incapacity to
interpret itself in its essence (i.e. for Dasein to ‘get behind its thrownness’). In the following, the
self-relation of interpretation will be presented again as it appears in Foucault, and then
developed in reference to Mead’s social pragmatism. The issue of the reflexivity of reason which
has no transcendental ground, but identifies itself as arising from a history of practices, is
presented clearly in Foucault’s genealogical accounts. The aim here is to further show how this
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problem can be identified as both foundational and irresolvable, and yet productive. Mead’s
account of the ‘me’ and the ‘I’ describes the division which appears in the reflexivity of a mind
that emerges from social relations. The division cannot be resolved, and yet it makes possible the
self-transformation of the self, and of society.
Foucault states, regarding Nietzsche’s genealogy: “Finally, descent attaches itself to the
body. It inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it
appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the debilitated and prostrate bodies of those
whose ancestors committed errors.”138 Genealogy involves a study of descent rather than origins,
of contingencies rather than necessities, of accident rather than teleology; and these are
examined, especially, as they are written upon the body. The history of the subject is the history
of bodies observed, defined and manipulated: of disciplined bodies. We find, therefore in
Discipline and Punish a genealogical account of the history of the subject, as constituted through
‘details and accidents’ written upon the body, the ground of the history of the subject.139 The
subject appears, in Discipline and Punish, as an object of observation, defined by normalizing
practices. The individual is ‘produced’ by ‘power.’ “We must seek once and for all to describe
the effects of power in negative terms: It ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ . . . In fact, power
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual
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and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.”140 We ought to ask this
narrator: Who are you, and to whom do you speak?
Mead examines ‘mind’ as arising through certain types of social exchanges which take
place in a person’s development. In an analysis of the concept of the ‘gesture’ and the arising of
mind, Mead writes: “The primitive situation is that of the social act which involves the
interaction of different forms, which involves, therefore, the adjustment of the conduct of these
different forms to each other, in carrying out the social process.”141 This process is constituted by
gestures which are involved in a play of stimuli and responses. An action on the part of one
‘form’ is an occasion for a response by another, which in turn becomes an occasion for another
action on the part of the first ‘form.’ It is through the play of gestures and responses, which take
the form of language, that mind and self arise.
Consider the divided self identified by Mead:
[The real self is that] living act which never gets directly into reflective experience. It
is only after the act has taken place that we can catch it in our memory and place it in
terms of that which we have done. It is that “I” which we may be said to be
continually trying to realize, and to realize through actual conduct itself. One does not
ever get it fully before himself.142
What one can get fully before oneself is, rather, only ever the “me.” The self can never become
an object to itself except as its own history, in its memory. And yet, Mead realizes that the self is
defined by its history; that it is a process embedded in relationships; and that it is constituted,
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apparently without residue, through interactions with others. The “I” which acts, and which can
reflect upon itself as “me,” does not consist of any substantial essence beyond the ‘mind’ that
arises through interactions. The self is, in itself, unified, as a process which emerges from social
interactions. But, for itself, it is always divided: It can never get itself fully ‘before’ itself. The
self is always a ‘riddle’ to itself. It is constituted through social processes which it identifies in
itself as “me,” as its history, as internalized norms, and as practices which shaped it in a distinct
way. But it stands forth, ekstatic, and always ahead of itself, and as the acting “I” examines itself
as an object.143 Regarding pain, Mead writes: “If we can get, so to speak, outside of the thing,
dissociating it from the eye that is regarding it, we may find that it has lost a great deal of its
unendurable character. The unendurableness of pain is a reaction against it.”144
Foucault’s

‘lighthearted’ genealogical takes this approach toward historical descent: In

Discipline and Punish we confront the history of the modern subject, which could only be
regarded as a tragedy if Foucault had not dissolved all of its narrative power. He presents that
history with an eye to details, accidents, and contingencies, rather than narrative continuity.
“Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled
and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many
times.”145 The story of the modern subject has not even the narrative coherence to be a tragedy.
Foucault attempts to examine it with a relentless objectivity which deconstructs post facto
narrative impositions of progress and development, and finds, rather, particular, parochial
accidents and contingencies. This approach to genealogy, at the same time that it constitutes a
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certain history, constitutes the genealogist; it represents a certain attitude. It is the attitude of the
suffering self objectifying its own suffering, and so finding an attitude of light-heartedness
through terrors.
Walter Benjamin’s historical method represents this approach:
Method of this project: literary montage. I needn’t say anything. Merely show. I shall
purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the
refuse—these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into
their own: by making us of them.146
For Benjamin, the ‘rags’ and ‘refuse’ remained un-inventoried because categories of inventory,
e.g. narratives of progress, represent historical ‘continuity,’ which is only ever the apparent
continuity of domination.147 History is to be objectified; and continuity should be ‘interrupted.’
Benjamin compared his literary technique of montage to Brecht’s theatre, which confronts the
audience with interruptions, elisions, and narrative disruptions. It is intended to ‘distance’ its
audience, to remain lighthearted, to encourage critical awareness, reflexivity rather than
absorption. It is ‘gestural’ and fragmented: “[The] strict, frame-like, enclosed nature of each
moment of an attitude which, after all, is as a whole in a state of living flux, is one of the basic
dialectical characteristics of the gesture. This leads to an important conclusion: the more
frequently we interrupt someone engaged in an action, the more gestures we obtain.”148
Regarding opposition, Mead writes: “A person may reach a point of going against the
whole world about him; he may stand out by himself against it. But to do that he has to speak
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with the voice of reason to himself. He has to comprehend the voices of the past and future.”149
What is this voice of reason, and how does one speak it? It is ‘spoken’ precisely in the selfobjectification of the self. To the extent that the “I” reflects upon the “me” it is distanced from its
absorption. To the extent that the “me” is made an object, the “I” stands forth, ecstatically. This
least of all means, of course, that the “I” metaphysically transcends the “me.” The “I” is, indeed,
only the “me” as it acts; just as the “me” is only the “I” as it has acted. But in the objectifying
reflexivity of the self, it loses its absorption in its past ways of acting. Indeed, then, ‘gestures’
appear as such; the self can identify itself with the history of its gestural exchanges, which lose
their appearance of inevitability. The objectified self discovers its own history as significantly
constituted by accidents and contingencies. Self-objectification distances it from its identification
with the narratives in which it had been absorbed, and fragments its history. This is “the voice of
reason.” It speaks against the suffering of identification with pain; of identification with
‘substantiality’ which was only an appearance sustained by absorption, and interrupted here in
reflexivity.150 The “voices of the past and future” represent history objectified, as particular
voices and ongoing gestural exchanges, rather than narrative continuity.
The narrator of Discipline and Punish is precisely this historically constituted subject
engaged in self-objectification. It is lighthearted, because it interrupts its absorbed identification
with the appearance of substantiality; it is distanced from the pain which constituted it, because it
is self-objectifying. The absence here, like that of the subject of “Las Meninas,” but framed by
practices rather than representation, is the “riddle” that is guessed at. Foucault shows us that this
guessing, reflexivity, which interrupts, also reconstitutes. As the genealogical method identifies
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the constitution of the subject, it reconstitutes the subject. Genealogy is transformative, because
it interrupts; it breaks absorption; it fragments narratives into the accidents of history, and it
objectifies, such that identity is discovered in a historically situated field of gestures.
Just as genealogy identifies the practices which are its objects of examination as
clearings, as cleared fields, which are not only bounded by ‘repressive’ power, but which
become always also productive spaces upon which discourse, knowledge, and identities can
play, genealogy itself clears a space. Genealogy confronts the subject with self-objectification,
which breaks the spells of historical progress and narrative continuity. It presents the subject to
itself, always incompletely, because the subject cannot get ‘before’ itself, and so it directs
attention to precisely that remainder, the absence, which cannot be captured, which is not “me”
but rather that which is always ahead of “me,” already acting. Genealogy presents to the self the
riddle of its own reflexivity. It clears a reflexive space, bounded by the oscillations of guessing at
that riddle, in which the “I” discovers the “me” and wonders at the elision between them. This
space, opened by the riddle of reflexive subjectivity, creates the field of agency. It is a space in
which the self can re-form its identity by breaking its absorption in its “me.” And it motivates the
self-transformation of the social, which, objectified, is revealed as a field of performed gestures,
which were conditioned by a history of accidents and contingent details. The appearance of
‘inevitabilities’ is shattered. The field of the social is flattened, the illusion of ‘depth’ broken by
objectification. The performativity, and therefore mutability, of practices and identity, displace
substantiality. The field is opened by ekstasis, in which it is discovered that the ground from
which one steps forth was never even first substantial, but indeed only ekstasis covered by
absorption in narratives and the appearance of continuity.
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“The ‘I’ is the response of the individual to the attitude of the community as this appears
in his own experience. His response to that organized attitude in turn changes it.”151 As the
‘organized attitude,’ the “me,” changes, so also changes the responses of the individual to others.
Reflexivity is always a social act, because it changes the self in its relations. Genealogy expands
the space of this reflexivity. It clears a field of reflexivity. It does not simply extend agency, such
that values can be revalued, or identities reformed: fixity is challenged altogether, such that it no
longer appears as any sort of beginning or end. We can thus identify the mutability of practices
and norms, as not only opening them to particular transformations, but as always indicating their
essential fluidity. The deep reflexivity which arises through genealogical understanding can open
a social space for greater fluidity of practices and norms generally.
Judith Butler asks:
How might we encounter the difference that calls our grids of intelligibility into
question without trying to foreclose the challenge that the difference delivers? What
might it mean to learn to live in the anxiety of that challenge, to feel the surety of
one’s epistemological and ontological anchor go, but to be willing, in the name of the
human, to allow the human to become something other than what it is traditionally
assumed to be? 152
It means guessing at Nietzsche’s riddle. It means being in the space of reflexivity opened by the
dilemma of the self’s self-relation. It means valuing revaluation, as an ongoing process. Butler’s
answer: “This means that we must learn to live and to embrace the destruction and rearticulation
of the human in the name of a more capacious, and, finally, less violent world.”153 The self
confronted by the dilemma of its self-relation, posed by an encounter with its genealogy, finds in
its groundlessness a new space of freedom: To transform itself, it need not first find some
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substantial essence from which it can attain leverage over that which is mutable. There is no
essence to be found, and yet through the irreducible riddle of its reflexivity, the self can make an
object of itself, and it can act differently. And by realizing this, the self can “encounter the
difference that calls our grids of intelligibility into question without trying to foreclose the
challenge that the difference delivers.” There is no essence to be challenged by that difference,
and our grids of intelligibility are always continuously re-formed.
There an irony to this, that in discovering that it is constituted by an arbitrary history of
practices and discourses motivated by power and influenced by accidents, the subject finds a new
space of agency. But, this is precisely because the subject is otherwise identified with its “me,”
with certain discourses of knowledge and practices from which it is constituted, and absorbed in
historical narratives. When this absorption is broken, although no-thing (no substantiality) of the
subject remains apparent, the limits of reflexivity have been correspondingly expanded. The self
finds that essences it took to be immutable are rather only conventions, perhaps sustained by
‘performativity,’ and are therefore fluid through and through. It has no position ‘outside’ of this,
but it can become an ‘object’ to itself, and ‘objectify’ its history. Such reflexivity produces a
space in which ‘the human’ can be ‘destroyed’ and ‘rearticulated,’ such that it is continuously
freed from the violence of normalization.
Interruption and absorption correspond with the phenomenology of interpretation and
understanding. The moment of interruption, in which the “I” reflects upon the “me,” represented
by the objectification of the historically-constituted ‘subject’ in its genealogical self-analysis, is
the movement of reinterpretation. What Heidegger identifies as falling, absorption in the They, is
an interpretive mode engaged in covering its interpretive activity. It is understanding which
obscures the interpreting through which it is sustained. And the alternative identified by
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Heidegger, authenticity, corresponds with the interpretive movement, which is an interruption.
Anxiety interrupts, or is interruption. But, in interrupting, it reshapes the absorption which is
interrupted.
Benjamin focuses particularly on the moment of interruption, as he identifies absorption,
continuity, with the continuity of a history of continuous tragedy. Benjamin expresses his intent
to “annihilate Heidegger” in a letter about a reading group that he and Brecht planned to form; in
another letter, Benjamin describes the shock of the encounter between himself and Heidegger, in
relation to their “very different ways of looking at history.”154 David S. Ferris suggests that what
is to be annihilated in the ‘shock’ of their encounter is the historical continuity which
Heidegger’s phenomenological ‘essences’ represent.155 Ferris writes, further:
Because of the difficulty posed by this attempt to distinguish a moment of
discontinuity within the continuity of history (a difficulty that is at the basis of the
attempt to distinguish historicality from history), one is forced to speak about this
moment as if it were a flash, a shock, even an entrechoc, whose condition of
existence is its immediate decay or disintegration. This is why Benjamin’s
understanding of the historical is useless to political organization: such an
understanding is the testimony of an event, that is, of a dialectical image, that must
last long enough to be critical, but be cut off from what it criticizes, lest the dialectical
complicity of its ground be revealed.156
The issue is that interruption, the pure moment of reinterpretation, cannot stand alone without a
relation to absorption, to the understanding of a tradition, as historically developed and expressed
154

Walter Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, eds. Gershom Scholem and Theodore W. Adorno,
trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 365. Benjamin
writes: “An introduction that discusses epistemology is necessary—especially for this book, a discussion of the
theory of historical knowledge. This is where I will find Heidegger, and I expect sparks will fly from the shock of
the confrontation between our two very different ways of looking at history.” Ibid,, 359-360.
155
“Heidegger comes to represent a history as continuous as that of the aura, which by the time of the Baudelaire
essay no longer undergoes mere decay, but suffers the shattering that Benjamin sought to do to Heidegger: ‘the
shattering of the aura in the experience of shock.’” David Ferris, “Aura, Resistance, and the Event of History,” in
Walter Benjamin: Theoretical Questions, ed. David Ferris (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 23.
156
“Aura, Resistance, and the Event of History,” 24.

122
in practices and discourse. The moment of interruption stands only against the background of
absorption, of that which is interrupted; and interruption always involves a revision of the
background understanding. But, further, interruption, as the standing out of something against a
background, or in the appearance of something in its opacity, is that by which the background is
formed, and is that which sustains it. Understanding is constituted by a history of the interpretive
revisions of understanding.
Mead’s analysis of the self-reference of the self in the relation between the “I” and the
“me” examines how the self can reform itself through self-objectification: Mead addresses the
relationship of the self to itself in reflexivity, but does not address the self’s confrontation with
its self-relation, and the ‘nullity’ or elision which this latter confrontation reveals. Anxiety is the
self’s confrontation with its incapacity to get itself fully before itself, or to ‘get behind’ itself (its
thrownness). Mead examines the division of the self (into the ‘I’ and the ‘me’), but not the self’s
encounter with this division, which it cannot overcome, in anxiety. The phenomenological
appearance of the division itself is not examined. The division, uncovered in ‘existential
interpretation,’ is the primordial interpretation of interpretation, which appears as anxiety, and is
‘unintelligible.’
It is always in relation to this unintelligibility, which is ‘disclosed’ in the fundamental
null-relation of the self to itself, that revised interpretation is possible. In complete dependence
upon the tradition—with no deeper primordial source of intelligibility—the ‘self’ could
reinterpret itself and its world, as made intelligible through its own tradition, only in relation to
some other tradition, and there could be nothing besides or beyond this. The ‘field of agency’
described here as produced in the oscillations between the “I” and the “me” is precisely the
‘nothing,’ the null-disclosure, of anxiety. This is primordial self-reference, and reveals Dasein to
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itself as an interpretive perspective from which reinterpretation can be projected. There is,
beyond the capacity of the self to make an object of itself, the capacity of the self to recognize
this capacity. Such recognition is that from which reinterpretation which realizes the
provisionality of interpretive projections is possible.
Anxiety, as it has been presented here, has a phenomenological appearance which is not
bound to any particular theoretical orientation. As it is the appearance of primordial reflexivity, it
is a possibility wherever there is Dasein. Anxiety, in the formal sense which it has been given (as
the primordial interpretation of interpretation), is a potentiality of all interpretation, by which
interpretation reveals itself to itself. Various ‘levels’ of interpretive activity can therefore be
referred to anxiety, as not only the ontical anxiety of a particular being, but as the ontological
possibility of anxiety which runs through all interpretation.
The self-transformation of communities which is supported by the possibility of
reinterpretive projections is, further, described by Watsuji in his dialectic of communityindividuality, which has been identified here as founded upon the interpretive ontological
structures of Dasein. The individual, for Watsuji, is that which stands forth from community, in
challenging its values, or posing over against it some reinterpretation of communal foreunderstanding. The movement of individuality is opposed to the community in the
unintelligibility of its appearance to the community.

3. Death and the space of death: healing, and folk mythology as critique

Heidegger identifies death as that in the face of which Dasein encounters anxiety. Death,
as Dasein’s ‘ownmost potentiality,’ is that which authentic Dasein ‘anticipates.’ It reveals the
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finitude of the interpretive perspective from which Being is understood, and so, in anxiety, the
finite aspect of Being itself appears. But ‘anxiety’ can appear also as pervading a social space: as
not strictly unintelligibility encountered by a particular being in its being-towards-death, but in
the imposition of unintelligibility, as, for instance and especially, terror. There is, in this case a
‘call’ not necessarily toward another mode of intelligibility, but toward uncovering the order of
oppression in its unintelligibility, in, for instance, “the way that healing can mobilize terror in
order to subvert it, not through heavenly catharses but through the tripping up of power in its
own disorderliness.”157
Michael Taussig, in his history and ethnography of the Putumayo region of Colombia,
Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man, writes that the ‘space of death’ is “preeminently a
space of transformation: through the experience of coming close to death there can come not
only a growth of self-consciousness but also fragmentation, then loss of self conforming to
authority.”158
Taussig, who takes inspiration from Walter Benjamin, examines folk mythology and
ritual in the Putumayo as responses to colonial order. He describes the local practices of
marginalized communities which manifested in response to colonialism, to terror imposed by
military dictatorships, and to exploitative capitalist economic practices, as critical revaluations
and as reconfigurations of the historical. Taussig’s description of the ‘space of death’ refers not
strictly to the anxiety of a particular being’s confrontation with being towards death; rather, it
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refers also to the ‘spaces’ in which communities are submitted continuously to extreme
oppression, to terror and the persisting specter of torture and death. And, Taussig maintains,
responses of such communities expressed in mythology and in ritual practices are not
sublimations or dissociations from the material ground of oppression, but involve critical
reinterpretations, which may, indeed, in their ‘surrealism’ and apparent disorderliness, respond
more directly to the order of the oppression to which they are responses than could other modes
of discourse.159
There are a few reasons why Taussig’s account is interesting in the context of the present
discussion: First, he examines the ‘space of death,’ of terror and oppression, as inspiring
reinterpretive (critical) responses on the part of the oppressed (this is compellingly analogous to
the relation between being towards death and reinterpretive projection, but considers death as a
social space); second, these responses have a form of not only theoretical critique, but of
idiosyncratic critical praxis. Following an account of ‘A Case of Fortune and Misfortune,’ a story
of folk healing, which demonstrates the indigenous rearticulation and reappropriation of
colonialist concepts such as ‘wildness,’ and institutions such as economic class hierarchy,
Taussig writes:
[The] magic and religious faith involved in this are neither mystical nor pragmatic,
and certainly not blind adherence to blinding doctrine. Instead, they constitute an
imageric epistemology splicing certainty with doubt, and despair with hope, in which
dreaming—in this case of poor country people—reworks the significance of imagery
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that ruling class institutions such as the Church have appropriated for the task of
colonizing utopian fantasies.160
That ‘imageric epistemology’ of folk healing ritual:
Montage: alterations, cracks, displacements, and swerves all evening long—the
sudden interruptions, always interruptions to what at first appears the order of ritual
and then later on takes on little more than an excuse of order, and then dissolves in a
battering of wave after wave of interruptedness into illusory order, mocked order,
colonial order in the looking glass.161
Taussig’s account addresses the oppositional power of the oppressed to appropriate and to mock
the practices and discourses of their oppressors, often through rearticulations of myth and ritual
praxis. The opposition of the communities that Taussig discusses takes the form of revised
practices which reinterpret the social conditions from which they emerge. ‘Implicit’ myths, such
as the ‘wild’ Indian, are objectified through practices which rearticulate and appropriate such
myths, such that their power can be disrupted.
In the folk myths and rituals examined by Taussig, the narrative order of established
colonial power is interrupted. In response to the ‘space of death,’ to the ‘social anxiety’ of terror
and oppression, the intelligibility of oppressive practices to themselves, their narrative logic and
the reality which they maintain, is challenged. The ‘imageric epistemology’ of folk myth
challenges the intelligibility of established power by disrupting its narrative power. In a series of
contradictory folk stories of ‘virginal historiography,’ in which popular icons of the Virgin Mary
are told to have been received first by the Indians, and then stolen by the Church; or brought by
the Church and stolen by Indians; or as exchanged repeatedly back-and-forth, there is
represented:
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the joke-work and semiotic play in the dreaming of popular iconography. I am
thinking here not merely of the strumming of the string of defeat and salvation that
creates multiplicity of versions concerning the Virgin, this juggling with the semiotic
of the miracle. I am also thinking of the way that the heavy tone and mystical
authority of the official voice of the past is brought down to earth and familiarized
with gentle and sometimes saucy wit. The evidence indicates that the profusion of
variation that knits and unknits a diverse reality is the work of play that deflates
systematicity—a stratagem of paroles teasing, with all their multiplicity and double
epistemologies, the pretensions of a master language not merely manifested but
claimed by ruling classes.162
Taussig sees the legitimizing myths of oppression as always open to revision and rearticulation
by those whose oppression is legitimized. In the imageric, ‘surrealist,’ folk rearticulations of the
sober myths of the Church, or of capitalism, those myths are rearranged through wit and humor.
Folk mythology, in its pluralism, contradictions, and its rapid and ongoing revision, challenges
the very notion of enduring narrative coherence.
There is, in Taussig’s account, a representation of a rapid play between understanding
and interpretation. It is inspired, likely, because the understanding which is continuously
reinterpreted is so clearly represented in a history of oppressive practices and their corresponding
legitimizing discourse. Where both oppressed and oppressors identify themselves through myths
shared by both, without access to some further ground of intelligibility, there is space at least to
play with the myths, to cut them with levity and rearrange them, and, especially, to show the
interdependence of the images of the oppressed and the oppressors.163
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Taussig’s account points to the irreducible reflexivity at the heart of sociality. It is not
only through recourse to other sources of intelligibility—to external traditions or philosophical
systems—that communities find oppositional leverage. Because the understanding of a society,
its history of practices and discourse, is sustained only as it is continuously interpreted, and
always in relation to the possibility for radical reinterpretation, there is at the ground of the social
the possibility for its self re-formation. But, to examine this reformation, we have to consider not
only the moment of interruption, but also the moment of absorption. Transformation is not
effected through the one side of the interpretive projection—the projection from—but in the dual
movement which includes the return, the revision of the understanding from which interpretation
is projected.

4. ‘Existential communitarian’ revaluation

The phenomenology of Watsuji’s dialectic of sociality is perhaps most apparent in the
example of oppositional communities. In the formation of community around an oppressed
identity for the sake of revaluating the position of that identity within a field of power
relationships, the assertion of individuality and the affirmation of community are brought
together in a single movement. There is, on one hand, the background intelligibility (the
tradition; the social field) in which an identity has first some determinate form. On the other
hand, there is the ongoing (individual) interpretive activity which sustains the form of an
identity. These two movements are mutually interdependent. They are represented
phenomenologically by the structures of understanding and interpretation. As reinterpretive
projections, opposition movements involve a communal re-formation of the ground of their own
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intelligibility—their ‘thrown’ social identity, which is ‘taken up’ and interpretively projected.
Opposition to established structures of power involves a dual movement: of critique, of
deconstruction; and of constitution: a reconstitution through opposition. The tension between
these two moments constitutes an apparent dilemma. A coherent, shared identity is the basis for
solidarity; and yet, that identity was first constructed within the oppressive structure, and so its
perpetuation threatens the perpetuation also of the power structure which the community
opposes. There are two ideal modes of discourse which correspond to these two concerns for,
first, solidarity, and second, critique: The first identifies, or constructs, a subject of discourse,
which it seeks to emancipate from oppressive structures; the second deconstructs its subject.164
These tensions within emancipatory discourse are dialectically related: Opposition involves an
ongoing process of deconstruction and reconstitution. Oppositional movements depend upon
solidarity; and yet the basis for that solidarity—the shared identity which provides a foundation
for the community—is renegotiated through the development of the movement.
An approach which supports the critical reconstitution involves the formation of what
Ann Ferguson describes as oppositional communities.165 Ferguson presents an ‘existential
communitarian’ account of the revaluation of values.
Those of us who want to challenge the presuppositions and privileges involved in
social roles that perpetuate social inequality are faced with a Nietzschean existential
choice to rebuild ourselves and our virtues . . . This starting point acknowledges that
human identities are importantly defined by our relation to the social order. Thus
164
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feminists, uppity women, and profeminist men cannot change ourselves individually
by “pulling ourselves up by our own individual bootstraps.” Instead, we will require
alternative supporting communal frameworks to deconstruct our internalized sexism,
racism, heterosexism, and class attitudes. 166
The starting point, or the material with which these communities work, can be described in
reference to Iris Young’s concept of ‘social groups:’ “A social group involves first of all an
affinity with other persons by which they identify with one another, and by which other people
identify them.” 167 Such a group is of course not yet an oppositional community: “Group affinity
. . . has the character of what Heidegger calls ‘thrownness:’ one finds oneself as a member of a
group, whose existence and relations one experiences as always already having been.”168 An
oppositional community could be defined as a social group which has ‘taken up’ its thrownness.
It has organized around the identity into which it found itself thrown, for the purpose of
revaluating that identity. It is in this process that a community collectively takes up its thrown
foundation—the category or categories by which it first found itself defined—and re-forms them
through revaluation. The community thereby becomes its own project—it projects itself by
‘taking up’ the categories into which it was first thrown and re-forming them.
Thrownness here means that one finds oneself in a ‘situation’ (with some understanding)
which was not first chosen. One appears in a world which is marked by ‘facticity:’ Living at a
certain time in history, within a particular tradition, speaking a certain language, belonging to a
class. Categories of social identity are therefore always first marked by thrownness. But, in
addition to thrownness, there is projection; one ‘has’ projects; or is a projection from the thrown
background. And so, although as existing, one cannot ever get behind the background of
166
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thrownness, one can ‘take up’ that thrown foundation as a project. This projecting contrasts with
‘falling.’ The latter describes the state in which one identifies oneself entirely with the identity in
which one has been thrown, and has not ‘taken up’ this thrown identity and ‘projected’ oneself.
Hoagland’s account of lesbian feminist communities exemplifies Ferguson’s existential
communitarianism: “From lesbian lives, I think we can find another way of approaching choice.
For from our lives we realize that nothing that exists is ours (not even a subordinate position of
service). What exists that is lesbian we’ve created out of nothing (with not even seed nor sperm
as catalyst). What exists that is lesbian exists because we’ve made it happen.”169 Ferguson
summarizes Hoagland’s position as follows: “She argues that we can transform autonomy and
community, which are values usually thought to oppose each other, into a synthesis of
autonomy-in-community, or what she calls ‘autokoeneny.’”170
But, although the valuing of community and autonomy may often be thought to be
opposed, it is certainly not only in particular types of communities that community and
autonomy are synthesized. Rather, they are always already bound together in such a way that
either exists only in reference to the other. This is the significance of Watsuji’s dialectic, and,
more generally, of the relationship between understanding and interpretation. Further, it the point
of Giddens’ account of structuration, as that from which ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ can be
abstracted.171 The types of oppositional communities described by Hoagland and Ferguson do
make apparent in a unique way the interdependence of agency and structure, or autonomy and
community. They represent the movement of thrown projection, in which an understanding—
here represented by the identity into which the members of a group find themselves thrown—is
169
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revised through reinterpretation. The group takes up its identity and re-forms it: it embraces both
‘interruption’ and ‘absorption.’
Watsuji writes: “Conscience is the call of the original totality.”172 The ‘original totality’ is
not the thrown self, but the social dialectic of community-individual:
Totality is said to arise in the negation of individuality, but it is not able to appear
through the negation of one individual alone. Individuals are the many, and the
totality as community existence arises at the point where there are many individuals
become one by forsaking their individuality. But in any totality whatsoever,
individuality is not extinguished without residue. As soon as an individual is negated,
it negates the totality so as to become an individual once more. In this way, it repeats
the movement of negation. Totality subsists only in this movement.173
This call of the conscience is not even a call for the negation of the individual for the sake of the
community. It is, rather, a call to the ‘totality’ which involves an ongoing dialectical process in
which the individual asserts herself against the community and then through this assertion is lead
back to an affirmation of community.
The social dialectic can be described here as a reconstitution of community through ‘a
project’ in which the moment of ‘individuality’ is directed back at the reconstitution, the
affirmation of, community. Oppositional communities involve the two moments of challenging
and reconstituting their own foundation: the category which serves as both the basis for their
solidarity and the subject of their revaluative process. Watsuji’s call of conscience is a call
toward not the community as it already is, but a call toward ‘the totality,’ which can be identified
with the dialectic of communal re-formation. The call of conscience is the call toward the
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ongoing revaluative process which constitutes the totality, containing the two moments of
‘deconstruction’ and ‘reconstitution.’
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Conclusion: Interpretation and Sociality

My central aim here has been to develop an account of social reflexivity, and to indicate
how this provides a space for social transformation. By describing the fundamental relation
between phenomenology, hermeneutics, and ontology, I have argued that what ‘is’ for us is as it
appears interpretively, in relation to an existing context of intelligibility—a historical tradition,
expressed in a particular social field. As this background of intelligibility (‘Being’) is produced
and sustained, as understanding, only through ongoing interpretation, it is not only always open
for revision, but is always already a process of being-revised. Interpretation is always
interpretation from a particular perspective, and this particularity is revealed to itself (Dasein) in
anxiety, which discloses finitude (as the ‘null’ disclosure of interpretation’s self-interpretation).
By the formal definition which I have given it here, anxiety, as exemplified by that which arises
in the face of death (finitude), is an interpretive movement. Anxiety does not take one outside of,
or beyond a tradition, but reveals the particularity and contingency of understanding to itself, by
indicating that understanding is sustained always interpretively. The hermeneutic significance of
the notion of anxiety is that it reveals interpretative activity to itself, not by discovering some
position beyond interpretation, but in the fundamental self-reference of interpretation. But as
interpretation is a projection from an understanding, which is always socially produced and
contextualized, authenticity is social, and indicates that which (interpretation) supports the
possibility of social transformation.

There are three distinguishable aspects of my aim in this project:
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First, in chapters one through three, I presented an interpretation of Heidegger’s Being
and Time which shows a thematic unity between the two divisions of the text (the first, with its
focus on everyday ways of being; and the second, which develops an account of ‘authenticity,’
as a distinct way of Being). As I have shown, it is by recognizing the fundamental relation
between phenomenology and hermeneutics, and identifying authenticity as interpretive, that we
discover a depth to the thematic unity of Being and Time which has perhaps been often
overlooked. My analysis of Being and Time, which constitutes the first half of this work,
establishes the ontological foundation for the second half.
Second, in reference to Watsuji’s phenomenological study, Ethics in Japan—which itself
responded to Being and Time—I have developed, in chapter four, an account of social
phenomenology with the aim of showing that sociality is, in everyday ways of being,
phenomenologically primordial (which means that interpretation is always initially socially
oriented). To this end, I have presented several case studies that examine phenomena which are
perhaps most likely to be identified as essentially private, and as indicative of the
phenomenological primordiality of individual subjectivity. I have argued that the body,
sensations in general, and emotion, are not, in everyday ways of being, ‘experienced’ as
personal, private phenomena, but are always already public, except for certain unusual and
privative modes (e.g. for a surgeon who examines a body as a ‘physiological thing’ for the sake
of performing an operation). As I suggest, Heidegger does, in Being and Time, gesture toward
the possibility for such a social phenomenology, but does not there develop it. Therefore, my
account of social phenomenology can be described as an extension of Heidegger’s thought into a
domain which he, as Watsuji rightly acknowledges, neglects. However, as I discuss in chapter
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five, Watsuji’s attempt to position ethics as first philosophy leaps over Heidegger’s hermeneutic
ontology, which Watsuji’s own account must be understood in relation to, as its foundation.
Third

, in chapter six, I return explicitly to the theoretical frame which, in my

introduction, I first established: the issues of reflexivity, genealogy, and social transformation in
Nietzsche and Foucault; further, I present the relation of my account of social reflexivity to
Mead’s social pragmatist account of reflexivity and the notion of interruption in Benjamin’s
thought; and, finally, I show how my theory of social reflexivity can provide a frame for an
analysis of the examples of: folk mythology as critique (which demonstrates, especially, the
‘interruptive’ power of social reflexivity) and oppositional communities (which express the
dialectical relationship between ‘interruption’ and ‘absorption,’ or interpretation and
understanding, and agency and structure).
My analysis of social reflexivity is intended to show how we can take sociality as a
starting point, and find there irreducible agency, as a source of novelty and social transformation
generally, and as a potential ground of opposition to normalizing discourse and practices and
oppressive social institutions. I have attempted to accomplish this by showing that what has been
identified as the ‘existentialist’ dimension of Heidegger’s thought, represented in division two of
Being and Time, which describes the individuation of Dasein and its distancing from ‘the They’
through confrontation with ‘nullity’ (in its self-reference) and ‘uncanniness’ (involving, for one
thing, the appearance that oneself and one’s world could have been other than they are, and are
permeated by apparent contingencies), and the ‘communitarian’ aspect of Being and Time, which
identifies tradition as the basis of intelligibility (of Being, of the possibility of something
appearing as something), should be identified as deeply interrelated.
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On one hand, authenticity is dependent upon tradition as the existing basis of all
intelligibility. As I have maintained, authentic Dasein is interpretation which has confronted its
own particularity; this is particularity within some historical tradition, which provides always
already an understanding of what is. The concept of authentic Dasein can be applied to any
interpretive process which projects from an encounter with its own particularity. As this
interpretive particularity is nothing other than the particularity of a position within a tradition and
social field, it is only on the basis of an existing understanding that authentic interpretation is
possible. What distinguishes authentic interpretation is not that it has freed itself somehow from
the general understanding from which it projects, but that it has projected from an understanding
of the particularity of its position within a tradition and social field. And it is only this
particularity, the specificity of an interpretive position, which supports the potential for novelty
and change through authentic interpretation.
On the other hand, tradition, or background understanding, is dependent upon ongoing
interpretation, of which authenticity is the fundamental form. There is no understanding except
that which is brought into play in particular interpretive acts. The background understanding of a
tradition subsists in no abstractable space, or ethereal realm, but in the concrete practices and
specific discursive acts which constitute a social field; and the stability of these practices, as
social structure. is sustained only through the agency of actors who constitute a society. The
ontological background for the interdependency of social structure and agency is the
hermeneutical relation between understanding and interpretation. Every social action is an
interpretive act projected from an understanding, and opens that background understanding to
revision. Social structure is nothing other than the present face of a history of agency;
understanding is the immediate form of a history of interpretive acts. The tradition, from which
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interpretation is projected, and which is opened for revision in the projection, is nothing other
than a history of such acts of interpretive revision. Authenticity, as ‘existential interpretation’—
interpretation which identifies and projects from its own interpretive particularity—reveals that
which is at the heart of that which it projects from (interpretation), and which is revised in its
own projection (understanding).

To show the depth of the significance of this interpretive ontology, and its relation to
social transformation, I extended Heidegger’s phenomenology into a robust social
phenomenology. Through an examination of Watsuji’s thought I developed an account of the
phenomenological primordiality of social ‘betweenness.’ There are two related ways that
interpretation and understanding—i.e. Being—are/is social: First, a social field, as the immediate
form of a tradition, is the basis of intelligibility (the possibility of identifying something as
something at all); Second, in everyday ways of Being, interpretation always already relates to the
others with whom one shares a social space. Heidegger thoroughly develops an account of this
first significance of sociality to Being, in his analysis of Being as phenomenological
intelligibility which is founded upon a historical tradition. But the second relation between
sociality and Being, in the ways that beings in a world always first appear as something within
social relations, is suggested but not systematically explored in Being and Time. This second
significance of sociality, which concerns the phenomenology of what Heidegger identifies as the
existential structure of ‘Being-with,’ and, for example, the publicness of equipment (and of all
worldly beings), is closely examined by Watsuji, as betweenness.
But, while Watsuji’s social phenomenology does demonstrate that the beings within a
world exist always as they are understood through social relations, and that the everyday self-
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understanding of Dasein is an understanding of itself as it is in relation to others, Watsuji
problematically neglects the foundational ontological significance of interpretation: He positions
his dialectic of sociality beyond and as the basis for interpretation. Where, in Heidegger’s
account, the foundational ontological disclosure is that of anxiety, which reveals interpretation to
itself and so indicates—in the contingent, ‘uncanny’ appearance of the world as revealed by
anxiety—reinterpretive possibilities, in Watsuji’s account the most foundational disclosure is
that of interdependence, and this, especially, of that between the individual and the community.
The issue is that Watsuji does not identify the fundamental relationship between hermeneutics
and phenomenology: his phenomenological method is not sufficiently hermeneutical, and so
terminates in something like a primordial experience (of interdependence), as the rock-bottom
phenomenological fact of existence. Anxiety, as it has been defined here, brings together
phenomenological and hermeneutical disclosure, in the not-appearing of interpretation to itself,
in the face of its own finitude (in relation to death).
The methodological problem is that Watsuji’s phenomenological account is already
interpretive, but his account of the dialectic of sociality as the foundation for interpretation
attempts to free itself from the interpretive position from which that ‘foundation’ can appear at
all. My substantial concern with this aspect of Watsuji’s approach is that it does not acknowledge
the extent to which sociality is always open to transformation and continually transformed, as it
is sustained by and expressed in interpretive acts. Therefore, Watsuji’s social dialectic should be
identified as interpretive through and through, and as corresponding, in its positing of the
interrelated ‘negative movements’ of individuality and community, to interpretation and
understanding. Watsuji’s concern that Heidegger examines only the ‘one side’ of the dialectic of
sociality is a consequence of his misidentification of Dasein as an ontical individual, rather than
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an ontological interpretive process. Dasein sustains itself as interpretive projection from a
foundation of understanding, and is therefore only as it projects from its understanding, which is
always social understanding.
In this description of the relation between interpretation and sociality, my aim has been to
show how the resources for social transformation are contained in the very heart of sociality. I
bounded my account with a discussion of Nietzsche’s riddle of reflexive reason, and Foucault’s
analytic of finitude, to indicate that the resources for social transformation will not be discovered
by looking beyond sociality, to some substantial ground (e.g. the subsisting or transcending
individual subject, or the biological) from which social relations emerge. The question which I
have asked here is: How can we identify the possibility of social transformation without recourse
to some external point of leverage by which opposition and social re-formation are supported?
My response is that sociality and interpretation are entirely bound together, and that, in
the very dilemma of its self-reference (the impossibility of getting itself fully before itself),
interpretation opens a space of potential transformation. This dilemma is anxiety, formally
defined as Dasein’s fundamental self-interpretation, or that which reveals itself to itself as an
interpreting being. It is in the face of its particularity and finitude, of death, that Dasein identifies
itself as having a specific interpretive position, which is founded upon a tradition (as Dasein is
thrown into a world) and yet is responsible for itself. Anxiety describes the foundational selfreference of interpretation—that which reveals interpretation to itself. By identifying itself as
interpretive, the otherwise potentially taken-for-granted background understanding from which
Dasein projects is colored by ‘uncanniness’ and the appearance of contingency and, therefore,
mutability. As it has been defined here, anxiety describes not, strictly, an ‘experience of anxiety,’
but, generally, interpretive self-referentiality. There are, perhaps, varied degrees and types of
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anxiety, within different interpretive domains, which share the strict formal definition of some
foundational interpretive self-reference, and support the possibility of reinterpretation within
whatever domain they appear. The importance of the concept of anxiety is that it identifies a
resource for interpretive transformation within a social domain, without recourse to an external
point of reference.
Such

interpretive self-reference objectifies and distances the act of interpreting from that

which it otherwise takes for granted as an understanding which may appear immutable.
Objectification has the phenomenological character of uncanniness: that which appears is
permeated with the character of contingency; and it is apparent that what is could be otherwise.
This is what Mead’s “I” experiences in its self-objectifying examination of itself as “me;” and it
is the appearance of history to the genealogist, who examines historical narratives with an eye
toward the influence of the accidental and the contingent. This is the gaze that interrupts, by
indicating that what may have been taken as coherent historical narrative, or as the orderly selfunderstanding of a tradition or society, is constituted by accidents and contingencies which have
been cobbled together, and paved over by an averaging of inconsistencies. But historical
narratives and social understanding are the basis of the interpretive movement which identifies
the thrownness of its own position. Interruption is possible only in relation to the interpretive
self-disclosure of interpretation projected from an understanding, which is that into which
interpretation is first ‘absorbed,’ and which is revised in the ‘interruptive’ movement of
reinterpretive projection.
The self-objectification of the “I,” as “me,” reveals to itself that there is something
always outstanding—it discloses the ek-static interpretive position which stands-out and cannot
objectify itself. Self-objectification reveals to the self that there is always something that cannot
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be objectified, because it is that which objectifies. Ontologically, this is to say that, in anxiety,
Dasein discovers that it cannot gets itself fully before itself, or ‘get behind its thrownness,’ and
so discloses to itself—as nullity—that which cannot be disclosed, which is its own projectedness.
But this, which cannot be disclosed (is unintelligible), becomes continuously only through the
ongoing interpretive revision of understanding. Therefore, the interpretive movement, which has
its foundational form in authenticity (interpretation projected from its self-interpretation in
anxiety), is always oriented back toward an understanding, which is the beginning and end of
interpretation. Authenticity has therefore always social significance, as it involves, in interpretive
projecting, the revision of the social understanding from which it projects. Authenticity means
taking up some way of Being in relation to the tradition from which and into which the authentic
interpretation is projected, and in relation to the others in a social field in relation to whom one
understands oneself.
In my discussions of Taussig’s analysis of folk mythology, and feminist oppositional
communities, I show how the preceding frame provides a resource for understanding social
opposition and transformation. Taussig’s ethnography of Colombian folk practices considers, in
relation to Benjamin’s thought, how those subjected to a history of terror and oppression can find
novel modes of objectifying and interrupting the discourses which legitimize their oppression.
My analysis of feminist oppositional communities, and Ferguson’s model of existential
communitarian opposition, indicates the dialectical complexity of the relation between
individuality and community, or, generally, social understanding and reinterpretation, revealed
by oppositional movements. Taussig’s account shows, especially, how the interruptive moment
can emerge out of the social, as a mode of objectifying self-reference; my discussion of feminist
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oppositional communities is intended to further show the relation of the interruptive moment to
the absorptive, in relation to the issue of self-reconstituting oppositional communities.

The general aim of my analysis of opposition is to demonstrate how the ontological
account developed here provides a frame for understanding social transformational process. This
analysis is intended to be meta-ethical—to describe a normative space of transformation while
leaving it significantly undefined, or without making particular normative claims about what
happens within that space. Social reinterpretive processes have always normative significance, as
they involve revised ways of understanding and acting in relation to others. But I have left open
the question of how exactly we might understand these processes to be normatively oriented, and
whether some abstract normative frame could be applied to evaluate such social transformational
processes generally. Here I can at least gesture toward the sort of normative account which might
be founded upon the meta-ethical analysis which has been developed. The following would
provide a basic foundation:
First, as Being qua intelligibility is sustained by ‘individual’ interpretative positions
(Dasein), which can uncover their own finitude and the absence of any finally determining,
essential foundation from which they project (their groundlessness), one has this interpretive
responsibility for ‘what’ and ‘how’ one is. Second, as interpretation is projected from an
understanding, one is indebted first to that understanding, which is expressed in a social field,
and discovered in one’s relations with others, as providing the social basis from which
interpretation is projected, and to which it stands always in relation.
In relation to, on one hand, an existing understanding¸ one who acknowledges that
understanding is social understanding—that Being is social, meaning that what ‘is,’ including
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oneself, can be only as it is understood in relation to others—recognizes that one’s own existence
is dependent on the existence of others. On the other hand, in relation to interpretation, one who
has identified one’s own interpretive way of Being should thereby recognize that others share
also this way of Being and capacity for reinterpretation. It is likely that interpretive openness,
and the potential fluidity of understanding, depends significantly upon a community which
recognizes its interpretive foundations, and thereby remains open to interpretive movements
within itself.
What I have defined as interpretation, in the most fundamental sense, is the ontological
foundation for agency. In Heidegger’s hermeneutical ontology, action has always an interpretive
structure within many possible levels of interpretation (e.g. from pre-ontological interpretation to
ontological Interpretation). One who has identified one’s own interpretive way of Being and
thereby recognized that others share this way of Being, should realize also that the openness of
this interpretive capacity in any individual is supported through mutually supportive recognition
of interpretive openness. This is the ontological correspondent of the ontical idea that the agency
of individuals within a society is deeply interdependent—that the extent of one’s own agency is
ultimately bound to the agency of the others with whom one shares a social space. One might,
therefore, suppose that hermeneutical openness involves something like an imperative to support
the interpretive openness of others. This would indicate that perhaps there is a contradiction of
sorts involved in (authentic) ontological interpretive projections which do not serve to support
the interpretive openness of others. The capacity for social reinterpretation could be said to
demand that the reinterpret movement be supportive of further reinterpretation. Ontically, this
would mean acting in a way that supports and extends the agency of others. If authenticity
involves interpretation’s uncovering of itself as ontological (in anxiety), along with a projected
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reinterpretation, this reinterpretive projection might be identified as bound to that which anxiety
discloses such that it ought to involve a way of Being which supports also the interpretive way of
Being of others.
An implication of this interpretive openness would be a general tolerance toward, and
even explicit support of, that which appears unintelligible. As reinterpretation involves, from the
perspective of the understanding from which the interpretation is projected, an aspect of
unintelligibility, a positive orientation toward interpretive openness must involve tolerance
towards, perhaps even a special interest in, that which appears unintelligible. Therefore, ways of
being within a social field which are not immediately or entirely intelligible in relation to the
tradition which is the background understanding of that world—that is, ways of being which do
not fit into existing categories of intelligibility—can be supported and appreciated as expressions
of the interpretive vitality of the tradition, in its mutability, which is a condition for the
possibility of the existence of the tradition.
A primary intention here has been to show that Heidegger’s Being and Time presents the
ontological foundation for a robust, and potentially radical, social philosophy. Heidegger’s
attention to the ontological significance of finitude, and the particularity of interpretive positions,
is not only not simply ‘individualistic,’ in the sense of encouraging the isolation or solipsistic
self-definition of the individual, but indeed provides a resource for social thought which looks
toward possibilities of radical social transformation. The significance of this approach is that it
provides an account of transformative potentialities which exist at the heart of sociality, without
recourse to any position beyond sociality, but in the self-reference of interpretive positions
within a social field. In other words, finitude and particularity, recognized as such, have
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revolutionary potential, and we need look no further to find the basis for the possibility of social
transformation.
Anxiety is nothing other than the appearance of finitude and particularity to itself. I have
presented anxiety here as nothing other than a potential of all interpretation—the turning back of
interpretation toward itself, and identifying itself as interpretation. In the absence of historical
teleology, a rational order which is foundational to traditions, or recourse to some substantial
position beyond or subsisting within traditions, the most foundational phenomenological
disclosure is only the anxiety of interpretation’s identification of itself, and the corresponding
realization of the contingent aspect of that which happens to be and appears such that it could
have been otherwise.
This is perhaps an unfortunate fact of social existence, that it appears not to be ordered by
any rational teleology. As Sartre suggests that the existentialist is embarrassed by the absence of
God, the social philosopher concerned with transformation might well be embarrassed by the
absence of historical teleology. Yet, this embarrassment is only one side of, or one possible
response to, a revelation which discloses the openness of sociality to transformation. The other
side of this embarrassment is the individual’s sense of responsibility for her ongoing
interpretation of the social field—for her way of Being, which is always already affirming or
rejecting particular social norms. I have attempted here to describe the phenomenology of this
responsibility, in reference to anxiety, and identify it as a resource for social transformation.
There remains, further, the question of what general normative form this responsibility might
take—of how social transformational process are to be guided in reference to particular norms. I
have suggested briefly the direction that such a normative account might have, but it remains
here undeveloped. My intention has been to describe the ontological space in which social
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transformational processes take place. What I have maintained is that the finitude and
particularity of the positions from which Being is understood and interpreted provide in their
self-disclosure (anxiety) a groundless ground upon which reinterpretive projections—socially
transformative processes—are projected.

However, following the very general normative criteria identified above, in relation to the
moments of interpretation and understanding, social movements specifically can be evaluated in
reference to their ‘authenticity.’ There are three general criteria which could be suggested for
evaluating social movements in relation to the hermeneutic social phenomenology presented
here: First, the self-recognition of a movement as interpretive—that is, without recourse to a
finally fixed and essentialized ground as providing the content for its projection (with a
corresponding avoidance of epistemic authoritarianism). Second, the recognition of the sociality
of understanding—the identification of the social ground for the interpretive projection, and an
acknowledgment of the relation back to this understanding, as transformed through the
interpretive movement. Third, as a synthesis and extension of the preceding two criteria, the
transformation of understanding such that it does not constrain or cover the interpretive capacity
which transformed it (not interpreting such that the interpretation is itself covered).
This means that the (interpretively) authentic social movement is one which understands
itself as transforming existing order, and as having this capacity not because of any essential
discovery which it has made about itself (e.g. about its history, as fixed and determining of what
it is and ought to be), but through a recognition of its ‘thrownness’—the situation in which it
finds itself—and which it cannot ‘get behind,’ but must relate to interpretively. And, because its
own projection is supported by its ‘anxious’ discovery of its interpretive finitude (nullity,
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groundlessness), it should not project in such a way that it covers that which provided the
possibility for its own existence (interpretive particularity). In relation to the point above,
regarding the interpretive responsibility to support others in their own interpretive authenticity,
the corresponding point here is that the authentic social movement develops such that it
continuously supports its own interpretive openness. Again, in ontic terms, this means that, as the
movement is dependent upon its own agency, it should be directed toward sustaining and
extending agency.
But such commitment to expanding agency cannot involve a straightforward privileging
of individuality over community—to do so ignores their dialectic interdependence (and is likely
to fail to extend agency, in failing to recognize that agency exists only in relation to, is made
possible by, particular social practices). As has been maintained here, ‘individuality’ and
‘community’ are ontical in relation to ontological interpretation and understanding, to which they
correspond. What the individual finds herself to be (encounters herself as), fundamentally, is (in
anxiety—interpretive self-reference) her finitude and particularity as an interpreting being, from
which Being is understood in a certain way. But this means that what it is to be an individual is
to be thrown into some particular understanding (a tradition, a social world), which itself exists
only as the history of ongoing interpreting, sustained by individual interpretive perspectives, and
which is therefore revised along with the individual’s reinterpreting. This corresponds to the
‘dual movement’ of human Being (betweenness) described by Watsuji, as involving a back-andforth movement between individuality and community—which are really ‘one movement’
because either can be described as the movement of the other: the community transforms itself
through the assertion of individual members over against the community; the individual
transforms herself in the affirmation of community.
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As it recognizes the interdependent relationship between interpretation and
understanding, the authentic social movement ought not give priority to either individuality or
community. Opposition movements which aim to transform existing social conditions can be
engaged in a reformation of the categories of identity, such that, for instance, what constitutes an
intelligible member of a community is revised. This cannot involve a simple assertion of
individuality, because, for one, this presupposes some certain and conclusive notion of the
ontical individual (which was defined in advance by the very pre-understanding which is to be
opened for revision); and, second, because the understanding which would be revised in such an
assertion is social understanding, maintained by a community. In the assertion of individuality,
there is, therefore, already reference to the community and its norms, to which the appeal or
opposition is directed, and which the assertion seeks to modify.
The authentic social movement is one which is an expression of hermeneutic reflexivity,
both in the ontological sense of identifying its own interpretive foundation, and the relation
between interpretation and understanding; and in the ontical sense of identifying the
corresponding dialectical relationship between individuality and community. Such a movement
aims toward an expansion of interpretive openness generally: it does not cover itself (qua
interpretation) with a fixed understanding of what it is (e.g. a static notion of its own identity
category), and it holds itself responsible therefore for recognizing the interpretive capacity of
others. Unlike some notions of freedom, such a concept of interpretive openness cannot be
opposed to the situation—the tradition and social world—in which it is found; rather, it is only
possible as a projection from that situation. It is therefore in the dual recognition of interpretation
and the understanding from which it is projected that social conditions can be transformed. A
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movement which is oriented toward a recognition and expansion of interpretive openness cannot
give final priority to either the individual or the community.

My account of social movements is intended first to indicate how the ontological analysis
that preceded it can provide a novel way of understanding social transformation. Here I have
suggested also some criteria, derived from my ontological analysis, that support the normative
evaluation of social movements. It is of course not the case that a social movement must
understand itself conceptually in the terms presented here, to be considered ‘authentic.’174
Though its self understanding need not explicitly involve the conceptual frame presented here, a
movement can be evaluated on the basis of: its interpretive openness, or epistemic closure (its
reference to fixed and essentialized concepts); to its acknowledgment of the provisionality of
whatever particular concepts provide its guidance, or its epistemic authoritarianism; to its
recognition of and openness to dialogue with alternative perspectives (especially those which are
not entirely within its frames of intelligibility); to its acknowledgment of the background
understanding which is the basis for its own interpretive projection, and is to be opened for
revision; and, finally, especially, a movement can be evaluated on the basis of the extent to
which it is motivated by and apparently moving towards a general expansion of interpretive
openness (this, in reference to the extent to which, on one hand, it avoids covering its own
174

Regarding the self understanding of social movements, it can be emphasized here further that the suggested
normative criteria for examining social movements are by no means intended to preclude the development of
specific goals or norms in relation to which a movement orients itself. As a very general analysis of the self
understanding of social movements, I am here describing only what a social movement’s appropriate relationship to
its own aims might be, and that is as responses to the specific situation in which the movement finds itself. The
‘interpretive’ process is even arrested by the absence of commitment generally, as it is perverted by conclusions
which are taken as complete, fixed, or as finally beyond the interpretation from which they emerged. (This
corresponds to Watsuji’s discussion of the two ways that the movements of sociality can be halted: at the point of
community which eclipses individuality entirely, or at that of the assertion of individuality which leads not to a
reaffirmation of community.) The emphasis here is that the ‘authenticity’ of a movement depends on its
acknowledgment of its responsibility for the particular norms and aims by which it directs itself, which are
maintained as they are continuously valued.
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interpretive foundation with a fixed understanding, and on the other hand—but necessarily at the
same time—it recognizes and respects the interpretive openness of others).
Asi

de from offering a frame for evaluating social movements, the account presented here

suggests conceptual tools that could be taken up explicitly by social movements. Though a full
development of the implications and practical applicability of this approach is beyond the scope
of this conclusion, this project is intended to provide support for critical reflexivity directed at
the revision of existing social practices and discourse. For those who, for instance, take seriously
Foucault’s genealogical accounts of the development of oppressive and normalizing social
practices, and seek to identify a theoretical background to support opposition movements, I have
suggested that it is necessary to find some ground for opposition to that which has been
historically constituted precisely in the heart of the historically constituted. I have offered, as an
analysis of that ground, an account of Being and Time which identifies, at the center of sociality,
as constituted by the historical descent of a tradition, irreducible interpretive openness. Though I
have attempted here to constrain my focus mostly to the ontological dimensions of the
phenomena of interpretation and sociality, this is least of all because I am concerned foremost
with presenting an account which remains socially disengaged, or disinterested. Indeed, this
analysis is intended as a direct challenge to the modus operandi of discourses and practices
which normalize, which devalue the incompletely intelligible, and which support oppression and
domination by covering their interpretive foundations, and presenting themselves as the essential
and the ‘taken for granted’ foundation of the social. To summarize my ontological approach:
Being is as it is interpreted and interpretation is always social. Therefore, also, Being is always
social Being, and sociality is interpretive. An understanding of the relationship between
interpretation and sociality, between hermeneutics and (social) phenomenology, provides a basis
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for opposition to oppression sustained by historically-constituted traditions, without recourse to
some position beyond that which is historically-constituted; additionally, such an account is
already fundamentally opposed to the forms of opposition which cover their contingent
background with an appearance of necessity, inevitability, or in being entirely taken for granted.
I have attempted to develop an account of social relatedness that opposes orientations that
give priority to individual subjectivity, yet without describing the individual as defined in a
straightforward way by the community. In this analysis of ontology as hermeneutic social
phenomenology, my intent has been to describe the ontological foundation for individuality and
community, and to show that this foundation—as interpretive—challenges a straightforwardly
communitarian understanding of social existence. The social understanding which provides the
basis for intelligibility was formed interpretively over time, is maintained in practices and
discourse only as it is continuously interpreted, and is open always to significant reinterpretation.
Such interpretive activity is the ontological basis for individuality. ‘Authentic’ interpretation is
the fundamental and exemplary interpretive mode. This approach is intended to provide a frame
for understanding social existence generally and for describing social movements. Further, as I
have discussed in this conclusion, certain normative criteria for evaluating social phenomena
could be derived from this ontological account. Even without specifically defined criteria, my
approach here is generally and fundamentally opposed to an important dimension of oppressive
discourse and practices: interpretation’s self-covering, in which a certain understanding is taken
for granted as immutable or necessary. The everyday starting point of understanding in general is
social relatedness, but the social relations are open always and fundamentally to change, and this
significantly to the extent that the essential mutability of those relations is recognized.
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